State v. Morton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘ “(1) when and where the interrogation occurred; (2) how long it lasted; (3) how many police officers were present; (4) what the officers and defendant said and did; (5) the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door; (6) whether the defendant is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) how the defendant got to the place of questioning, that is, whether he came completely on his own in response to a police request or was escorted by police officers; and (8) what happened after the interrogation — whether the defendant left freely, was detained, or was arrested.” ’ [Citation omitted.]” Morton, 286 Kan. at 640 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Guein · State v. Summers

2. ““ ‘ “[t]o reduce the risk of a coerced confession and to implement the Self-Incrimination Clause” (Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 , 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 , 123 S. Ct. 1994 [2003] [Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part]), the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 [, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 ] (1966), concluded that states may not use statements stemming from a custodial interrogation of a defendant unless the State demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.’ ” Morton, 286 Kan. at 639 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Schultz

3. ““A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether an interrogation is custodial for purposes of Miranda. The first prong is: What were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation? We review that determination under a substantial competent evidence standard. The second prong of die inquiry is: Under the totality of those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave? We apply a de novo standard of review to that determination. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Morton, 286 Kan. 632, 640 , 186 P.3d 785 (2008).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Summers