Volume 288 — Illinois Reports

<p>1. Schools—there is no constitutional limitation as to agencies the State shall adopt in providing free schools. There is no constitutional limitation as to the agencies the legislature shall adopt in providing for free schools or as to the tax rates that shall be fixed for such purpose, and the legislature may form and constitute any territory it may see fit into a school district and give to it corporate powers as such without any vote or consent of the people of the territory.</p> <p>2. Same—the validating act of ipip is valid. The high school validating act of 1917 is valid, as it only purports to validate such proceedings with reference to the organization of districts as the legislature might have authorized in the first instance.</p> <p>3. Same—validating act of ipip makes valid all acts of boards of education authorised by general School law. The high school validating act of 1917 makes valid every act of the boards of education of the districts affected where such acts were authorized by the general School law, including the levy of high school taxes previously levied in a district coming within the act.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Greene county; the Hon. Frank W. Burton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike county; the Hon. Harry HigbEE, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Deeds—ambiguous clause will be construed against grantor. Where a deed is so worded that it will be understood in one way by some and in another way by others, that meaning is to be adopted which is adverse to the interest of the grantor.</p> <p>2. Same—when court will consider surrounding circumstances in construing deed. Where the terms of a deed are ambiguous, to ascertain the intention of the parties the court will take notice of the surrounding circumstances.</p> <p>3. Same—when a covenant runs with the land. Where the owner of two adjoining lots conveys one of them, except ten feet thereof, with a covenant that the ten-foot strip shall be kept open as a passageway to be used in connection with a building which the grantor intends to erect on the adjoining lot, the fact that the grantor subsequently abandons the building project and sells the adjoining lot and the ten-foot strip, reciting in the deed the former covenant as to the passageway, will not prevent said covenant from running with the land.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. FoELL, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. C. V. Miles, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—when school board is not engaged in hazardous occupation under paragraph 8 of section 3 of Compensation act. A board of education in maintaining a school building is not engaged in a hazardous occupation under paragraph 8 of section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, where there is no showing that the building is subject to any statutory regulations or to any regulatory municipal ordinances.</p> <p>2. Same—when janitor of school house is not engaged in employment connected with building. The janitor of a school house is not engaged in an employment connected with the school building while occupied in trimming trees on the school grounds, and an injury sustained at such occupation does not arise out of or in the course of employment in the conduct and management of the school building.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jacob H. Hopkins, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills—when devise is of a fee simple. A devise of all the testator’s real estate to his brother, “to have and to hold the same to him and his heirs forever,” is a devise of a fee simple title, 'and the rule in Shelley’s case has no application.</p> <p>2. Same—when devise zvill lapse. A legacy or devise will lapse where the legatee or devisee dies before the death of the testator.</p> <p>3. Same—re-publication of the will by codicil does not revive lapsed devise. Where a codicil disposing of certain lapsed legacies makes no reference to a clause of the will creating a devise of a fee which has lapsed by the death of the devisee, the re-publication of the will by the execution of the codicil does not affect such a clause nor create a new and different devise from that which has lapsed, so as to vest 'the fee in the heirs of the deceased devisee.</p> <p>4. Same—when a devise will be sustained by implication. Devises by implication are sustained where there is clearly shown in the will an intention on the part of the testator to make a devise, although, in fact, he has not done so by formal language in the will.</p> <p>5. Same—a devise by implication cannot rest upon conjecture. To uphold a gift by implication the inference from the will of the testator’s intention cannot rest upon conjecture but must be such as to leave. no hesitation- in the mind of the court and permit of no other reasonable inference.</p> <p>6. Same—if possible, a lapsed legacy or devise will sink into residuary clause. If a legacy or devise lapses and there is a general residuary clause broad enough in terms to embrace it such legacy or devise will sink into the residuum; and this rule is based on the presumed intention of the testator that the residuary clause shall include everything not effectually devised or disposed of.</p> <p>7. Same—particular mode of expression not necessary to constitute residuary clause. The term “residue” means that which remains, and no particular mode of expression is necessary to constitute a residuary clause.</p> <p>8. Same—a residuary clause should be construed to prevent intestacy. A residuary clause should be so construed as to prevent intestacy of any part of the testator’s estate unless there is an apparent intention to the contrary.</p>

