Volume 283 — Illinois Reports

Writ of Error -to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. WindES, Judge, presiding.

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph county; the ■ Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Jersey county; the Hon. Norman L. Jones, Judge, presiding.

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal and writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Walker, Judge, presiding.

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

<p>1. Trusts—when resulting trust arises—parol evidence. Where the purchase money for land, or a definite part of it, is paid by one person and the title is conveyed to another person the law construes such facts as constituting a resulting trust, and such trust arises not from the contract or agreement of the parties but from their acts and may be established by parol evidence.</p> <p>2. Same—there is no presumption of advancement where wife pays for land conveyed to husband. Where a man pays for land and causes it to be conveyed to his wife or child the presumption is that it was intended as a gift or advancement, but the reasons for such presumption do not apply where the wife pays for the land and causes it to be conveyed to her husband.</p> <p>3. Same—evidence, of resulting trust must be clear but may be circumstantial. Parol evidence to establish a resulting trust must be clear, strong and unequivocal and must establish the payment of the purchase money by the alleged beneficiary beyond doubt; but such evidence may be circumstantial as well as direct.</p> <p>4. 'Same—declarations to establish a resulting trust must be direct. While the statements of a deceased person as to who owned the land may be of such a nature as to base thereon a finding that a resulting trust arose, yet these declarations must be direct and certain, and, to be controlling, should be corroborated by other facts and circumstances.</p> <p>5. Same—evidence of resulting trust is not sufficient if it can be explained upon any other theory. Evidence which is doubtful or is capable of reasonable explanation upon any theory other than that of the existence of an implied or resulting trust will not be sufficient to entitle the beneficiary to a decree declaring and enforcing the alleged trust.</p> <p>6. Husband and wipe—when husband’s ante-nuptial agreement does not affect rights of his heir. A husband’s ante-nuptial agreement, which is executory and is not enforced in his lifetime, does not affect the rights of his daughter as his heir-at-law, where the husband and father dies intestate while the daughter is a minor.</p> <p>7. Same—ante-nuptial agreement will not affect marital rights unless intention to do so is apparent. The marital rights of a husband or wife will not be taken away by an ante-nuptial agreement unless the intention to do so is clearly apparent.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Madison county; the Hon. Henry B. Eaton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Notice—possession of land is ordinarily notice of rights of possessor. Where a writ of attachment in aid of a suit against the record owner is levied on property in possession of others, the possession is ordinarily notice of the rights of the possessors and of every fact that can be learned by inquiry on the premises as to the nature of such rights.</p> <p>2. Estoppel—when the party in possession is estopped to assert ownership. One who has continuously represented herself to be the agent of the holder of the record title to a lot and who is in possession of the lot when a writ of attachment in aid of a suit against such holder is levied, is estopped, after the suit has proceeded to judgment, execution sale and deed and a partition suit has been begun, to disclaim her previous representations and assert her ownership of the lot under an unrecorded deed.</p> <p>3. Appeals and Errors—ruling not covered by assignments of error cannot be reviewed. Alleged error in refusing to re-refer the case to the master in chancery to hear additional testimony cannot be reviewed on appeal where the point is not covered by the assignments of error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. ■

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Hancock county; the Hon. E. W. Dunham, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeals from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appear from the Circuit Court of Wabash county; the Hon. Jurius C. Kern, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal frpm the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. William F. Cooper, Judge, presiding.

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph H. Fitch, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. N. Hoover, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge; presiding.

