Volume 282 — Federal Reporter

Action by the Goldwyn Pictures Corporation against the Howells Sales Company, Inc., and others. Prom an order granting an injunction pendente lite, defendants appeal.

In the matter of the Hub Carpet Company, bankrupt. From an order or decree, Wallace Benedict, as receiver, appeals. Certiorari granted 258 U. S.-, 42 Sup. Ct. 591, 66 L. Ed.-.

Suit by the Ransome Concrete Machinery Company against Robert R. Moody to set aside an alleged contract of employment with counterclaim by defendant for breach of the contract. Decree for defendant, and plaintiff appeals and brings error. Plaintiff’s business apparently consisted in the manufacture of concrete machinery.

Morton, Judge. In the matter of the Winnisimmet Shipyard, Inc., alleged bankrupt. From a decree dismissing the petition on motion of Edmund K. Arnold and others, the E. B. Badger Company and others, petitioners, appeal.

„ ' Action at law by James Gallagher against the Netherlands American Steam Navigation Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries, and negligence is charged against the plaintiff in error, hereinafter called the defendant. Judgment has been obtained against it in the sum'of $5,000.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Waterloo Creamery Company and others--against the National Bank of Commerce of Toledo, Ohio, and others. On motion to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United' States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; J. W. Whitaker Thompson, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by.Clarence A. Krouse against the International Glass Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Payment <§=>74(1)—Bill of lading marked “Freight prepaid” conclusive of payment, in absence of charge and proof of fraud or mistake.</p> <p>That on delivery of goods to a vessel for carriage, freight on which was required to be prepaid, the carrier delivered a bill of lading stamped “Freight prepaid,” accepting from the shipper’s agent, knowing who the principal was, the agent’s duebill, is evidence of payment of the freight, conclusive in the absence of charge and proof by the carrier of mistake or fraud in the transaction.</p>

Libel in admiralty by the Niles-Bement-Pond 'Company against the Dampkiesaktieselskabet Balto, in which the Ocean Transportation Corporation was impleaded under the fifty-sixth rule in- admiralty. From a decree giving it insufficient relief, libelant appeals.

<p>Shipping <§=»207—-Launch owner’s liability held limited to value of launch.</p> <p>Where owner of steam launch stated to captain of scow, transporting material with which to make a fill up a creek, “This little launch is able in good weather to take you up; if my launch is disengaged, you may call my launchman,” and the scow was injured while being towed by the launch, when struck broadside by wind and tide, carrying scow to other side of channel, where she struck on a rock and was stranded, the liability of the launch owner was limited to the value of the launch, under Kev. St. § 4283 (Comp. St. § 8021), in the absence of a showing that the launchman was incompetent.</p>

<p>Collision <@=95(7)—Tow’s tug and colliding steamer both in fault.</p> <p>In collision between a high light barge, being towed on long hawsers by a tug upstream from a slip, and a steam lighter backing from the slip above, the barge and tug being moved towards the pier ends by the prevailing wind when the tug turned upstream, held-, both tug and lighter were at fault; the tug in not giving signals of its movement and in not having a lookout, and the lighter because of delay of its lookout in reporting presence of the tow.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri; Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge.</p> <p>David Bram, alias Alfred Phillips, was convicted of violating the</p> <p>Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, and he brings error.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the Woodlawn Farm Dairy Company against the Erie Railroad Company. On motion to strike off counterclaim.</p>

