Battle v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1980
Citation profile
92 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 92 later decisions — most recently November 2019 · most notably Dawkins v. State (1988), Ware v. State (2000)
92 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Barker v. Wingo · Klopfer v. State of North Carolina · Midgett v. State · State v. Auld · Stewart v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 92 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Given the fact that consent must precede penetration, it follows in our view that although a woman may have consented to a sexual encounter, even to intercourse, if that consent is withdrawn prior to the act of penetration, then it cannot be said that she has consented to sexual intercourse. On the other hand, ordinarily if she consents prior to penetration and withdraws the consent following penetration, there is no rape.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“It is next urged by the defendant that the trial court committed reversible error in not charging the jury that in the commission of a rape, consent may not be withdrawn during the act of intercourse. The Court fully and correctly charged all of the elements constituting the crime of rape. The jury was further instructed that consent could be withdrawn at any stage "during the preparatory acts." The general rule may be summarized as follows: Consent must precede the penetration. Burdick, The Law of Crime, Vol. 2 s 484, at p. 235. See 44 Am.Jur., "Rape," s 8, p. 906; 52 C.J., s 26, p. 1017, and State v. McCaffrey, 63 Iowa 479 , 19 N.W. 331 (Ia.1884). ( Id. at 435-36, 67 A.2d at 180.) In State v. Allen, 163 Kan. 374 , 183 P.2d 458 (1947), the court said: Appellant argues the evidence failed to disclose force was employed. It will serve no useful purpose to narrate the detailed facts of the episode. It may be conceded, as contended by appellant, the episode started in what appellant has seen fit to denominate a mutually desirable "petting party." It also frankly should be stated the woman admitted that at one time during the episode she contemplated sexual intercourse. The trouble is, the evidence also discloses that it ceased to be a mutually desirable affair, the woman resisted and thereafter appellant resorted to force. The reason, or reasons, for her change of mind are not controlling. The fact she did change her mind, so advised appellant, and thereafter resisted his effort”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Dean Burdick further comments: It is said or intimated by some that consent may be given during any part of the intercourse, that is after the penetration but before completion of the coitus. However, an examination of the cases sometimes cited in support of such a doctrine shows that such comments are dicta or else made in connection with evidence relating to the alleged nonresistance of the woman and tending to show that she consented before the act. If penetration alone completes the act, it is illogical and unsound to say that consent may follow the penetration. (Id. at 236.) The reason for this view is expressed by W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law s 57 (1972), in discussing consent of the victim as a defense to crimes generally: Condonation, the forgiveness of a criminal offense by the victim, is no defense. Sometimes this is explained on the ground that condonation is after-the-fact consent by the victim and thus cannot be any more effective than before-the-fact consent. This, however, might suggest that condo-nation is a defense in those circumstances where before-the-fact consent would bar conviction, but this is not the case. While before-the-fact consent may negative an element of the offense or preclude infliction of the harm to be prevented by the law in question, this is not true of subsequent condonation. Such forgiveness “has no proper place in the criminal law. The interest of the state is paramount and controls prosecutions ... (f)or it is the”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.