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← 283 F.3d 1275 - Pace v. Capobianco

Pace v. Capobianco’s Empirical Analysis

283 F.3d 1275 · 2002

Citation profile

141
cited by 141 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
November 2024
most recently cited

43 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 141 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2024 · most notably Brosseau v. Haugen (2004), Vinyard v. Wilson (2002)

43 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

700200220102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Graham v. Connor · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Bonner v. City of Prichard

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 141 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “an affidavit stating only that the affiant ‘believes’ a certain fact exists is insufficient to defeat summary judgment by creating a genuine issue of fact about the existence of that certain fact”); see also Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.1996) (”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “used the automobile in a manner to give reasonable policemen probable cause to believe that it had become a deadly weapon with which [suspect] was armed”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]he use of deadly force is more likely reasonable if: the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious physical harm to officers or others; the suspect committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious harm, such that his being at large represents an inherent risk to the general public; and the officers either issued a warning or could not feasibly have done so before using deadly force. But ... none of these conditions are prerequisites to the lawful application of deadly force by an officer seizing a suspect.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.