<p>!. Taxation <@=^608 (5)—Equity has jurisdiction to grant relief against excessive assessment.</p> <p>Where property is assessed as an entirety, and there has been an overvaluation arising from the adoption of a rule in conflict with constitutional or statutory direction, there is no remedy at common law by paying tbe tax and suing for recovery of the excessive portion, and equity has jurisdiction to restrain collection of such excess.</p> <p>2. Taxation <@=3608(5)—Grounds of Injunction to restrain collection of tax as ex-</p> <p>cessive.</p> <p>To entitle a property owner to an injunction to restrain collection of taxes on the ground of excessive or discriminatory assessment, where complainant’s property was assessed at actual value as required by statute, it must be shown, not only that other property generally was assessed at a lower valuation, but that such undervaluation was intentional and systematic.</p> <p>3. Municipal corporations <@=>979—Preliminary injunction granted to restrain col-</p> <p>lection of excessive taxes by city.</p> <p>Temporary injunctions granted, restraining collection of.a portion of the taxes levied by a city on public utilities, based on an assessment by a state board at full market value, where other property in the city, assessed by a different tribunal, was intentionally and systematically given a valuation which did not in fact exceed 75 per cent, of its cash value.</p>

<p>Clerks of courts <S=»54—Not entitled to commission on Liberty Bonds deposited as bail.</p> <p>Under Revenue Act 1919, § 1320 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3301a), authorizing deposit of Liberty Bonds as bail, and providing that, when security is no longer necessary, “such bonds so deposited shall be returned to the depositor,” on such return the clerli is not entitled to exact a fee of 1 per cent., under Rev. St. § 828 (Comp. St. § 1383), as for “receiving, keeping, and paying out money.”</p>

At Law. Mandamus by W. A. Starnes against J. T. Rose, Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Georgia. A mandamus is brought to require the registration under section 1 of the Harrison Narcotic Act (Comp. St. § 6287g) of a physician licensed to practice under the Georgia laws; registration having been refused or suspended by the collector on the sole ground that two indictments were pending for trial against the applicant, charging offenses against said act.

<p>1. Constitutional law <3=290(3)—Drains <®=2( I)—Drainage statute, providing for general notice before establishment of drain and for hearing on question of benefits, held not unconstitutional as denying due process.</p> <p>The South Dakota drainage statute (Bev. Code S. D. 1919, § 8458 et seq.), which provides for general notice to all persons affected to show cause why proposed drainage district should not he established, and for notice and hearing on the question of benefits, at which any landowner may contest the amount of benefits or deny the existence of any benefits, does not violate Const. IT. S. Amend. 14, as to due process. ■</p> <p>2. Courts <3=282(3)—Suits attacking drainage assessment on constitutional grounds within the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>Suits attacking drainage ditch assessments as violative of the Constitution of the United States, and each involving an amount in excess of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, were within the jurisdiction of the federal District Court.</p> <p>3. Courts <3=263—When real and substantial question under federal Constitution involved, court may decide all questions involved.</p> <p>Where bills involve a real and substantial question under the Constitution of the United States, the jurisdiction of a federal court extends to every question involved, whether of federal or state law.</p> <p>4. Courts <3=262(2)—Remedy in federal court necessary to defeat suit in equity.</p> <p>Where diverse citizenship exists, the remedy at law which will prevent the bringing of a suit in a federal court of equity must be a remedy on the law side of the federal court, and not a remedy in the state courts.</p> <p>5. Drains <3=7!—County commissioners held without authority to take in new</p> <p>lands not benefited in assessing cost of repairs and maintenance. .</p> <p>Where drainage ditches duly established under the South Dakota laws for the drainage of agricultural lands had become clogged in places and too narrow in others, and because of the inefficient manner of their construction a river into which they emptied was threatening to wash away large areas of land and change its course into a new channel, the duty of the county commissioners was to clean and maintain the ditches, under Rev. Code S. D. 1919, § 8470, and they had no power, by pretending to abandon the ditches and establish a new ditch on the same location, without in fact abandoning anything except the spillway, to assess a part of the costs of the maintenance and repairs on lands outside the original drainage districts and in no way benefited by the drainage thereby provided.</p> <p>S. Drains <3=70—Statute held not to authorize abandonment of ditch for purpose of including additional territory in making assessment for repair and maintenance.</p> <p>Rev. Code S. D. 1919, § 8489, providing for the abandonment of a ■ drainage ditch and the re-establishment of a ditch over the same territory, where proceedings to establish a ditch have been enjoined, vacated, or set aside, did not authorize county commissioners to abandon ditches constructed and in use, and to establish a new ditch on the same location for the purpose of including additional territory in assessing the costs of repairs and maintenance.</p> <p>7. Constitutional law <@=>233—Equal protection of the laws denied by making assessment on different basis than other property.</p> <p>A city and railway and power companies, whose property was subjected to a drainage ditch assessment, were denied the equal.protection of the. laws, where their property was not assessed on the. same basis as farm lands, and could not be assessed, on any reasonable basis, the amount which was assessed.</p> <p>8 Drains <@=>52—Duty to repair embraces duty to repair break in bank of river, etc., due to drainage ditches.</p> <p>The duty to maintain drainage ditches under the South Dakota laws involves the duty to repair a break in the banks of a river, due to the inefficient manner in which the ditches were constructed, and to prevent water naturally flowing in the river from being taken therefrom.</p> <p>8. Constitutional law <@=>29—Provision for drainage districts for any public use held not seif-executing.</p> <p>The provision of Const. S. D. art. 21, § 6, that the Legislature may pro- . vide for the organization of drainage districts for the drainage of agricultural lands, and “for the drainage of lands for any public use,” is not self-executing, in the absence of legislation providing for drainage, except drainage of agricultural lands.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit for infringement of a patent by the Grasselli Chemical Company against the National Aniline & Chemical Company, Inc. On defendant’s objection to certain interrogatories propounded by plaintiff to it.</p> <p>The suit was upon two patents for chemical processes, and the interrogatories were directed toward learning whether the defendant had practiced the processes described in the claims. The prayer asked for treble damages, as is usual in such cases. The defendant answered, denying infringement. The interrogatories are 15 in number, and ask whether the defendant has made the product of the processes, and, if so, whether in so doing it has used different elements mentioned in the claims, but never the process as a whole. The defendant objects, first, because the suit is for a penalty; and, second, that the disclosure 'should be limited to the processes as a whole, though it has in effect answered such by the denial of infringement.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Grand Aerie, Fraternal Order of Eagles, against W. H. Buck and others. The constitution and laws of the Fraternal Order of Eagles provide that on abandonment or revocation of the charter granted to a subordinate aerie any property acquired and held by it shall become the property of the Grand Aerie. Lake Park Aerie operated under such a charter and acquired title to certain real estate.

<p>Bankruptcy @=>396(3)—Life insurance policy held not exempt.</p> <p>Under Gen. St. Fla. 1906, § 3154, providing that, whenever any person shall die leaving insurance on his life, insurance shall inure exclusively to the benefit of beneficiaries, and that the proceeds shall not- be liable to attachment or any legal process in favor of any creditor of the insured, an insurance policy was not exempt in bankruptcy proceedings against the insured; the statute having reference merely to the disposition of the proceeds after the insured’s death.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota; Page Morris, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Flathead County State Bank against the First National Bank of Caledonia. Judgment on a directed verdict for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>Í. Patents <§=>328—945,649 and 944,722, for tiro protectors, not Infringed.</p> <p>The Warring Patent, No. 945,649, for a tire protector built up of plies of fabric compressed and vulcanized and then coated with quick vulcanizing cement, and the Eshelman patent, No. 944,722, for an inner liner semi-cured by vulcanizing, held not infringed by defendants’ use of a quick vulcanizing cement and by their treatment of their inner tire, claimed to be the same as plaintiff’s semieuring.</p> <p>2. Patents <$=>312(3)—Evidence held insufficient to show vulcanization by use. Evidence in suit for infringing a patent for tire protectors held insufficient to show that vulcanization could or did take place, as claimed, as a result of the heat generated by the use of the tire.</p> <p>3. Patents <§=>328—1,137,064, for inner tire, not infringed. The Krichbaum patent, No. 1,137,064, for an inner tire with one of the edges secured by wire ring or band and the other intended to overlap and interlock with it, held to be given a narrow construction, in view of the prior art, and, so construed, not infringed.</p>

Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. Suit by the Corona Typewriter Company against the Fox Ti>pewriter Company. Judgment granting plaintiff partial relief, and both parties appeal.