<p>1. Deeds—construction of the words “and” and “orP Courts will construe the word “and” as meaning “or,” and conversely, where such construction is necessary to give effect to the intention of the grantor.</p> <p>2. Same—“descendants” take as purchasers in grant to “children and their descendants.” Where a grant in a deed is to “children and their descendants,” the words “and their descendants” are to be construed as words of purchase.</p> <p>3. Same—descendants take by way of substitution, only, in a grant to several and their descendants. Unless the instrument creating the estate indicates a contrary intention in a grant to several and their descendants the descendants will take by way of substitution, only, and not in competition with their parents living at the time of distribution.</p> <p>4. Same—when remainder to children and their descendants is vested. Where there is nothing in the deed to indicate that the descendants are not to take in substitution in a grant of a remainder to children and their descendants, the remainders will vest in the children in being at the time the deed is made, subject to reduction by birth of other children and subject to defeasance by the death of any child before the termination of the particular estate, in which event descendants will take their deceased parent’s share.</p>

<p>1. Minors—a minor may disaffirm or ratify contract within a reasonable time after attaining his majority. Within a reasonable time after attaining his majority a minor may disaffirm a contract made by him - during minority or he may by acts recognizing the contract after becoming of age ratify it.</p> <p>2. Same—minor cannot defeat ratification of contract by alleging ignorance of right to disaffirm. Where a minor enters into a contract for the purchase of land his acts in making payments under the contract and having it recorded after he has become of age will ratify the contract, and as he is presumed to know the law he cannot afterwards be heard to say that he performed the acts of ratification in ignorance of his right to disaffirm.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Crawford county; the Hon. Duane Gaines, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation-—circuit court may review decision of arbitrator although no application is made for review by commission. Where the decision of the arbitrator has become the decision of the Industrial Commission because no application is made for review before the commission, the circuit court has jurisdiction to review the record of the proceeding before the arbitrator by writ of certiorari.</p> <p>2. Same—accidental injury necessary before compensation can be awarded for death of an employee having pre-existing disease. Compensation may be awarded for the death of an employee although he was afflicted with a pre-existing disease, provided the disease was aggravated and accelerated by an accidental injury received in the course of the employment, but to bring the case within the rule there must have been an accidental injury as the immediate or proximate cause of death.</p> <p>3. Same—when death is not from accidental injury. An injury is said to be accidental which occurs in the course of the employment unexpectedly and without the affirmative act or design of the employee, but the mere fact that the death of an employee afflicted with heart trouble may have been hastened by the heavy character of his regular work does not show accidental injury.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph county; the Hon. J. F. Gillham, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Statutes—when a statute will be given retroactive effect. While a statute is generally deemed to be prospective, only, it will be given a retroactive effect when it is clearly the intention of the legislature that it shall so operate.</p> <p>2. Same—words should be given ordinary meaning. In the construction of statutes it is the duty of the court to take the words found in the statute and give to each its ordinary, usual meaning.</p> <p>3. Same—statute cannot deprive citizen of vested right. The legislature cannot pass an ex post facto law or a retrospective law impairing the obligation of contracts, nor can it deprive a citizen of any vested right by a mere legislative act.</p> <p>4. Pensions—amendment to section 3 of Police Pension Fund act is retroactive but is not invalid. The amendment in 1917 to section 3‘ of the Police Pension Fund act, providing that the applicant for a pension must be fifty years of age, is intended to be retroactive and to apply to all persons who were entitled to claim pensions under the act before it was so amended, but the amendment is not for that reason invalid, as the right to apply for a pension is not a vested right.</p> <p>5. .Same—right to claim police pension may be taken away by State. As between the State and the members of the police department of one of the municipalities, the State may take away the right to claim a pension under the Police Pension Fund act without affecting the contract of the claimant or violating the constitution.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. John J. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David F. Matchett, Judge, presiding.

