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284 So. 2d 448

Walker v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided October 16, 1973

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1973-10-16

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently February 1974

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The facts of this case show the Petitioner to be a man whose mental processes were substantially impaired at the time of the homicide, even though he may have known right from wrong. “Testimony concerning demonstrable brain damage conflicted. One physician testified that the defendant’s electroencephalogram showed abnormalities; another testified that it appeared normal but could indicate anxiety. “One physician testified that there was evidence of organic brain damage; three testified that there was no such evidence and another that such damage was possible. “One doctor testified that the defendant did not know right from wrong at the time of the crime; another testified that he did; and four others equivocated although they were all inclined to think he did know right from wrong at the time of the crime. “However, the doctors were unanimous in their judgment that the Petitioner suffered severe mental impairment at the time of the crime. They all agreed that his illness was such that extreme stress could trigger explosive and irrational behavior. All the Petitioner knew was that ‘something hit me and that was it.’ The doctors agree that because of his emotional problems, depression, inability to use his normal defensive techniques of avoidance and denial to control his impulses and ‘potentially explosive’ behavior, he was ‘under terrific emotional stress at the time’ of the crime. Emotional stress has to be avoided, because under such stress, the various doctors testified, ”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Walker v. State

Relies on 276 So. 2d 17 - Anderson v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1973-10-16

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PER CURIAM.

¶1The defendant was indicted for first degree murder; an information was filed and the defendant pleaded not guilty. Pursuant to Rule 3.210, CrPR, 33 F.S.A., the defendant gave notice of his intention to rely upon the defense of insanity.

¶2The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 775.082(2), F.S.A. No hearing was held pursuant to Rule 3.780, CrPR, 33 F.S.A., because the statute made a life sentence mandatory.

¶3The only point presented by the appellant which urges error in the trial of the case against him is contained in his *449third point on appeal. This point urges that the McNaghten test of insanity is arbitrary, unreasonable, and obsolete and is consequently a denial of substantive due process of law. This issue has so recently been decided against the position assumed by appellant that we do not discuss it further and find that it does not present reversible error. See Anderson v. State, Fla.1973, 276 So.2d 17.

¶4Appellant’s remaining two points are as follows:

“I. Florida’s legal requirement that all persons not insane under the Mc-Naghten rule who are convicted of first degree murder be sentenced to life imprisonment violates Florida’s constitutional ban against cruel punishment where the evidence indicates the defendant suffered severe mental impairment at the time of the homicide.
“II. Florida’s legal requirement that all persons not insane under the M’Naghten rule who are convicted of first degree murder be sentenced to life imprisonment violates the due process and equal protection clauses of Florida’s constitution, as applied to a defendant who suffered severe mental impairment at the time of the homicide.”

¶5 We hold that no error has been demonstrated under either point. Appellant’s principal emphasis in argument was upon point II which urges that the Florida mandatory life sentence for first degree murder constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law. It is urged that because there was some evidence in the trial court that he was mentally ill that he thereupon becomes a member of a class which is denied equal protection because of the mandatory life sentence. While there is evidence in the record which the jury could have believed and under which it could have found him mentally incompetent, we find no evidence in the record that the appellant belongs to a special class or group. The argument that the mandatory life sentence is discriminatory is exactly the opposite of the generally accepted meaning of “equal protection.” It has often been stated that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires that all persons be treated alike. See cases cited at 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 488. It is clear that the law under which the appellant was sentenced provides every individual convicted of first degree murder with exactly the same treatment.

¶6Affirmed.

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