Action by William A. Higgins and another against the California Prune & Apricot Growers, Inc. Decree of dismissal, and plaintiffs appeal. The California Prune & Apricot Growers, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of California, and is hereinafter referred to as the California corporation. It is engaged in the business of selling California dried fruits.

<p>I. Intoxicating liquors <©=»236(4)—-Evidence claimed to show offense under business name held not to support conviction of second defendant.</p> <p>Evidence claimed to show that S. N. manufactured and possessed vessels intended for use in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor at a factory building bearing the sign “S. N. & Son” did not support a conviction of H. N.„ without evidence that S. N. had only the one son. or that he even had a son, or that the business name was not a trade-name or the name of a corporation.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <@=>20—Proof of intention essential, unless otherwise provided by statute.</p> <p>Unless otherwise provided by statute, one cannot be convicted of crime without proof of an intention to commit a crime.</p> <p>3. Intoxicating liquors <@=>236(5)—No presumption that possession of vessel capable of use as part of still is unlawful.</p> <p>National Prohibition Law, tit. 2, § 18, making it unlawful to manufacture or possess for sale any vessel, etc., designed or intended for use in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, creates no presumption that the possession of a vessel that might be used as a still, or part of a still, is unlawful.</p> <p>4. Intoxicating liquors <@=>131—Manufacture of vessel usable as part of still must be with specific wrongful intent.</p> <p>Under National Prohibition Law, tit. 2, § 18, the act of manufacturing a vessel capable of being used as part of a still must be coupled with the specific intent to do the wrong denounced in the statute, before defendant is guilty!</p> <p>5. Intoxicating liquors <@=>236(19)—Intent to manufacture vessel for prohibited purpose must be shown.</p> <p>Under National Prohibition Law, tit. 2, § 18, the wrongful intent in manufacturing a vessel capable of being used as part of a still must be proved as an independent fact, or circumstances established from which it woujd be proper to permit a jury to find such intent.</p> <p>6. Intoxicating liquors <@=>236(19)—Evidence insufficient to show wrongful intent in manufacturing copper vessel.</p> <p>In a prosecution under National Prohibition Law, tit. 2, § 18, evidence helé insufficient to show an intent to manufacture stills for use in the unlawful manufacture of liquor, in manufacturing copper vessels capable of being used as part of a still.</p> <p>7. Criminal law <@=>753(2)—Verdicts should be directed, unless there Is evidence of facts excluding every hypothesis but guilt.</p> <p>Unless there is substantial evidence of facts which exclude every other hypothesis but that of guilt, it is the duty of the trial judge to direct a verdict for accused.</p> <p>8. Criminal law <@=>l 159(2)— Judgment reversed when evidence consistent with innocence.</p> <p>Where all the substantial evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt, it is the duty of an appellate court to reverse a judgment of conviction.</p> <p>9. Intoxicating liquors <@=>242— Imprisonment held not authorized on first conviction.</p> <p>Under National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, §§ 18, 29, one convicted of manufacturing and possessing for sale vessels, etc., designed or intended for use in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor as a first offense cannot be punished by imprisonment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas; Jacob Trieber, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by E. A. Rolfe and R. L. Pettus, trustees, against John R. Coates and others, with cross-suit by Genevieve Pettus West and another against John R. Coates and another, consolidated with a suit by John R. Coates, Jr., and another against Stuart Pettus and others. From the decree rendered, E. A. Rolfe and R. L. Pettus, trustees, and others, appeal.</p>

