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283 N.C. 550

196 S.E.2d 756

State v. Williams

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided June 1, 1973

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1973-06-01

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““to establish a uniform system of control over the sale, purchase ... of intoxicating liquors ... to insure, as far as possible, the proper administration of this Chapter under a uniform system throughout the State.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Craig v. County of Chatham

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1973-06-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently September 2005

12 state decisions

801973198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Justice Huskins

¶1dissenting.

¶2I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority for reasons which follow.

¶3The stated purpose of Chapter 18A of the General Statutes is to establish a uniform system of control over the sale, purchase, transportation, manufacture, and possession of intoxicating liquors in North Carolina and to provide administrative *555procedures to carry out that purpose. G.S. 18A-1 states the purpose and then provides: “This Chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that the sale, purchase, transportation, manufacture, and possession of intoxicating liquors shall be prohibited except as authorized in this Chapter.” (Emphasis added.)

¶4G.S. 18A-2(4) provides in pertinent part: “The word ‘liquor’ or the phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ shall be construed to include . . . beer, ...” G.S. 18A-2(5) provides in pertinent part: “The term ‘malt beverages’ shall mean beer, ...” Thus, as used in Chapter 18A of the General Statutes, beer is both an intoxicating liquor and a malt beverage.

¶5G.S. 18A-3(a) provides: “No person shall . . . possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this Chapter.” This of course means that no person shall possess beer except as authorized in this Chapter.

¶6G.S. 18A-35(a) provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the . . . possession of malt beverages . . . [is] permitted without restriction or regulation.”

¶7In essence, the foregoing provisions produce the following state of affairs with respect to the possession of beer: G.S. 18A-3(a) is the only provision in Chapter 18A prohibiting the possession of beer and it says that possession of beer is prohibited “except as authorized in this Chapter.” G.S. 18A-35(a) is the only provision in Chapter 18A permitting the possession of beer and it says that possession of beer is permitted “except as otherwise provided in this Chapter.” Thus, the possession of beer is prohibited except where permitted and permitted except where prohibited. Neither area is defined nor otherwise identified in Chapter 18A. Therefore, following the mandate in G.S. 18A-1 that Chapter 18A “shall be liberally construed to the end that the . . . possession of intoxicating liquors [meaning beer] shall be prohibited except as authorized in this Chapter,” I conclude that the possession of beer in open cans on the streets of Mount Airy is prohibited under State law; and the ordinance in question, prohibiting the possession of open beer in the streets, is not in conflict therewith. In my view the validity of the ordinance should be upheld.

¶8Putting aside the superlative draftsmanship, it is my view that the General Assembly never intended to authorize possession of beer in open cans, or its consumption, on the public *556streets and highways of the State. In my opinion the beer industry will be surprised to learn that its lobbyists have accomplished that result. If, as the majority holds, the law permits the possession of beer in open cans on the public streets, then the law must also permit its consumption there. After all, there is no point in opening a can of beer if one doesn’t intend to drink it. I do not believe the beer industry sought or desires, or that the Legislature intended to legalize, such practice.

¶9For the reasons stated I vote to uphold the validity of the ordinance in question.

Justice Lake joins in this dissenting opinion.
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