Cross v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

139 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 139 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[a]s a general rule, in order to gain the admission of evidence of other criminal acts under the common scheme or plan exception it is necessary that the crimes, including the crime charged, so relate to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. Moreover, there must be “not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations.” The concurrence of common features under this exception, however, must be more than simply a manner of operation, which is possessed to some extent by most criminal recidivists. A method of operation is not, by itself, a common scheme, but merely a repetitive pattern.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 42 Md. App. 107 - Whitfield v. State · 133 Md. App. 311 - Reidnauer v. State

2. ““The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, is that in a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and inadmissible. This principle is merely an application of the policy rule prohibiting the initial introduction by the prosecution of evidence of bad character. Thus, the state may not present evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is ‘substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.’ C. McCormick, Evidence, § 190 (2d ed. 1972). ... [Ajpart from the fundamental proposition that an accused may be convicted only by evidence which shows that he is guilty of the offense charged, and not by evidence which indicates his guilt of entirely unrelated crimes, there are additional reasons underlying the general rule. Evidence of other crimes may tend to confuse the jurors or prejudice their minds against the accused and to predispose them to a belief in his guilt. Finally, unless he knows in advance that evidence of other crimes is to be used against him, the accused will be unprepared to defend against such evidence. There are exceptions to this general exclusionary rule which, perhaps, are equally well-recognized. Thu”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 42 Md. App. 107 - Whitfield v. State · Lebedun v. State

3. “[Tjhough the evidence may fall within one or more of the exceptions, the trial judge still possesses discretion as to whether it should be received. In the judicious determination of this issue he should carefully weigh the necessity for and probativeness of the evidence concerning the collateral criminal act against the untoward prejudice which is likely to be the consequence of its admission.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 42 Md. App. 107 - Whitfield v. State · State v. Faulkner