<p>1. Public lands <@=3143—State land' commissioner’s jurisdiction did not extend to adjudicating title to island previously granted to levee district.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of the commissioner of state lands, under Act Arle. March 21, 1917, §§ 1, 5 (Acts 1917, pp. 1468, 1470 [Crawford & Moses’ Dig. §§ 6796, 6800]), declaring islands formed in navigable waters of the state, since its admission to the Union, to be its property and subject to sale, and providing that said commissioner shall determine preferential rights, did not extend to adjudicating title to such an island, which the state had previously granted to a levee district, and which it had quitclaimed.</p> <p>2. Levees and flood control <§=32-—Grant to levee district not repealed by statute declaring islands state property.</p> <p>Act Ark. March 21,1017, § 1 (Acts 1917, p. 1468 [Crawford & Moses’ Dig. § 6796]), declaring all islands formed in navigable rivers of the state after its admission into the Union to be the property of the state, and subject to sale, was not intended to repeal Act Ark. March 29, 1893, so far as any such island was included in the grant thereby to a levee district of all lands of the state within the district.</p> <p>3. Levees and flood control <§=?7—District and grant held to extend to middle of Mississippi river.</p> <p>The levee district created by Act Ark. Feb. 15,1893 (Acts 1893, p. 24), as amended by Act Mareb 21, 1893 (Acts 1S93, p. 119), giving its boundaries; placing its east meander line “along the right bank of the Mississippi river,” and providing that it shall contain “all that area which has * * * at any time * * * overflowed by waters of the Mississippi river,” had for its eastern boundary the middle of said river, so that an island in that part of the river, formed after admission of the state and belonging to the state, was included in the grant by Act Ark. March 29, 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 172), to the district of all the lands of the state within the district.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas; Jacob Trieber, Judge.</p> <p>Ben Murry and Joe Williams were convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States by having possession of intoxicating liquors and of transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act, and they bring error.</p>

<p>1. Courts <@=>366(19)—Determination of homestead exemption rights goveraed by statutes and decisions of states.</p> <p>The determination of homestead exemption rights in the federal courts is governed by the statutes and decisions of the states.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <@=>399(1)— Bankrupt’s representations before bankruptcy held not to estop him from claiming property exempt as homestead.</p> <p>Where property was selected by the bankrupt, with the intention of exempting and using it as a homestead, and the property possessed all of the qualifications of a homestead under the state statutes, the bankrupt was not estopped to claim such property as a homestead by the fact that he had, before bankruptcy, designated other property as his homestead in financial statements, and had procured credit on statements that property sought to be exempted in bankruptcy was not so claimed, where his wife had not joined in such representations.</p>

<p>1. Patents <@=>328—Reissue 14,316, for a belt buckle, valid and infringed.</p> <p>The Ballou reissue patent, No. 14,316, for a belt buckle, while the elements are old, is for a true combination which has utility and discloses invention. Claims 1, 3, and 4 held valid and infringed, and claim 2 invalid.</p> <p>2. Patents <§=l 12(3)—Deliberate decision of Patent Office entitled to weight.</p> <p>The action of the Patent Office in granting a patent for a combination, after considering objections of anticipation and aggregation, while not controlling, is entitled to weight, when the same defenses are presented to a court in an infringement suit.</p>

<p>1. Judgment <§=>675(1)—When persons, not parties, contributing to defense are concluded.</p> <p>While one who, for his own interest, joins in the defense of a suit to which he is not a party of record, with the knowledge of the adverse party, is concluded by the judgment therein, his mere contribution to the cost of the defense, without any right to participate in the conduct or control of such defense, is not sufficient' to make him a privy or render the judgment binding on him.</p> <p>:2-.Judgment <§=>580, 581—Pendency of proceedings for reversal does not affect bar; reversed judgment not bar.</p> <p>While the mere pendency of proceedings to review a judgment does not affect its admissibility or effect as the basis of an estoppel claimed in a later suit, its subsequent vacation by the court rendering it, or its reversal by an appellate court, would render it nugatory, and subject any other judgment based thereon to similar vacation or reversal.</p> <p>3. Jury <§=>12(5)—Issues of fact raised by plea of res judicata triable by jury.</p> <p>The defense of res judicata, based on the claim that defendant, while not a party of record, contributed to the defense of the action in which the prior judgment was rendered, raises issues of fact on which defendant is entitled to a trial by jury.</p>

In Admiralty. Suit for collision by James A. Potter and others, owners of the gas lighter Providence, against the steamship Georgia, and by James A. Potter, administrator of the estate of Manuel Williams, deceased, against the Hartford & New York Transportation Company.