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph county; the Hon. John F. Gillham, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors—when freehold is involved on appeal from dismissal of a petition to set aside order of probate of will. Where the effect of an order admitting a will to probate is to vest a freehold estate in the devisees a freehold is involved on an appeal from a subsequent order dismissing a petition to set aside the order of probate, as a judgment of reversal and the setting aside of the probate would, temporarily at least, divest the freehold.</p> <p>2. Descent—from whom an illegitimate son may inherit. An illegitimate son can inherit property only from his mother, any maternal ancestor or any person from whom his mother might have inherited if living, but at common law he could inherit nothing and was looked upon as the son of nobody.</p> <p>3. Wills—notice of probate of will is required only to heirs-at-law, legatees and devisees. The statute in relation to the probate of wills only requires the petition to state the name and place of residence of each'' of the heirs-at-law, legatees and devisees and requires notice to said parties, only.</p> <p>4. Marriage—reputation and cohabitation must concur to raise presumption of marriage. To raise a presumption of marriage cohabitation and reputation must concur, and the strength of the presumption depends upon the circumstances, but the cohabitation must be matrimonial and not meretricious, and the reputation must be founded on general, not divided or singular, opinion.</p> <p>5. Same—presumption of marriage from cohabitation and repute is rebuttable by proof. The presumption arising in favor of marriage from evidence of cohabitation and repute is rebutted and overcome by proof that the relation was meretricious in its inception, and when shown to have been illicit in its origin it will be presumed, in the absence of anything showing otherwise, that its continuance was of the same character.</p> <p>6. Same—token marriage may be proved by pedigree evidence. Marriage may be proved by pedigree evidence, but such evidence must be established by the declarations of deceased blood relatives made at a time when such.relatives could have no possible interest in the litigation in which such declarations were used.</p> <p>7. Same—when pedigree evidence and repute are admissible to rebut proof of marriage. Pedigree evidence and repute are a species of hearsay evidence, and where there is no direct proof of actual marriage but a presumption of marriage is attempted to be established by proof of cohabitation, by pedigree evidence and by repute, declarations of the same parties of a contrary character are admissible in rebuttal.</p> <p>8. Evidence—presumptions must arise upon the proof. Where there is clear proof of a fact no presumptions can be indulged except such as arise upon the proof.</p> <p>9. Same—what may be considered pedigree evidence. An inscription on a tombstone properly comes under the head of pedigree evidence, and where the question is whether a certain person is the legitimate son of a testator, the fact that he is not named in the will as a legatee or devisee may be considered in connection with the pedigree evidence introduced.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hardin county; the Hon. Charles H. Miller, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills—when execution of a will is presumed to be in compliance with the statute. Where the attestation clause of a will is complete, the signatures genuine and the circumstances are corroborative of due execution, there being no evidence disproving a compliance with the statute in any particular, it will be presumed that all the provisions of the statute have been complied with, although one of the attesting witnesses cannot recollect the execution of the will.</p> <p>2. Same—testator is not required to sign will in presence of witnesses. A testator is not required to sign h'is will in the presence of the attesting witnesses, and it. is-sufficient if he acknowledges the instrument in their presence as his free and voluntary act.</p> <p>3. Same—mark evidencing signature may be made by an agent. The testator’s name, as well as the mark evidencing his signature to a will, may be written by an agent at the testator’s direction, provided the testator acknowledges the will as his voluntary act.</p> <p>4. Same—what testimony of an attesting witness is admissible. Where a will is properly attested and the attestation clause shows that all the necessary formalities have been complied with, an attesting witness who has witnessed a number of wills but does not recollect attesting the will in question, though he admits his signature, may testify that he understands the formalities required, and that he would not have signed the will if the necessary questions had not been asked and if the will had not been executed in the proper way.</p> <p>5. Same—when will signed by a mark’may be probated although there is no evidence that testator made the mark. Where the attesting witnesses testify to the proper execution of a will and the attestation clause states all the details required for such execution, including acknowledgment, the instrument may be admitted to probate although there is no proof that the testator personally made the mark evidencing his signature.</p> <p>6. Evidence—what interest will disqualify a witness. The interest which will disqualify a witness in a proceeding to probate a will must be certain, direct and immediate, showing that he will gain or lose as the direct result of the suit, otherwise his interest, if any, goes merely to his credibility and not to his competency.</p> <p>7. Same—attorney should not appear as witness in his own case. It is not in conformity with professional ethics for an attorney connected with a case to appear as a witness and no great weight should be given to his testimony, but the mere fact that the witness is a partner of the attorney conducting the case does not disqualify him, where there is no evidence that he is to share in the fees.</p> <p>8. Costs—guardian ad litem fees may be taxed as costs in proceeding to probate a will. The appointment of a guardian ad litem for minors is necessary in a proceeding to probate a will, and the circuit court, on appeal, has power to appoint a guardian ad litem and tax a reasonable fee for his services as costs.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Samuel C. Stough, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. Tut hill, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal to review decision of Board of Review of Cook county.</p>

