¶1dissenting.
¶2Although the majority acknowledges that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969) does not require the use of magic *781words or precisely-defined language during a guilty plea proceeding, it nevertheless “ ‘elevate[s] formalistic litany of constitutional rights over the substance of the dialogue between the trial court and the accused.’ [Cit.]” Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 745 (1) (683 SE2d 586) (2009). See also Hawes v. State, 281 Ga. 822, 824 (642 SE2d 92) (2007).
¶3The plea hearing transcript in this case “affirmatively shows that the trial court specifically advised [Wilson] of his right to remain silent,” and “[t]he fact that the trial court advised [him] of this right at a separate point in the plea colloquy from its advisement to him of the remaining Boykinrights is of no legal significance.” Jackson v. State, 285 Ga. 840, 841 (1), fn. 2 (684 SE2d 594) (2009). The trial court then explained that right in a reasonably intelligible manner by adding the words “thereby not giving any evidence against yourselves.” See Adams v. State, supra.
¶4The majority relies solely upon a dictum in a footnote of Adams, quoting an intermediate appellate court in Louisiana, that the phrase “right to remain silent” “ ‘frequently is used interchangeably with the “right against self-incrimination” and is an acceptable substitute as long as it is clear that the trial court is referring to the right to remain silent “at trial.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Adams v. State, supra at 746 (1), fn. 3.1 am not convinced that this dictum sets forth a controlling rule in Georgia. Moreover, even assuming that it does, the trial court’s reference in this case clearly included the right to remain silent at trial.
¶5Contrary to the majority, the trial court never limited the right to remain silent to the guilty plea hearing itself. Informing Wilson that he had a right to remain silent during the guilty plea hearing would be completely unnecessary because he himself requested the hearing. Harrell v. State, 275 Ga. 519, 520-521 (2) (570 SE2d 315) (2002). Instead, the trial court explained the procedure for waiving the right to remain silent by pleading guilty at the hearing. The majority confuses this explanation of waiver with placing a limitation on the right to remain silent. The trial court specifically stated, “however, if you want to proceed and dispose of your case by pleading guilty, I need for you to answer my questions out loud.” This plain language simply expressed the procedure for waiver in a manner reasonably intelligible even to defendants of limited vocabulary and comprehension. See Adams v. State, supra. “The crucial issue is whether [Wilson] understood that his guilty plea was tantamount to a waiver of the right to remain silent, and the record shows that he did.” Harrell v. State, supra at 521 (2).
¶6Today’s decision illustrates how far this Court has wandered from a correct understanding of Boykinby requiring a “formalistic litany of constitutional rights” and making that litany a constitutional right itself. See Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 614 (556 SE2d 435) (2001) (recognizing the difference between the constitutional rights to which the accused is entitled and any constitutional requirement that he be informed of those rights). Indeed, the majority is so determined to adhere to this formalistic *782litany that it reverses based on a failure to inform Wilson properly of his privilege against self-incrimination and the waiver thereof by a guilty plea, even though Wilson has never argued, either in his habeas petition or in this appeal, that his guilty plea was involuntary or uninformed for that reason. “In the wake of Boykin, most jurisdictions revised their procedures for taking pleas so that defendants were specifically warned of the constitutional rights lost by entry of a plea other than not guilty. [Cits.]” 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 21.4 (e) (3d ed.). Although we now have a rule to that effect, “that Rule is not a constitutional provision, and habeas corpus relief is not available unless [the petitioner] suffered a substantial denial of his federal or state constitutional rights. [Cit.]” Britt v. Smith, supra at 612. Most jurisdictions, “often stressing the uniqueness of Boykinin that the defendant had been sentenced to death and his plea had apparently been accepted without any admonishments or inquiry whatsoever,” have held that a guilty plea is not constitutionally defective merely because the trial court “failed to articulate specifically the constitutional rights listed in the Boykincase[.]” 5 LaFave, supra. Georgia’s contrary understanding of Boykinplaces this state in a distinct minority. 5 LaFave, supra. Accordingly, I believe that the time has come to replace the formalistic litany currently required by this Court with the understanding of Boykinexpressed by the majority of jurisdictions, as “we have always considered the [due process] rights that are conferred by our state constitution upon one who pleads guilty to be coextensive with those granted by the comparable provision of the federal constitution. [Cit.]” Britt v. Smith, supra at 614. Regardless of whether or not that time has arrived, I must respectfully dissent to the reversal in this case of the habeas court’s order denying relief.
¶7I am authorized to state that Justice Nahmias joins in this dissent.