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← 287 N.J. Super. 370 - Whitaker v. Devilla

287 N.J. Super. 370 - Whitaker v. Devilla’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
3
states following
March 2004
most recently cited

6 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Wene v. Meyner · Lesniak v. Budzash · 286 N.J. Super. 477 - Loftus-Smith v. Henry · 275 N.J. Super. 286 - Taylor-Segan v. Rajagopal

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Any insurer authorized to transact or transacting automobile or motor vehicle insurance business in this State, or controlling or controlled by, or under common control by, or with, an insurer authorized to transact or transacting insurance business in this State, which sells a policy providing automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance coverage, or any similar coverage, in any other state or in any province of Canada, shall include in each policy coverage to satisfy at least the liability insurance requirements of section 1 of P.L.1972, c. 197 (C. 39:6B-1) or section 3 of P.L.1972, c. 70 (C. 39:6A-3), the uninsured motorist insurance requirements of subsection a. of section 2 of P.L.1968, e. 385 (C. 17:28-1.1), and personal injury protection benefits coverage pursuant to section 4 of P.L.1972, c. 70 (C. 39:6A-4) or of section 19 of P.L.1983, c. 362 (C. 17:28-1.3), whenever the automobile or motor vehicle insured under the policy is used or operated in this State. Any liability insurance policy subject to this section shall be construed as providing the coverage required herein, and any named insured, and any immedi ate family member as defined in section 14.1 of P.L.1983, c. 362 (C. 39:6A-8.1), under that policy, shall be subject to the tort option specified in subsection a. of section 8 of P.L.1972, c. 70 (C. 89:6A-8).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “There is no basis shown in the present case to distinguish between a New Jersey resident who pays a New Jersey insurance company for “no threshold” coverage and an out-of-state resident who opts for substantially the same coverage with the same insurance company. In any event, the result would be anomalous. Consider next-door neighbors living just over the border in a contiguous state. One pays for “no threshold” coverage with an insurance company authorized to do business in New Jersey, while his neighbor obtains his insurance from a company not so authorized, and does not pay for the greater coverage. If the Deemer provision is interpreted as applying to the first, he cannot recover for non-economic damages if he is injured in an automobile accident occurring here, but his neighbor, who has not paid the greater premium can recover non-economic loss without regard to the verbal threshold. We can not attribute so absurd and unnecessary an intention to our Legislature, particularly where the New Jersey authorized insurance company can probably control the optional premium for the “no threshold” coverage just as easily as it does with a New Jersey resident. [Ibid]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Applying the “verbal threshold,” however, to non-residents, such as the plaintiff, who specifically elect and pay for the broader coverage through a New Jersey company, does not advance the Legislature’s, or the Governor’s, intent of containing costs of automobile insurance by allowing recovery for “non-economic” damages only to those who pay for “no threshold” access to the courts. There is no basis shown in the present case to distinguish between a New Jersey resident who pays a New Jersey insurance company for “no threshold” coverage and an out-of-state resident who opts for substantially the same coverage with the same insurance company. jjs ij< jjs :}: We conclude that the language employed by the Legislature in the Deemer provision, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, was inadvertently overbroad and was not intended to restrict the rights of persons such as the present plaintiffs. We reverse and remand.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.