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Harry C. Moran, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Special assessments—only component elements of improvement need be itemized in estimate. The statute requires only that the estimate be itemized to the satisfaction of the board of local improvements, and it is sufficient, so far as the property owners are concerned, if the estimate is so specific as to give a general idea of the cost of each of the substantial, component elements of the improvement. (Lyman v. Town of Cicero, 222 Ill. 379, distinguished.)</p> <p>2. Same—when plan of improvement should be considered as incorporated in ordinance. Where the plan of the improvement is attached to and made a part of the ordinance it should be considered as if incorporated in full in the ordinance.</p> <p>3. Same—the estimate should be read with the ordinance. The estimate of the cost of a proposed improvement should be read with the ordinance in order to remove any uncertainty as to the description of the improvement and to ascertain the proper description thereof.</p> <p>4. Sams—some details of work must be left to public authorities. An ordinance for a street improvement providing that the sound curb shall be re-set cannot be objected to because it does not specify particularly what curb is to be re-set and what is to be put in new, as the determination as to what curb is sound must be left to the discretion of the public authorities, subject to whose approval the work is to be done.</p> <p>5. Sams—statute as to division of assessment into installments refers to the entire assessment. Section 42 of the Local Improvement act, providing the manner in which the assessment shall be divided into installments, has reference to the entire assessment and not to the individual assessments against the various tracts.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry M. Fisher, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Clyde E. Stone, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Constitutional law—acts of 1917, regarding election of town officers in towns of 25,000, do not extend terms of incumbent officers. The act of June 14, 1917, (Laws of 1917, p. 286,) providing for the election in 1920, and every four years thereafter, of an assessor, collector and supervisor in incorporated towns of 25,000 and over, and the act of June 25, 1917, (Laws of 1917, p. 486,) providing for the election in 1920, and every four years thereafter, of a president and clerk of said towns, do not extend the terms of office of the officers elected in 1916 and are therefore not invalid on such ground.</p> <p>2. Elections—nominating petitions in town of Cicero must be filed with election commissioners of Chicago. Under section 2 of article 8 of the Election law the commissioners of election of the city of Chicago are ex-officio commissioners of election of the town of Cicero, and nominating petitions of candidates for the offices of assessor, collector, supervisor and clerk in said town must be filed with said board of election commissioners within the time required by paragraph 4 of section 30 of the act concerning the holding of primary elections.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law—courts have power to decide whether bill has become a law. No bill can become a law except in the mode prescribed by the constitution, and the power and duty to decide whether a bill has become a law reside in the courts.</p> <p>2. Same—bill presented to the Governor for approval must be the same one passed by the legislature. Before a bill can become a law it must be presented to the Governor for his approval, and it is essential that the bill presented to the Governor be the same one as was passed, with its amendments, by both houses of the General Assembly.</p> <p>3. Same—the act of June 28, 1917, regulating registration of voters in large cities, is invalid. The act of June 28, 1917, (Laws of 1917, p. 460,) regulating the registration of voters in cities of over 150,000, was presented to the Governor for his approval without containing the amendments shown by the journals of the General Assembly to have been adopted by both the senate and the house of representatives, and hence is invalid and does not affect the prior registration laws.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Franklin county; the Hon. Julius C. Kern, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Practice—when trial court should allow the defendant to amend affidavit of merits. In a suit on a promissory note, where the defendant’s original affidavit of merits is made by her attorney, who through inadvertence, oversight or mistake fails to set up the true defense, which cannot be made under the pleadings on file, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, should allow such amendment to the affidavit of merits as will enable the defendant to present her defense to the action.