Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The foundation of preemption doctrines is the Supremacy Clause, which invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. Finn · Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh

2. “... [W]e view the actions of the School District in entering into the Lease agreement as plainly proprietary. There is no state or local statute or ordinance or guideline with respect to the RF Emissions levels at issue here. The School District entered into a single lease agreement with respect to a single building. The District did not purport to punish Sprint for any past conduct or to impose any condition with respect to any Sprint tower other than that to be located on the High School.... We see in this record no basis, for an inference that the School District sought to establish any general municipal policy. ... [A] private individual, if approached by Sprint for permission to erect a cellular tower on his private property, would plainly have the right simply to refuse to enter into such a contract. The School District has the same right in its proprietary capacity as property owner to refuse to lease the High School roof for the construction of such a facility.... Further, a private party who has the right to refuse outright to lease his property also has the right to decline to lease the property except on agreed con ditions (assuming those conditions would not violate law or public policy). Since, so far as we are aware, nothing in the law requires a communications company to operate at the FCC Guidelines maximum permissible radiation exposure levels, the private owner could elect not to grant a communications company a lease for the construction and operation of a ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Superior Communications v. City of Riverview · Superior Communications v. City of Riverview

3. “[W]here the federal statute contains `a provision explicitly addressing preemption, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,' preemption is restricted to the terms of that provision.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 290 F. Supp. 2d 352 - Drake v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings · Drake v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings H J