State v. Hemphill’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We similarly conclude in this case that appointed counsel’s argument at the hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw his pleas was egregiously ineffective. While attorneys have a duty of candor toward the tribunal under Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 508), this duty does not require an attorney to forsake his or her role as a client’s representative. [Citation omitted.] Here, appointed counsel’s argument against defendant’s interest forced defendant to argue his own case, resulting in the complete abandonment of counsel’s role as defendant’s representative. “We also conclude that Hemphill was prejudiced by the abandonment. The defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his pleas, read liberally, raises questions regarding the voluntariness of his pleas and their factual basis. The district court apparently concluded that the defendant’s motion raised substantial issues of fact or law, as the court did not summarily deny the motion but instead áppointed counsel to represent the defendant and held a hearing to determine the merits. [Citation omitted.] Yet these issues were not explored at the hearing. Instead, the defendant’s appointed counsel explained why he felt that the issues did not have merit, and the defendant, left to argue for himself, stated only that he did not ‘know how to go about this’ and did not ‘know what to say’ because he ‘thought [he] was going to have somebody to represent [him].’ ” 286 Kan. at 594-95 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 42 Kan. App. 2d 392 - Alford v. State

2. “A fatal flaw in Guillory's argument is that the first Ortiz exception, excusing an untimely notice of appeal where the defendant was not informed of the right to appeal, was based on the fact that a criminal defendant has a statutory right to be advised of his or her right to a direct appeal. K.S.A. 22-3424(f) requires the sentencing court to inform criminal defendants of the right to appeal. In contrast, there is no statutory requirement that the district court advise a K.S.A. 60-1507 movant of the right to appeal the decision on his or her motion. "The fundamental fairness principle underlying all three exceptions recognized in Ortiz and its progeny is based on the facts that the defendant's failure to timely appeal was the result of being deprived of a right to which he or she was entitled by law: the statutory right to be advised of the right to appeal; the statutory right to be provided an 9 attorney to file an appeal; or the right to have the appointed attorney perform effectively in perfecting the appeal. .... "As far as the filing of a timely notice of appeal is concerned, a pro se K.S.A. 60- 1507 movant is in the same position as all other pro se civil litigants and is required to be aware of and follow the rules of procedure that apply to all civil litigants, pro se or represented by counsel. [Citations omitted.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 57 Kan. App. 2d 145 - In re I.A.

3. “K.S.A. 22-4505(a) requires that a district court inform a defendant of his or her right to appeal from a conviction and the right to have counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent; K.S.A. 22-3424(f) states that a district court has a duty at sentencing to inform a defendant of the right to appeal from his or her sentence after a jury conviction. There is no similar statutory requirement regarding a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 57 Kan. App. 2d 145 - In re I.A.