</p> <p>2. Amendments—court’s discretion in allowing amendments is subject to review. The discretion vested in courts to allow amendments under section 1 of the statute on amendments is a judicial discretion which is subject to review, and one which should be exercised liberally in favor of the allowance of-such amendments whenever essential to the proper presentation of a party’s cause of action or defense.</p> <p>3. Bills and notes—when fraud is a defense against assignee of note. Under section 10 of the Negotiable Instruments act fraud in obtaining the making or executing of a promissory note may be availed of against any assignee of the note as well as against the party who perpetrated the fraud.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. Norman L. Jones, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Deeds—when a decree setting aside deed will not he sustained. A decree setting aside, at the suit of one claiming as devisee under the grantor’s will, a quit-claim deed given in consideration óf services rendered by the grantee will not be sustained, where the deed was executed only eight days after the will was made and there is no proof of any subsequent change in the mental capacity of the grantor nor of undue influence or fraud by the grantee; and the court cannot substitute compensation for said services on the basis of a quantum meruit, as the grantor has a right to put his own value on them.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Effingham county; the Hon. William B. Wright, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Schools—when there is no de facto district. After a judgment of ouster against a board of education of a high school district has been affirmed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the act under which it was organized was void there'is no school district de pire, and unless there is an attempt to organize a district under some law authorizing its creation there is no de facto district.</p> <p>2. Same—zvhen tax levied by board of education is unauthorised. After final judgment of ouster against the board of education of a high school district organized under the void act of 1911 has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, the persons acting as directors of the district have no power to levy a tax.</p> <p>3. Taxes—legislattire cannot validate levy of a tax after judgment by Supreme Court holding it invalid. The legislature has no power to validate the levy of a tax after a judgment by the Supreme Court holding such tax levy invalid. (Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. People, 219 Ill. 408, followed.)</p> <p>Cartwright, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Wills—when devisee of life estate has power to convey fee. Where a will devises a life estate with general language indicating a power of disposal, although the life tenant could dispose of the estate devised without express power, the power is regarded as only pertaining to the estate devised and is interpreted as meaning such disposal as a life tenant could make, but where the will indicates an intention to confer power to convey the fee, effect will be given to such intention without enlarging the life estate to a fee.</p> <p>2. Same—when life tenant has power to convey fee. Where a testator devises a life estate in all of his property to his daughter-in-law for her natural life or as long as she remains the lawful wife of the testator’s son, with remainder to the son’s children, a subsequent codicil giving her power to sell and dispose of the property by deed conveying absolute title, “without claim of title by any person referred to in my said will,” gives her power to sell the fee but does not enlarge her life estate.</p> <p>3. Same—when life tenant, with power to convey fee, occupies trust relation to remainder-men. A devisee of a life estate having power to convey the fee and having an estate in possession under the devise is, in the absence of a contrary intention in the will, entitled to the possession of the proceeds of the sale and to the income from such proceeds during the continuance of the life estate, but as to the principal the devisee occupies a trust relation to the remainder-men.</p> <p>4. Same—zvhen court will retain jurisdiction for protection of infant defendants. Where a devisee of a life estate asks for a construction of the will and is decreed to have power to convey the fee without enlarging her estate, the existence of her trust relation to the remainder-men as to the principal of the proceeds from the sale authorizes the court to preserve the remainder and to retain jurisdiction to protect the infant defendants.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—crime of obtaining money by means of confidence game may be committed by a forgery. Because the crime of forgery is proved to have been committed by the false indorsement of a note or check it does not follow that the defendant can not be found guilty under an indictment charging him with obtaining money by means of the confidence game, as such false indorsement makes the note or check such a false or bogus check as is contemplated by the statute.</p> <p>2. Same—when there is no variance between an indictment and proof in a confidence game case. Under an indictment charging the defendant with obtaining, by means and use of the confidence game, “fifty ($50) dollars, of the value of fifty ($50) dollars, of the money and personal goods and property” of a certain clothing store, there is no variance where the proof shows that the defendant secured an $18 overcoat, a $10 hand-satchel and $22 in money by a forged indorsement of a traveler’s check.