<p>Certificate of appeal to review the decision of Board of Review of Cook county.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibble, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and Errors—when question of revenue is involved. The question of revenue is involved when some recognized authority of the .State or some of the municipalities authorized by law to assess and collect taxes are attempting to proceed under the law to collect the same and when the controversy is whether the funds in dispute belong to the revenue of the county or State or some division thereof.</p> <p>2. Same—executors cannot appeal, as executors, from order of the probate court in favor of estate. Executors cannot appeal, as executors, from an order and judgment of the probate court in favor of the estate on a citation against them to inventory property claimed as their own, and where they have appealed as executors they cannot, by stipulation in the circuit court, change the proceeding to one under sections 81 and 82 of the Administration act and thus escape the binding force of the probate' order and judgment, from which they have not appealed as individuals.</p> <p>3. Taxes—no lien attaches to tax certificates for unpaid taxes. The words “personal property” in section 254 of the Revenue act, and the words “goods and chattels” in section 137, are to be construed as having the same meaning and as comprehending only such personalty as may be made subject to levy and sale under an execution on a judgment at*law, and where tax redemption money is paid in to the county clerk no lien attaches thereto for unpaid taxes due from the holder of the tax certificates, which are mere choses in action.</p> <p>4. Same—tax collector can enforce collection of taxes only by lien of his warrant. The tax collector is authorized to demand and receive pay for taxes or enforce a lien on his warrant, and if payment is not voluntarily made to him and he has no lien he has no further authority to institute an action to recover the amount of the taxes.</p> <p>5. Same—when bill of interpleader cannot be maintained as in nature of a creditor’s bill. Where a county clerk, who is sued by an executor to recover redemption money for tax certificates, files a bill of interpleader, making the county a defendant because it claims the money for unpaid taxes on the estate, the bill of inter-pleader cannot be maintained as a bill in the nature of a creditor’s bill, where there is no judgment against the estate or the estate is not shown to be insolvent.</p> <p>6. Administration—when an administrator pro tem need not be appointed. An administrator pro tem is not necessary in a case where there is already an executor duly appointed although the executor is claiming property as his own in opposition to the estate he represents, as the appointment of such an administrator is authorized only under section 72 of the Administration act where the executor has filed a claim against the estate.</p> <p>7. Same—proceeding under section 81 of Administration act to compel executor to inventory property is against him individually. A proceeding under section 81 of the Administration act to compel an executor to inventory property which he claims in opposition to the estate he is administering is a proceeding against him individually.</p> <p>8. Practice—practice where necessary party hies a disclaimer. A disclaimer is a mode of defense, and if it prevails the defendant must be dismissed, as a general rule, with costs, but if a defendant attempts to disclaim in a case where his disclaimer does not entitle him to a dismissal but must, notwithstanding his disclaimer, still be retained as a party defendant in order that the subject matter of the case be finally disposed of, he should be retained in the suit and his disclaimer stricken from the files.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—if killing is proved defendant must prove circumstances in justification. Where a defendant is indicted for murder and the evidence clearly shows that he committed the homicide the burden is upon him to show circumstances in justification of his act, and the weight to be given such evidence is for the jury.</p> <p>2. Same—when instruction that calling foul names zvill not justify attack is proper. It is not improper in a murder trial to instruct the jury that calling foul names does not justify an attack, where the defendant, according to his own testimony, had been called foul names by the deceased a few minutes before the fatal encounter, though he did not assault the deceased for that reason.</p> <p>3. Same—certificate of judge is only proper method of showing what took place in his presence. An assignment of error that the court erred in overruling a peremptory challenge during the examination of the jurors cannot be considered where the bill of exceptions contains no certificate of the judge as to what actually took place, as this is the only way of showing what the judge does or what occurs in his presence.</p>

<p>1. Trial—on motion to instruct for defendant the evidence is to be taken most strongly in favor of plaintiff. A motion to instruct the jury to find for the defendant is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, and the testimony so demurred to, together with all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, must be taken most strongly in favor of the plaintiff.</p> <p>2. Wills—what is undue influence. Undue influence is any improper or wrongful constraint, machination or urgency of persuasion whereby the will of a person is overpowered and he is induced to do something he would not do if left to act freely.</p> <p>3. Same—burden is on the contestant to prove charge of undue influence—fiduciary relation. The burden rests upon the contestant to prove the charge of undue influence, and the mere fact that beneficiaries in a will stand in a fiduciary relation to the testator does not put upon them the burden of showing an absence of fraud and undue influence, where there is no evidence tending to show that they were instrumental in procuring the execution of the will.