Adams v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The facts of this case provide no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness. In contrast to Pearce , [the appellant's] second trial came about because the trial judge herself concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct required it. Granting [the appellant's] motion for a new trial hardly suggests any vindictiveness on the part of the judge towards him. Unlike the judge who has been reversed, the trial judge here had no motivation to engage in self-vindication. ... The presumption of Pearce does not apply in situations where the possibility of vindictiveness is this speculative, particularly since the presumption may often operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus block a legitimate response to criminal conduct[.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. LOVELESS v. the STATE.

2. “best reflects the realities faced by district court judges who sentence a defendant on related counts of an indictment. Sentencing is a fact-sensitive exercise that requires district court judges to consider a wide array of factors when putting together a “sentencing package.” When an appellate court subsequently reverses a conviction (or convictions) that was part of the original sentence, the district court’s job on remand is to reconsider the entirety of the (now-changed) circumstances and fashion a sentence that fits the crime and criminal. The aggregate approach’s inherent flexibility best comports with this important goal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State of Iowa v. Stevie Dewayne Harrington

3. “does not require an absolute bar on the increase of sentences after re-conviction or resentencing, but seeks only to prevent 'increased sentences when that increase was motivated by vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. LOVELESS v. the STATE.