285 Pa. Super. 542 - Hall v. Lee’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(I)f this order were to be found to be presently appeal-able, it would tend to discourage the (trial) court’s use of the disciplinary tool, and it would merely become another weapon in the arsenal of dilatory practice for the attorney who wished to delay the judicial proceedings.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 426 Pa. Super. 127 - West v. Andersen · 354 Pa. Super. 253 - Elderkin, Martin, Kelly, Messina & Zamboldi v. Sedney

2. “Before we may consider the merits of this appeal, we must determine whether it is properly before us. Although the appellee did not raise this issue, the appealabil ity of an order is a question of jurisdiction and may be raised sua sponte. Williams v. Williams, 253 Pa.Super. 444 , 385 A.2d 422 (1978); Polascik v. Baldwin, 245 Pa.Super. 1 , 369 A.2d 263 (1976); 42 Pa.C.S. § 704(b)(2). Our court’s appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals from final orders of courts of common pleas. 42 Pa.C.S. § 742. A final order is generally one which terminates the litigation, disposes of the entire case, or effectively puts the litigant out of court. Adoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24 , 398 A.2d 642 (1979); In the Interest of C.A.M., 264 Pa.Super. 300 , 399 A.2d 786 (1979). “The reason for prohibiting appeals from interlocutory orders is ‘to preclude piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.’ ” Piltzer v. Independence Federal Savings and Loan Association of Philadelphia, 456 Pa. 402, 406 , 319 A.2d 677, 678 (1974); quoting from Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649 , 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954). Orders which do not dispose of the entire case may be deemed final and appealable, however, if postponement of appeal until after final judgment might result in the irreparable loss of the right asserted. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73 , 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978), construing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 296 Pa. Super. 463 - Swift v. Milner

3. “(g)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules, if following the refusal, objection or failure of a party or person to comply with any provision of this chapter, the court, after opportunity for hearing, enters an order compelling compliance and the order is not obeyed, the court on a subsequent motion for sanctions may, if the motion is granted, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motions or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in obtaining the order of compliance and the order for sanctions, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 361 Pa. Super. 92 - Markey v. Marino