</p> <p>4. Same—what question is presented on, motion to withdraw issue from jury. In a will contest case, on a motion to withdraw the issue of undue influence from the jury, the question presented is whether there is any evidence fairly tending to prove that issue.</p> <p>5. Same—admissions of one devisee as to acts of undue influence not admissible where devisees have separate interests. In a will contest case, statements or admissions made by a devisee concerning the testamentary capacity of the testator or acts of undue influence in procuring the execution of a will, while admissible in evidence where the interest of all the devisees is joint, are not admissible where the interests of the devisees are separate.</p> <p>6. Same—when interests of devisees are not joint. The interests of devisees under a will are not joint unless joint tenancy, and not tenancy in common, is expressly declared, and the act abolishing joint tenancies applies to personalty as well as to realty.</p> <p>7. Same—when error in holding court at home of a witness is harmless. Courts have no authority to exercise their functions in any place except that provided by law, but in a will contest case, where the only issues raised are those of testamentary capacity and undue influence, error in holding court at the home of one of the attesting witnesses who was unable to attend the hearing is harmless, where there is in the record abundant evidence, aside from that of said attesting witness, to sustain the finding of the jury.</p> <p>8. Same—when attesting witness need not be called in stiit to contest will. On the contest of a will by bill in chancery, when the execution and probate of the will are admitted by the bill and the only issue is the soundness of mind of the testator, it is not essential that the subscribing witnesses shall be called to prove either the due execution of the will or the testamentary capacity of the testator.</p> <p>9. Same—when testimony as to contents of former will is not admissible. In a will contest case, testimony regarding the contents of a former will is not admissible where the terms of such will are variant from the will in suit.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of DuPage ■ county; the Hon. Mazzini Slusser, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Disbarment—ivhen failure to exercise good judgment will not disbar. Mere failure of an attorney to exercise good judgment in his transactions with his clients, due to his inexperience rather than an intent to act dishonorably or unprofessionally, is not ground for disbarment.</p> <p>2. Same—attorney should exercise diligence in discharge of his duties. The relation of attorney and client is a fiduciary relation, and an attorney owes it to himself and to his profession to exercise diligence in the discharge of his duties.</p>

<p>1. Charities—charitable uses are not within rule against perpetuities. The statute of charitable uses is a part of the common law of Illinois, and conveyances or devises to charitable uses are not within the rule against perpetuities.</p> <p>2. Same—gifts to charity are favored by the courts. Gifts to . charity are looked upon with favor by the courts and every presumption consistent with the language used will be indulged in to sustain them. "</p> <p>3. Same—when devise is to charitable uses. Where property is devised in trust for the benefit of corporations that have no capital stock and can declare no dividends, and all of whose property or funds must be used for the carrying on of charitable purposes as set out in their charters, the devise is one to charitable uses.</p>

<p>1. Practice—judgment will not be reversed for matter of form. Section 77 of the Practice act provides that no verdict or judgment shall be set aside for irregularity, only, unless cause be shown for the same during the term such judgment or verdict shall be given, and where an action is in debt and the verdict and judgment are for damages, and no objection is made to either on account of form, the judgment will not for that reason be reversed.</p> <p>2. Medicine and surgery-—under act of 1885, authorizing fine for practicing without license, the first offense means the first conviction. Under the act of 1885, authorizing a recovery of $100 for the first offense and $200 for each subsequent offense of practicing medicine without a license, the offense does not consist of treating some individual but of practicing generally, so that a first offense means a first conviction, and there cannot be a conviction for more than one first offense, regardless of the number of individuals the defendant is shown to have treated.</p> <p>3. Same—•the legislature may define “practicing medicine” so as to include chiropractice. Although the chiropractor’s method of treating physical ailments, injuries or deformities is not within the common meaning of the term “practicing medicine,” the General Assembly, in an act authorizing a fine for practicing .medicine without a license, may define the practice of medicine so as to include chiropractice.</p> <p>4. Same—act of 1885, providing for examination for licenses to practice medicine, is not invalid. The act of 1885, as amended, providing for examination of applicants for licenses to practice medicine, is not invalid as giving arbitrary power to the State Board of Health to grant or refuse licenses, in its own discretion, to persons employing methods of treating human ailments without the use of medicine, as such act, while it does not prescribe the qualifications of such persons, does provide that all examinations shall be conducted under rules and regulations prescribed by the board, and such rules are subject to review by the courts to determine their reasonableness.</p> <p>5. Police power—the legislature is sole judge of what laws are necessary for protection of public health. The State has a right to regulate any and all kinds of occupations for the purpose of protecting the lives and health of the people, and within constitutional limits the legislature is the sole judge of what laws shall be enacted for such purpose, as all such measures and regulations are within the scope of the police power.