</p> <p>3. Same—when evidence is not sufficient to identify defendant. Where two defendants are charged with obtaining money by means of the confidence game and the only evidence to identify them is the testimony of the two victims of the offense, who are not able to positively identify one of the defendants although they are certain of the other, the former cannot be convicted on such testimony, alone.</p> <p>4. Same—what testimony is improper to show relationship between two defendants. Where one of two defendants charged with obtaining money by means of the confidence game is not positively identified on the trial, testimony of a police officer that after he had arrested the defendant who was positively identified he went to his hotel and asked the manager if the man arrested had a pal and was directed to the other defendant’s room is not proper to establish the relationship between the two defendants, where such conversation was out of the presence of the defendant against whom it is offered.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. William K. Whitfield, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—confidence game defined. The confidence game is any swindling operation in which advantage is taken of the confidence reposed by the victim in the swindler.</p> <p>2. Same—what constitutes the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses.' To constitute the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses the false pretenses must have been believed and relied on by the defrauded party and must be the direct cause of the loss, and it must be charged in the indictment and proved at the trial that the property was obtained by means of the false pretenses.</p> <p>3. Same—what person cannot be convicted of obtaining money by means of confidence game. To constitute the offbnse of obtaining money by means of the confidence game it must be proved that the person accused obtained the money by reason of the confidence reposed in him, and where the facts show that the taking was accomplished by overcoming the will of the victim by force or fear and not by reason of any confidence reposed in the accused, he can not be convicted on a count charging the confidence game.</p> <p>Carter, C. J., dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Elections—zvhen persons are and are not legal voters in the township. Registered voters in a township where they own their home, who move "out of the township for one year with the intention of returning, and who do return, at the end of the year are legal voters in the township during such year, but residents of a township who marry and go to another State with the intention of making their home there, lose their residence in the township and do not become legal voters therein by the mere fact that they subsequently change their minds and return to the township.</p> <p>2. Same—when parties boarding in school district are not legal voter's therein. One who works for and boards with his employer within the boundaries of a school district but who claims as his home his aunt’s residence outside the district is not a legal voter in the district; and the same is true of one who boards with a relative in the district while being attended by a physician but who claims his residence is with his nephew outside of the district, to which place he intends to return as soon as he is able.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—jury must determine value of evidence tending to identify defendant by his voice. A witness may testify to his knowledge acquired through any of his senses, but the question of fact as to his identification of the defendant in a criminal case by the sound of his voice should be left to the jury, uninfluenced by any intimation by the court as to the weight of the evidence. (Ogden v. People, 134 Ill. 599, explained.)</p> <p>2. Same—when evidence as to defendant drinking beer is admissible. In a prosecution for stealing chickens, where witnesses have testified that when two men in a buggy passed along the road, singing, on the night of the offense, they recognized the defendant by his voice, evidence that the defendant had been drinking beer an hour or two before that time is admissible.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—tax may be levied to complete a school building although bonds have been isstied up to constitutional limit. Although a school district has issued bonds for an amount within less than $100 of the constitutional limit of its indebtedness for the purpose of building a school house, it may afterwards levy a tax for building purposes to raise money to complete the building when the money from the sale of the bonds has been expended. (People v. Chicago and Texas Railroad Co. 223 Ill. 448, followed.)</p> <p>2. Same—btirden is on objector to establish invalidity of tax. On the application of the county collector for judgment and order of sale for delinquent taxes the presumption is that the taxes were legally levied, and the burden of proof is upon the objector to a tax to overcome the prima facie case made by the collector.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Clyde E. Stone, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Second Branch Appellate' Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar E. Heard, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—when evidence of birth of a child is admissible in prosemtion for rape. Evidence of the birth of a child does not tend to prove a particular person’s guilt of the crime of rape unless there are certain hereditary characteristics of an unusual nature reproduced in the child which may tend to show the child’s paternity, but where the prosecuting witness is under the age of consent, evidence of the birth of a child proves that a crime was committed and is admissible for that purpose.