State v. Hicks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

347 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 347 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"(a) Setting the date.—The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court: (1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: (1) The appearance of counsel; or (ii) The first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules; and (2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those events. "(b) Changing date.—On motion of a party or on the court's initiative and for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that judge may grant a change of the circuit court date. "(c) Court rules.—The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of practice for the implementation of this section in circuit courts.””

   29 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 48 Md. App. 115 - Goins v. State · State v. Brown

2. “'There are two circumstances, however, under which dismissal is not an appropriate sanction for violation of Rule 746. First, in addition to the requirement that, absent extraordinary cause, criminal cases at the circuit court level be tried within 120 days of the appointment or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of counsel under Rule 723, Rule 746 also requires that the act of setting this trial date be done within 30 days. Of course, as long as the case is tried within the 120-day deadline, the purpose of the rule and the statute upon which it is based, namely having the case tried promptly, will be accomplished, even if the setting of that trial date is not done within 30 days. In other words, the legislative purpose underlying § 591 and Rule 746 will in no way be advanced by holding that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for violation of the 30-day requirement. For this reason, we do distinguish between the 120-day requirement and the 30-day requirement. While the 30-day requirement is mandatory for those persons involved in setting the trial date, we hold that dismissal of the criminal case is not an appropriate sanction for violation of the 30-day provision.’ [Id. at 335.] Unlike the bringing of a civil or criminal proceeding where the applicable time limits are largely in the control of the party initiating the litigation, neither party here had control over the date set for the disposition hearing. We do not have before us in this proceeding the question of”

   18 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 48 Md. App. 115 - Goins v. State · State v. Brown

3. ““The provisions of Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are not mere guides or bench marks to be observed, if convenient. Accordingly, Judge Pollitt was correct in holding that Rule 746 is mandatory and that dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction where the State fails to bring the case to trial within the 120-day period prescribed by the rule and where ‘extraordinary cause’ justifying a trial postponement has not been established.” 5”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 48 Md. App. 115 - Goins v. State · State v. Parker