</p> <p>6. Same—exercise of police pozver must be reasonably necessary to accomplish legitimate object. The exercise of the police power is subject to constitutional limitations, and the power extends only to such measures as are reasonably necessary and appropriate for the accomplishment of a legitimate object within the domain of the police power.</p> <p>y. Same—legislature cannot invest administrative board with arbitrary power over rights of citizens. Every citizen has a right to be governed by fixed rules and cannot be subjected to the will or caprice of an administrative board, and the legislature cannot invest any board or commission with arbitrary discretion, which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few or which affords opportunity for unjust discrimination.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. Louis BERNREUTER, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—when death results from injury and not from intervening cause. Where an employee is injured by a barrel of meat falling on his leg, the injury subsequently develops an abscess necessitating treatment at a hospital, where he suffers further injury by a fall while getting out of bed, breaking his leg where the abscess had attacked the bone, his death from shock when operated on six days later is properly regarded as due to the injury rather than to the intervening cause.</p> <p>2. Sams—employer who denies liability cannot, after award is made, elect to pay compensation to deceased’s beneñciaries. The provision of paragraph (/) of section 7 of the Workmen’s Compensation act that compensation for an injury resulting in death may, at the option of the employer, be paid either to the personal representative of the deceased or to his beneficiaries, does not apply where the employer denies liability and refuses to make compensation until he has been adjudged liable in a proceeding conducted under the statute.</p> <p>3. Sams—when Industrial Commission is not required to declare proportion of award to each of beneñciaries. Where compensation is awarded on an administrator’s claim for an injury which results in death, paragraph (/) of section 7 of the Workmen’s Compensation act authorizes the distribution to be made under the order of the court appointing the administrator, and where the beneficiaries are the wife and children of the deceased the Industrial Commission is not required to find and declare the proportion of the award each of the beneficiaries shall receive.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Elections—requirements of Ballot law are applicable to ballots for voting on hard roads proposition. Under the revision of the Road and Bridge law in 1913 the ballot to be used at an election for voting on the proposition for or against a tax for the construction of hard roads must conform to the requirements of the Australian Ballot law.</p> <p>■2. Same—provision of section 14 of Ballot law requiring signature of clerk is mandatory. The provision of section 14 of the Ballot law of 1891 requiring each ballot to contain a fac simile of the signature of the clerk or town officer preparing the ballots is to prevent the fraudulent casting of spurious or illegal ballots and is essential to the validity of the ballots.</p> <p>3. Same—when mistakes of officers in charge of an election are fatal. While it is a rule that mistakes or omissions of the officers in charge of the machinery of an election should not defeat the plainly expressed will of the people at such election, yet such rule will not apply where said officers have failed to perform those duties of precaution which safeguard the votes of the people.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Hancock county; the Hon. Harry M. Wag-goner, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Corporations—section 56 of Foreign Corporations act, as amended in ipij, does not impair the obligation of contracts. Section 56 of the Foreign Corporations act, as amended in 1917, providing the method by which the proportion of the capital stock of foreign corporations represented by their property and business in Illinois shall be estimated and for assessment of additional fees thereunder, does not impair the obligation of contracts made by the issuance of licenses to such corporations under the act of 1897, as amended in 1899.</p> <p>2. Same—section 56 of the Foreign Corporations act does not discriminate against foreign„ corporations. Section 5b of the Foreign Corporations act, as amended in 1917, merely provides a just method of estimating the proportion of the capital stock of foreign corporations represented by their property and business in Illinois and does not discriminate against such corporations in favor of domestic corporations of like character.</p> <p>3. Same—when tax on a foreign corporation does not impose burden on inter-State commerce. While the State may not regulate inter-State commerce nor impose burdens thereon it is authorized to levy a tax within its authority, measured by the capital stock of a foreign corporation in part used in the conduct of such commerce; and where the circumstances are such as to indicate no purpose or necessary effect to burden such commerce, it may require a license fee based upon the proportion of capital stock represented by the property and business of such corporation in the State. Q</p> <p>4. Same—words “capital stock” in the Foreign Corporations act mean stock authorised by charter. The words “capital stock,” in section 56 of the Foreign Corporations act, as amended in 1917, providing a method of estimating the proportion of the capital stock of foreign corporations represented by their property and business in Illinois, mean the capital stock authorized by charter and not "the stock actually issued.