<p>1. Master and servant <§=>69—Labor Board is a body corporate, and may sue and be sued.</p> <p>The Labor Board, created by Transportation Act 1'920, tit. 3, is a body corporate, subject to the jurisdiction of federal courts, and may sue and be sued.</p> <p>2. Master and servant <§=>69—Labor Board held only authorized to hear disputes on failure of conference to agree and reference by parties jointly.</p> <p>Under Transportation Act 1920, § 301, it was intended that disputes between carriers and their employees should be considered, and if possible decided, by conference solely between the carrier and representatives of the employees, and the only power given the Labor Board under that section is to hear and decide a dispute which the conferees are unable to decide, and then only in the event that the parties jointly refer the matter to the board.</p> <p>3. Master and servant <§=>69—Labor Board not authorized to intervene in conference proceedings prior to reference of dispute.</p> <p>Under Transportation Act 1920, § 301, providing for conferences for the adjustment of disputes between carriers and their employees, the Labor Board is without power to intervene in the proceedings preceding a reference of the dispute to it by the parties jointly, except that under section 307 it may suspend the operation of a , decision making a readjustment of rates necessary.</p> <p>4. Master and servant <§=>69—Labor Board cannot control or direct method of selecting employees’ conference representatives.</p> <p>Transportation Act 1920, § 308 (4), authorizing the Labor Board to make necessary regulations for the efficient execution of the functions vested in it, gives it no right to direct or control the method of selecting persons to represent employees in conferences with employer under section 301.</p> <p>5. Master and servant <§=369—Labor Board’s decisions on disputes not submitted are advisory.</p> <p>Under Transportation Act 1920, § 307, the decisions of the Labor Board as to matters other than those submitted to it by the parties jointly under section 301 are advisory only.</p> <p>6. Commerce <§=33—Constitutional law <§=>89(4), 275(2)—Master and servant <§=> 69—Act providing for federal Labor Board held valid.</p> <p>Transportation Act 1920, tit. 3, authorizing the Labor Board to ascertain just and reasonable wages and working conditions, is within the power of Congress under its power to regulate interstate commerce, and does not violate the right of private contract, or take property without due process of law, in violation of Const. Amend. 5.</p>

Page, Judge. Suit by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company against the United States Railroad Labor Board and its members. From a decree granting an injunction, defendants appeal.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Puget Sound Power & Light Company against the City of Seattle and others.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Boston Confectionery Company, bankrupt. On review of the referee’s disallowance of claims. Claimant allowed to prove on direct notes.

<p>I. Towage <®=»14—Notice of Director General of Railroads to vessel owner that towing would thereafter be done at risk of tow, and owner’s refusal to accept such terms, h'eld not to constitute contract.</p> <p>Where Director General of' Railroads notified owner of vessels that all towing would thereafter be done at the risk of the tow, and the owner in reply stated that it would refuse to accept such terms, but would reserve the right to continue to report vessels for towing under the same conditions that had previously prevailed in reference to the responsibility for damage, and that if the Director General accepted the orders to tow vessels it would do so on the same terms and conditions that had theretofore prevailed, there was no contract between the parties as to the terms on which the vessels would be towed.</p> <p>2. Contracts <®=»27—One who avails himself of services by necessary implication assents to terms'on which services were rendered.</p> <p>One who, unlike a common carrier, has a right to refuse to render services, may render them on any terms he chooses, and any one who avails himself of the services by necessary implication assents to the terms.</p> <p>3. Towage <©=>14—Boat owner could not recover for damages caused by tug’s negligence, after accepting services of tug with notice that towing would be done at risk of tow.</p> <p>Where Director General of Railroads notified owner of boats that all towing would thereafter be done at the risk of the tow, the owner could not recover damages caused by subsequent negligence of the Director General’s tug in towing owner’s boat, though owner in reply to notice from Director General stated that it would not be bound by such terms, and that it reserved the right to continue to report boats for towing under the same conditions as to responsibility for damage that had previously prevailed, since' by acceptance of the services of the Director General’s tug it impliedly assented to the terms stated by the Director General.</p>

