Denton County v. Beynon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A 1999 per curiam opinion from this Court appeared to add a second element to the definition, stating "[a] special defect must be a condition of the same kind or class as an excavation or roadway obstruction and present 'an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways.' " State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (emphasis added)[, abrogated on other grounds by Denton Cnty. v. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329 (Tex.2009) (quoting Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 )]. The TTCA itself says nothing about "unexpected and unusual danger.” That phrase first appeared in 1992 in Payne . In that case, we observed that excavations and obstructions "present an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways.” Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 . The TTCA mandates no second prong, nor does Payne engraft one; the statutory test is simply whether the condition is of the same class as an excavation or obstruction. We used "unexpected and unusual danger” in Payrte to describe the class, not to redefine it. Nor does the case upon which Payne rests, Eaton, 573 S.W.2d at 179 , mandate that the condition, besides being like an excavation or obstruction, also pose an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary roadway users.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Texas Department of Transportation v. Jacqueline Ingram · Tex. Facilities Comm'n v. Speer

2. “Even still, the arm did not “pose a threat to the ordinary users of [Old Alton Road],” or prevent ordinary users from traveling on the road (as opposed to skidding off the road). Our cases rest on the objective expectations of an “ordinary user,” and such a driver would not be expected to careen uncontrollably off the paved roadway and into the adjoining grass, as [the driver] admitted when he stated that “the normal course of travel for [Old Alton Road] would be the asphalt pavement.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Texas Department of Transportation v. Teresa Renee Abila Lopez · Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez

3. “a defect that is not like an excavation or obstruction on a roadway.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tex. Facilities Comm'n v. Speer · Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez