Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The Fourth Circuit in Mills v. United States, supra, suggested two reasons why a guilty plea does not operate as a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, at least until sentence has been imposed. First, as the above quotation indicates, despite the guilty plea there could be an appeal of the conviction. Second, if a person who had pleaded guilty to a crime but who had not been sentenced were compelled by his testimony to disclose the extent or nature of his participation in the crime, the trial court might be affected in determining the extent and severity of the sentence to be imposed, 281 F.2d at 741 . That is, the witness might be forced to give testimony which could subject him to a more severe penalty. “We agree, for both reasons suggested in the Mills case, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is available to one in the position of the witness Montgomery. “Although a guilty plea waives many rights and precludes making successfully many arguments on appeal, nevertheless there are occasionally reversals of convictions based upon guilty pleas. Thus, before one is sentenced, so that the time for an appeal has not begun to run, there is an element of danger of a new trial on the same charge.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ellison v. State

2. ““This possibility is sufficient to justify Montgomery’s claim of privilege. For a witness to be entitled to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, it is not necessary that his testimony will with certainty lead to further criminal conviction. Rather, there must only be ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger,’ Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). The Supreme Court went on in Hoffman to state ( 341 U.S. at 486-487 [, 71 S.Ct. at 818 ) ]: ‘To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.’ The Court in Hoffman reversed a contempt conviction of a witness who refused to answer certain questions on the ground that ‘it was not “perfectly clear ... that the answerfs] cannot possibly have such tendency” to incriminate.’ 341 U.S. at 488 [, 71 S.Ct. at 819 .] In light of this standard, it cannot reasonably be concluded that there was no danger that Montgomery’s testimony might have injured him in a subsequent trial on the criminal charges involved.” 1”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ellison v. State

3. ““Gernie, however, like many other cases setting forth the same proposition, concerned a witness who had both pleaded guilty and been sentenced on the guilty plea. In the instant case, while the witness Montgomery had entered a plea of guilty, he had not yet been sentenced.” (Emphasis in original).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 65 Md. App. 321 - Ellison v. State