</p> <p>2. Same—when objection to evidence cannot be urged in the Supreme Court. Where no objection is made to the introduction of evidence at the time it is offered and there is no motion at any time during the trial to exclude.the evidence after its admission, an objection to such evidence cannot be urged in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>3. Same—defendant may refresh his memory by referring to memoranda. In a prosecution for rape the defendant, who was in the employ of the city during the months the several acts of intercourse were alleged to have taken place and who was required to make a record of his daily employment, should be permitted to refer to the memoranda to refresh his memory as to what he was doing at the time of the alleged acts.</p> <p>4. Same—proof of offer to settle bastardy suit is not admissible. In a prosecution for rape, evidence that the prosecutrix and her brother called on the defendant and offered to settle with him for a sum of money is not admissible where the offer has reference to the settlement of a bastardy proceeding against him.</p> <p>5. Same—when record of baptism is not admissible to prove the date of birth of prosecutrix. In a prosecution for rape an unidentified record of the baptism of the prosecutrix by a priest in a foreign country is not admissible to prove the date of her birth; but the error in admitting such record is harmless where the mother of the prosecutrix testifies positively to the date of birth and is not contradicted in any way.</p> <p>6. Same—evidence of several acts' of intercourse is admissible in a prosemtion for rape. In a prosecution for rape, evidence of more than one act of intercourse may be testified to by the complaining witness, not for the purpose of showing that different offenses were committed but to show the relation and familiarity of the parties.</p> <p>7. Same—fact of birth of child is not corroborative evidence. The fact of the birth of a child to the prosecutrix in a prosecution for rape cannot be considered as corroborating her testimony .as to her alleged illicit relations with the defendant, and the latter is entitled to an instruction to that effect.</p>

<p>1. Schools—the act of 1915 validated women’s votes for high school district regardless of how they voted. The act of April 24, 1915, validated the votes of women at elections for the organization of high school districts whether they voted for or against the organization.</p> <p>2. Same—what necessary to legalise high school district under the validating act of I9if. The validating act of 1917 applies to all high school districts composed of compact and contiguous territory, provided an election called by the county superintendent has been held and a board of education chosen, and if those two conditions have been complied with the district is legalized, regardless of other questions.</p> <p>3. Sam:e—what high school district has prior right to overlapping territory under section 3 of validating act. Where two adjacent high school districts validated under the act of 1917 have overlapping territory, section 3 of said act was intended to include such territory in the district which had first established and then conducted a high school, and where one district was first in holding the election to establish a district and has purchased a site and erected a school house thereon it will be entitled to overlapping territory in preference to an adjacent district which was first to elect a board of education but has conducted its school in rented property and has done nothing toward the purchase of a site, although both schools were opened on the same day.</p> <p>.4. Same—two school districts cannot legally exist at same time in same territory. Two school districts cannot legally exist at the same time in the same territory, exercising the same powers and jurisdiction, and where the territories of two adjacent high school districts overlap, section 3 of the validating act of 1917 must be so construed as to bring one district or the other within its terms.</p> <p>Duncan, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph H. Fitch, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Public utilities—fact that a connecting carrier is an electric railroad does not justify refusal to absorb switching charges. Where a steam railroad company absorbs switching charges on all connecting steam lines between it and shippers within a city, the fact that a connecting carrier is an electric railroad company does not authorize a discrimination against a shipper on said connecting line by the steam railroad company refusing to absorb connecting charges on the electric line.</p> <p>2. Same—absorption of switching charges is not matter of contract between carriers. Discrimination by a carrier against a shipper, consisting of the refusal of the carrier to absorb switching charges because the shipper is located on an electric instead of a steam railroad, cannot be justified on the ground that the carrier has no contract with the electric railroad, as the absorption of such charges is not a matter of contract between the connecting carrier and the carrier having the line haul.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the County Court of Boone county; the Hon. William C. DbWolE, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. A. A. ParTlow, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills—rule as to acceleration of remainder on failure of life estate. The rule that where there is a devise to one for life with a remainder to another and if the life estate fails for any reason the remainder is accelerated and takes effect at once is applied only to promote the presumed intention of the testator, and where the intention is evident that the remainder is not to take effect until after the expiration of the life of the prior donee the remainder will not be accelerated.