<p>1. Intoxicating liquors @=>202—Indictment for possessing still held fatally ambiguous.</p> <p>An indictment charging that defendant unlawfully possessed a still, designed and intended for use in the manufacture of intoxicating liquor, in violation of the National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, is fatally defective, as it was uncertain whether the unlawful intent or design alleged was that of maker, designer, or possessor.</p> <p>2. Intoxicating liquors @=209, 211—National Prohibition Act forbids possession of liquor or property for manufacture of iiquor.</p> <p>National Prohibition Act, § 25, prohibiting the possession of any liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating this act, prohibits the possession of either liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor, which liquor or property was intended to be used by the possessor in violation of this act.</p> <p>3. Indictment and information @=>33— Indictment charging unlawful possession of liquor held mere conclusion.</p> <p>In the absence of any statement of facts showing why the possession was unlawful, an indictment charging that defendant did unlawfully possess, etc., is a mere conclusion.</p> <p>4. Indictment and information @=>62—No intendments indulged in favor of in-</p> <p>dictment.</p> <p>Where the liberties of a defendant are involved, all the facts necessary to bring the case within the intent of the act must be alleged, as no intendments can be indulged in favor of the indictment</p>

At Law. Action by Estelle Ausbrooks, administratrix, against the Western Union Telegraph Company. On motion to vacate order remanding cause to state court. Action at law commenced in the Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, and removed, on the defendant’s petition, to the United States District Court for the Nashville Division of the Middle District of Tennessee.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri; Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Kelly-Atkinson Construction Company against the Arkansas Bridge Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of .the Northern District of Illinois. Suits by the United States, instituted by the United States District Attorney, against Isadore Shore and another, and by the United States, instituted by the Attorney General of Illinois, against Izidor Shorr and another. Decrees for the United States, and defendants appeal.

<p>In Error to the' District Court of the United States 'for the Western District'of Missouri; Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Alonzo Meadows against W. E. Stewart. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

At Law. Action by the Detroit Copper & Brass Rolling Mills Company against Hattie Wise and Robert J. Buck, executors. On motions by plaintiff to have case restored to calendar, and by defendant to make dismissal absolute.

In Admiralty. libel in personam by J. Aron & Co., Inc., against the Ivitckenbach Steamship Company, Inc. Interlocutory decree for libel-ant.

<p>Municipal corporations <§=3247—Power company, which recognize validity of contract with city until after enactment empowering city to make contracts, held estopped from claiming contract invalid.</p> <p>Where city, in reliance on contracts with power company to furnish it with electricity at specified rates, dismantled its own power plant, and the company recognized the validity of the contract by furnishing electricity thereunder for more than five years, and until after the enactment of a statute empowering the city to enter into such a contract, the company subsequently thereto was estopped from claiming that the contract was void because ultra vires at the time it was entered into.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by Thomas J. Horan against James Hughes, Jr., in personam, and the tug Peerless, in rem. Libel dismissed. This is a libel against the respondent Hughes, in personam, and the tug Peerless, in rem, for the loss of the coal barge Catherine Horan on October 23 and 24, 1917. At the time the tug was under charter to the respondent James Hughes, Jr., and was being towed from Boston to New Tork by the Peerless.

Suit by the Márchese Sisters Embroidery Corporation against the Gotham Silk Hosiery Company, Inc., for infringement of all claims of letters patent No. 1,313,198, dated August 12, 1919, issued on application filed September 7, 1916, to Concertina Márchese and Antonietta Márchese for process of inserting open work in fabrics.

<p>In Equity. Consolidated suits by Samuel N. McClean and by E. A. Gardiner and others against M. A. Bradley and others.</p>