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283 F.2d 772

Docket No. 81, Docket 25893.

United States v. Farago

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted Oct. 6, 1960.

Decided Oct. 26, 1960.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1960-10-26

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently April 1964

7 federal appellate ·

3 counsel of record

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002)

Relies on Koven v. United States · United States v. Dilliard

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1960-10-26

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¶1William L. Clay, Rochester, N. Y., for defendant-appellant.

¶2Neil R. Farmelo, U. S. Atty., Western District of New York, Buffalo, N. Y.

¶3(Robert J. Plache, Asst. U. S. Atty., Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for plaintiffappellee.

¶4Before HINCKS, WATERMAN, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM.

¶6Appellant was convicted of eight counts of using the mails for the purpose of executing a scheme or artifice to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. At his trial, evidence was introduced tending to show that appellant, via statements to the press, remarks at a stockholders’ meeting, and the mails, falsely misrepresented the prospects of the Uran Mining Corporation, in which he was the leading figure, resulting in the sale of $245,000 worth of Uran stock.

¶7Appellant urges that no evidence of a “scheme” was introduced. But we find the record replete with evidence of deliberately false statements concerning Uran, demonstrating a generally fraudulent purpose. This was sufficient to show the requisite “scheme or artifice,” even if appellant’s initial activities had proceeded from a wholly legitimate motive. Cf. United States v. Dilliard, 2 Cir., 101 F.2d 829, 834, certiorari denied 306 U.S. 635, 59 S.Ct. 484, 83 L.Ed. 1036.

¶8Appellant also complains of the admission of evidence. Some of these claims of error are patently without merit; as to others, he fails to show prejudice. In particular, he claims, that the evidence admitted tended to minimize the testimony of the defense witness Tip-ton, a geologist. But Tipton had not been engaged by Uran until April 1958 and evidence of an earlier period was admissible for its direct bearing on the issues. Moreover, any tendency such evidence might have to minimize Tipton’s testimony would not render it inadmissible.

¶9We have examined appellant’s other contentions and find no error.

¶10Affirmed.

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