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287 Ala. 685

255 So.2d 26

Otts v. Gray

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided November 18, 1971

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1971-11-18

Relies on Tullis v. Blue

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1971-11-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently October 2008 · most notably 497 So. 2d 111 - Otwell v. Bryant (1986), 360 So. 2d 936 - Semo Aviation, Inc. v. Southeastern Airways Corp. (1978)

28 state decisions

1301971198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

¶2The third party defendant .General Motors . Corporation' in its application ■ for rehearing asked the Court to extend its.' opinion to hold expressly that' the' trial court’s, judgment-in favor of the third party defendant General Motors Corporation-still stands arid that'the case was not reversed as to said 'General Motors Corporafion.

¶3*693Third party defendant General Motors Corporation was brought into the case by a third party complaint filed by defendants Gray and Swindle. The affirmative charge was granted in favor of the third party defendant General Motors Corporation and the jury returned verdicts in favor of General Motors in accordance therewith. The third party plaintiff Gray did not appeal. Third party plaintiff Swindle appealed but dismissed his appeal. The original plaintiff in the instant case never asserted any claim against General Motors Corporation.

¶4A similar situation existed in the case of Tullis v. Blue, 216 Ala. 577, 114 So. 185 (1927). This was an automobile accident case in which the plaintiff Blue obtained a judgment for damages against both defendants, Tullis and Haltiwanger. Only defendant Tullis appealed. This Court in that case held that defendant Tullis was entitled to the general affirmative charge, as requested by him in writing during the trial. In the concluding paragraphs of its original opinion, this Court said:

“It results that the refusal of that charge was error for which the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
“Reversed and remanded.”

¶5In its opinion on rehearing, this Court said:

“The foregoing judgment of reversal was intended to affect the judgment appealed from only as against the appellant, Tullis. The defendant Haltiwanger did not appeal from the judgment rendered against him and Tullis, and there is no conceivable reason, in law or in justice, for reversing the judgment as rendered against Haltiwanger.”

¶6After reviewing the law on the subject, this Court then concluded its opinion on rehearing :

“The order of reversal will be qualified, so as to reverse the judgment below- only as to the appellant, Tullis. As against Haltiwanger, the judgment-will-be neither reversed nor affirmed, but will simply stand as though no appeal had been taken.”

¶7In the instant case, defendants (also third party plaintiffs) Gray and Swindle, are in a position corresponding to that of defendant Haltiwanger in Tullis v. Blue, supra. Therefore, the judgment in favor of third party defendant General Motors Corporation, not having been appealed from, should stand as though no appeal had been taken.

¶8Application for rehearing granted as to General Motors Corporation. Opinion extended.

HEFLIN, C. J., and COLEMAN, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.
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