</p> <p>2. Same—when remainder is accelerated by widow’s renunciation of life estate. Where a testator devises his estate to his wife for life and provides for the sale and distribution of the remainder within one year after her death, and there is nothing to indicate any object of the testator in postponing the final disposition except to permit his wife to enjoy the property during her life, upon a renunciation by the widow of her interest under the will the remainder will take effect at once, and the remainder-men may elect to take the land in lieu of the proceeds of sale.</p> <p>3. Same—when certain remainder-men have no interest in the re-conversion. Remainder-men who are devised specific amounts of the proceeds of the sale of land and who have been paid the amounts they are entitled to under the will have no interest in the matter of an election by the other remainder-men to take the land instead of the balance of the proceeds of the sale thereof, as directed by the will.</p> <p>4. Same—when equity has jurisdiction of bill to construe will. The rule that a court of equity will not take jurisdiction of a bill to construe a will merely to declare that contingent remainders are destroyed and that the complainant has a legal title in fee simple does not apply where there is a real question as to the construction of the will, arising with reference to a re-conversion into real estate of a remainder devised as personal property. (McCarty v. McCarty, 275 Ill. 573, distinguished.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;■—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Walker, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—legal conclusions of Industrial Board not based on evidence are not binding on Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court will not disturb an award for insufficient evidence where the evidence is conflicting and there is competent evidence tending to sustain the decision, legal conclusions of the board not based on any evidence are not binding on the court and will not be sustained.</p> <p>2. Same—evidence before Industrial Board must be preserved by plaintiff in error in Supreme Court. Where the circuit court has reversed the decision of the Industrial Board it is not incumbent on the defendant in error in the Supreme Court to bring up the evidence to support the judgment of the circuit court, but the presumptions are in favor of said judgment and the plaintiff in error must overcome those presumptions by preserving the evidence. (Smith-Lohr Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 88, explained.)</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Eirst District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David F. MatchE^t, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. Franklin H. Boggs, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Lis pendens—doctrine of lis pendens stated. The doctrine of lis pendens is that the court having jurisdiction of the action cannot be prevented from proceeding to the final exercise of that jurisdiction by any transfer or other act of the parties to the action after the service of process or the happening of any other event necessary to the commencement of lis pendens.</p> <p>2. Same—mere beginning of suit docs not give priority over unrecorded deed. It is not the commencement of a judicial proceeding but the acquirement of a lien thereunder which gives priority over an unrecorded deed to the land involved in the litigation.</p> <p>3. Same—deed recorded prior to decree of sale is notice to purchaser. The recording of a deed to a third party prior to the entry of a decree of sale in a proceeding to sell the land to pay debts of the grantor but subsequent to the commencement of the proceeding is notice to the purchaser at the sale, and he cannot claim priority over the title obtained by the deed.</p> <p>4. Ejectment—a plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title. A plaintiff in ejectment must recover, if at all, on the strength of his or her own title, and the defendant’s possession, which he may maintain through his tenant, will not be disturbed until the plaintiff has shown a clear title as against the defendant.</p> <p>5. Same—a deed executed by part of grantors named is valid as to those executing it. A deed naming two or more parties as grantors but not executed by all is valid as to those executing it, in the absence of any agreement or understanding to the contrary.</p> <p>6. Same—homestead is not conveyed unless wife joins in deed. Where a husband and wife occupy property as a homestead, a deed conveying the property and naming the*husband and wife as grantors will-not convey the homestead interest unless the wife joins in executing the deed, and to the extent of $1000 in value the title to the premises is unaffected by the deed.</p> <p>7. Same-—there is no presumption as to the value of homestead property—the burden of proof. There is no presumption that' the value of property in which there is a homestead interest exceeds $1000, and where the wife of the grantor has not joined in the deed the burden is on the grantee, when bringing an action of ejectment, to prove that the property is worth more than $1000 in order to show the validity of the deed as to any part of the property.</p>

