concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part">Justice NOBLE,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that Appellee McBride had a duty to at least instigate an inquiry about proper registration procedures in Kentucky. Before he can effectively take all the steps required by the registration statute, KRS 17.510, officials must first know that the convicted sex offender has moved to Kentucky. And while the interstate compact may end up sending that information to Kentucky, this fact is certainly known by the convicted offender, whereas officials have little or no ability to ascertain it independently. Add to that the fact that Appellee had a sex offender identification card from another state which indicated his knowledge of a registration requirement, and it is apparent that the offender should, and does, have the burden of going forward with notice to the state where he has relocated. In fact, the statute now specifically requires it, though it was a reasonable burden before the latest amendment.

Where I depart from the majority is with its view that Appellee is subject to a felony charge for his failure to notify proper authorities of his relocation to Kentucky. Under the current version of the statute, and the one in place in 1998, convicted sex offenders are required to register with the appropriate authorities after their release from confinement (Within ten days in 1998; five days after 2000). Thereafter, if their residence address changes, they must register where they then reside. In 1998, the failure to register was a Class A misdemeanor offense. Since April 11, 2000, it has been a Class D felony offense.

In 2003, this Court held in Peterson v. Shake, 120 S.W.3d 707 (Ky.2003) that where an offender was released from prison and registered as a sex offender before the 2000 version of KRS 17.510 became effective, the offender was subject to the earlier version of the statute which set the penalty for a violation of the statute as a Class A misdemeanor. Peterson had registered as a sex offender in 1999, on his release from custody. However, in 2001, Peterson relocated without notifying authorities of his new address. He was charged with failure to register, as a Class D felony, which was the penalty in the version of the statute then in effect. He sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from proceeding with a felony trial against him, claiming that he had already registered prior to enactment of this penalty, and that while he had violated the statute by failing to re-register when he moved, he could only be charged with a misdemeanor, the penalty in effect when he was released from custody and initially registered. This Court agreed with him, and issued the writ declaring that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to proceed against Peterson absent a felony charge to which the failure to register could be pendent.

*809In its reasoning, this Court pointed out that Peterson could not “become” a registrant, because he already was one, and that the plain language of the 2000 amendment made it clear that it was intended to apply to new registrants, not those who had already been registered. The fact that Peterson was a violator under the present version of the statute did not mean that the penalty could be changed because he had secured his release before the current version of the statute was enacted. To further clarify, I would say that the primary question is whether one already is a registrant versus if one is just re-registering in a new place.

The 1998 version of the statute, which applies to Appellee as it applied to Peterson, carried a Class A misdemeanor penalty, and required a person moving to this state to register if the person was “required to register as a sex offender under ... the laws of another state.... ” The prefatory language, “required to register as a sex offender under ... the laws of another state,” proves the obvious: that Appellee was already a registrant. The only difference between him and Peterson is that Peterson first registered in Kentucky, while Appellee first registered in Tennessee. As the record makes equally obvious, it is not difficult to determine the date when Appellee was released from confinement and registered in Tennessee. There is nothing in the statute that requires a registrant from another state to be treated differently than a registrant from Kentucky, nor could such be supportable under federal constitutional principles.

ABRAMSON, J., and Special Justice JEFFREY C. MANDO, join.

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