Lewis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district · 193 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 197 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Under ... the Constitution of Maryland, implemented by Maryland Rule 757 b, a jury in a criminal trial is instructed that it is the judge of the law as well as the facts, and that the court's instructions are merely advisory. See Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571 , 357 A.2d 360 (1976). An exception to this principle is that determinations of the law governing the admissibility of evidence are within the sole domain of the trial judge, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89-90 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and the Maryland cases there discussed. "Here, the defendant contends that by instructing the jury as to the law pertaining to the admissibility of confessions, and later telling them generally that the instructions are merely advisory, error was committed. In light of the instructions as a whole, we are not prepared to say that reversible error was committed. Nevertheless, we agree with the defendant that, since the jury's consideration of the voluntariness of the confession involves a delegation to it to determine the propriety of admitting this evidence, Dempsey v. State, supra, 277 Md. at 143-150 , [ 355 A.2d 455 (1976) ], the instructions in this regard fall within the exception discussed in Brady and are consequently binding upon the jury. Henceforth in all criminal cases involving the jury's consideration of the admissibility of a confession, including the instant case on retrial, appropriate instructions to this effect should be given to the jury."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Adams

2. “On the other hand, we agree with the State that we should now change the technical common law procedural rule mandating that an accessory cannot be tried before the principal is sentenced. The fact that this rule became part of the law of Maryland in 1776 does not preclude such change. Recently in Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 334 , 396 A.2d 1054 , (1979), we assumed that misprision of felony was a common law crime and that it became part of this [S]tate’s law in 1776, but we held that it no longer exists in Maryland, stating “that the common law is subject to change.” 284 Md. at 341, 396 A.2d 1054 . As it is often said, “the common law is not static but adopts itself to changing conditions and increasing knowledge.” Latz v. Latz a/k/a Schafer, 10 Md.App. 720, 731 , 272 A.2d 435 (1971), quoting Maryland to use of Weaver v. O’Brien, 140 F.Supp. 306, 311 (D.Md.1956).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 Md. App. 222 - Sowell v. State

3. “[The common law] may be changed by legislative act as Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights expressly provides.... It may also be changed by judicial decision.... We asserted in Ass’n of Taxi Oprs. v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204 , 82 A.2d 106 (1951): “We have frequently held that it is our duty to determine the common law' as it exists in this State.... ” The doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude the exercise of this duty. We declared in White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354 , 223 A.2d 763 (1966): “The doctrine of stare decisis, important as it is, is not to be construed as preventing us from changing a rule of law if we are convinced that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life.” Accord, Hearst Corp. v. St. Dep’t of A. & T., 269 Md. 625, 643-44 , 308 A.2d 679 (1973).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 Md. App. 222 - Sowell v. State