<p>1. Drainage—how orders on treasurer of a drainage district mtist be signed. Section 156 of the Farm Drainage act, providing that the treasurer of the district shall pay money only on a written order signed by the chairman and countersigned by the clerk of the board of drainage commissioners, fixes the character of any other payment as illegal and unauthorized although the order is signed by a majority of the commissioners.</p> <p>2. Same—commissioners cannot divert part of assessment to any other purpose than that for which it was levied. The commissioners of a drainage district cannot divert any part of an assessment to any other purpose than that for which it was levied and the incidental expenses of the levy, and if there are different funds an order can only be payable out of the proper fund.</p> <p>3. Same—when treasurer of district is liable for funds paid out. The acts of a treasurer of a drainage district are ministerial in the sense that if an order is in due form and drawn upon a fund from which it is apparently payable he has no discretion as to payment unless the fund is insufficient or he has notice that the order is not legally chargeable to the fund, but he is liable if he pays irregular orders known by him to be drawn for claims not authorized by law or for expenditures not within the power of the board.</p> <p>4. Same—when an assessment is not void though judgment and order of sale are reversed. Objections to a special assessment by different land owners are practically different suits, and where a judgment and order of sale are reversed and the cause remanded as to objectors who appealed, on the ground that they should have been permitted to show that there was no deficiency authorizing the assessment, the assessment is not void and the fund paid in by land owners who did not object is subject to the purposes for'which it was levied.</p>

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edmund K. JarEcki, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ OR Error to the County Court of Scott county; the Hon. E. C. Funic, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—construction of paragraph (e) of section 8 of Compensation act for computing annual earnings. Where it is not the custom for the employer to operate the full number of working days in the year, in computing the annual earnings of an employee under paragraph (e) of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act the minimum number of days used as the basis of the year’s work cannot be less than two hundred.</p> <p>2. Same—testimony of an arbitrator as to information acquired ex parte should not be heard by the Industrial Board. The Industrial Board in a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation act should not receive the testimony of one of the arbitrators who acquired his information by an ex parte investigation for himself.</p> <p>3. Same—method of ascertaining average daily earnings under provisions of section 8 of Compensation act. Under the provisions of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, if an employee works eight hours for five days of the week and only four hours on Saturday his average daily earnings should b,e ascertained by dividing his weekly wages by 5Jd and not by 6.</p> <p>4. Statutes—statute should be construed to give to every word its ordinary meaning. Statutes are to be construed, if possible, so as to give to each word, clause and sentence its ordinary and accepted meaning, and all provisions should be considered.</p> <p>5. Words and phrases—meaning, of word "minimum.” The word “minimum” means the least possible quantity, amount or degree that can be assigned in a given case or under fixed conditions.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windrs, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Corporations—signature of president to judgment note prima facie hinds corporation. An officer of a corporation has no power, by virtue of his office alone, to bind the corporation by signing a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, but such power may be expressly or impliedly given, and a judgment note signed in the name of the corporation, “by” its president, (naming him,) will bind the corporation in the absence of a showing that he had no authority, as president, to sign the note. (Snyder Bros. v. Bailey, 165 Ill. 447, followed.)</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Sain Welty, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. S. C. Stough, Judge, presiding.

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. W. T. Church, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Harry C. Moran, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Deeds—a deed otherwise valid is not void because made in lieu of a will. The statement in a deed of trust by which a trust is created to continue after the death of the grantor, that the deed is made in lieu of a will, will not render the instrument void as a testamentary disposition of property, where the deed contains all of the requisites to constitute a valid conveyance of real estate under the statute and is duly executed, acknowledged and delivered.</p> <p>2. Same—reservation of life estate in grantor indicates present conveyance of future estate. Where a fee is granted with a reservation of an estate in the grantor for his life, such reservation creates a strong presumption that the deed is intended to take effect immediately as a present conveyance of the future estate, and where the grantor reserves no power for further disposition of the fee the deed is relieved of its testamentary character.</p> <p>3. Same—deed void as testamentary disposition must be void as a whole. A deed is to be construed as a whole and must stand or fall as such, and if it is intended as a will and is void as a testamentary disposition of a portion of the property it will be void as to all property embraced in the attempted conveyance.</p> <p>4. Same—when deed naming grandchildren as remainder-men is sufficient. A deed of trust by which a trust is created during the lifetime of the beneficiary and a remainder in fee is given to the grandchildren of the grantor who survive the beneficiary is sufficient without further description of the remainder-men, and upon the termination of the trust such grandchildren will become seized of the legal as well as the equitable estate in remainder.</p>