McNellis v. Raymond’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 5 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The trustee has the burden of showing more than the bare fact that Donald [bankrupt] paid a debt of Potter Securities [third party benefitted]; he must show that Donald’s payments to Raymond [defendant] constituted a misappropriation of Donald’s funds, such as would arise from an absence of obligation by Donald to Potter Securities. Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Co. v. Zoller, supra, [2 Cir., 109 F.2d 924 ] at 926. But here there was such a “degree of identity and commingling of affairs” between Donald and Potter Securities that they cannot be regarded as separate entities insofar as Donald’s obligation to repay the loans is concerned. Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., supra, [5 Cir., 270 F.2d 823 ] at 830. The deposit of Raymond’s money in Donald’s bank account, all else aside, gives rise to an antecedent indebtedness on the part of Donald sufficient to satisfy the requirement of fair consideration. Id. at 829. Moreover, the indirect benefit Donald received in postponing the date of bankruptcy as a result of Raymond’s loans would support a finding of fair consideration. Williams v. Twin City Co., supra, [9 Cir., 251 F.2d 678 ] at 681. Raymond’s loans, although in form to Potter Securities, found their way into Donald’s bank account by virtue of the identity of interest between Potter Securities and Donald. Raymond was entitled to be repaid. No one was more clearly indebted to Raymond than was Donald. Under these circumstances, to grant Donald an immunity from his obligatio”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Biggs v. United States National Bank of Omaha

2. ““ . . . [P]laintiff did not pursue at the trial his first cause of action, based upon the alleged usurious character of the loans, in reliance upon defendant’s representation that his transactions were solely with Potter Securities Corporation and not with the bankrupt, Donald S. Potter, or Potter Real Estate Company, his sole proprietorship. Contrary to defendant’s answers to certain of plaintiff’s interrogatories, defendant produced at the trial checks drawn by him to the order of Donald S. Potter and Potter Real Estate Company. Since plaintiff’s abandonment of his usury cause of action appears to have been induced by defendant’s failure to disclose prior to trial that he had had such transactions with Donald S. Potter or Potter Real Estate Company, plaintiff is granted leave to move for trial upon his first cause of action, . . ..” 287 F.Supp. at 234.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McNellis v. Raymond

3. “(1) That defendant is entitled to judgment dismissing the first cause of action alleged in the complaint. (2) That plaintiff’s motion to reopen the record and for a new trial on the second cause of action alleged in the complaint is denied. (3) That the Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint, including the first and second causes of action alleged therein, with costs.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McNellis v. Raymond