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors—when Supreme Court cannot review question whether an injunction was properly dissolved. As the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari a judgment of the Appellate Court directing the dissolution of a temporary injunction, it cannot review such judgment on a subsequent appeal from the judgment of the circuit court assessing damages upon dissolving the injunction in accordance with the mandate of the Appellate Court.</p> <p>2. Injunction—damages may be assessed upon dissolution of temporary injunction to abate nuisance. Where a temporary injunction issued on a bill to abate a nuisance is dissolved, the circuit court, under section 12 of the Injunction act, has authority to hear evidence in support of a suggestion of damages and to assess damages without disposing of the merits of the bill.</p> <p>Thompson, J., dissenting.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. George K. Martin, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Constitutional law—publication of statute creating a debt may be provided for in act itself. Under section 18 of article 4 of the constitution, requiring the publication of a statute creating a debt before the act is submitted to the vote of the people, a separate act is not necessary to confer authority for the publication, but the legislature may provide therefor by separate resolution or vote or by a provision in the act itself.</p> <p>2. Same—constitution must be construed with reference to its object. A constitutional provision must be construed, like a statute, with reference to the object to be accomplished, and when the real purpose is apparent but the words, followed literally, lead to an absurd consequence, there is sufficient reason to depart from the language.</p> <p>3. Same—what vote of the people is required to adopt a statute creating a debt. Under section 18 of article 4 of the constitution an affirmative .vote by a majority of the voters at an election for members of the General Assembly is required for the adoption of a statute imposing an indebtedness upon the State, and a majority of the votes cast, for members of the General Assembly, which, owing to our system of minority representation, would be literally a majority of three times the number of voters, is not required.</p> <p>4. Same—creation of a debt and levy of tax to pay interest may be included in one act. Under section 18 of article 4 of the constitution, requiring that a law authorizing the contracting of a debt shall be submitted to the people with a law levying a tax to pay the interest on the debt, the provision for the payment of the interest may be included in the act creating the debt, and two separate acts are not required.</p> <p>5. Same—provisions creating debt and levying tax to pay interest need not-be voted on separately by legislature. Where a law is passed imposing a liability upon the State, section 18 of article 4 of the constitution requires that the legislature provide for the levy of a tax to pay the interest on the debt; but where the provision for the levy of the tax is included in the act creating the debt, section 12 of article 4 of the constitution does not require that each of the provisions be voted on separately by the legislature. (People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, followed.)</p> <p>6. Same—provisions necessary to carry out purpose of act need not be expressed in title. The object of the constitutional restriction that an act shall not include subjects not expressed in the title is to prevent the inclusion in the act of provisions foreign to the subject of legislation and which have no legitimate tendency to accomplish the purpose of the act as expressed in the title, but provisions, however diverse, which tend to make effectual the purpose so expressed may be included in the act though not expressed in the title.</p> <p>7. Same—act of 1917 for State-wide system of hard roads does not impose burdens on owners of motor vehicles. The act of 1917 for a State-wide system of hard roads, in providing that the interest on the bonded indebtedness shall be paid out of the road fund created by section 19 of the Motor Vehicle act, does not impose any burdens on the owners of motor vehicles or grant any immunities to other property owners, as the act does not in any way affect the amount, time or manner of the payment of the fee for the registration of motor vehicles, as required by the Motor Vehicle act.</p> <p>8. Same—act of 1917 for State-zvide system of hard roads does not assume debts of counties. Section 10 of the act of 1917 for a State-wide system of hard roads, providing that use may be made of such roads already constructed by counties, and that in such case an amount of money equal to the share of the actual cost of such road paid by the county shall be allotted to the county, merely provides for the payment by the State of the cost of a road of which it takes control as a part of the State-wide system, and the State assumes no debt of the county but pays in cash for what it purchases.</p> <p>9. Same—in specifying objects of appropriation various items of expense need not be stated. Where money is appropriated for the single purpose of constructing a State-wide system of hard roads, the constitution does not require an itemization, in detail, óf every expenditure and of every contract required in the construction of the various roads contemplated in the system for which the appropriation is made.</p> <p>10. Same—legislature has absolute control over public highways. Subject to constitutional limitation the control of the legislature over the public highways is absolute, and the legislature may give jurisdiction over the highways to such authorities as it may see fit and change the control of them at pleasure.</p> <p>11. Same—act of 1917 for State-wide system of hard roads is not local. While the act of 1917 for a State-wide system of hard roads does not include all the highways in the State, it provides a system of highways affording reasonable connection with one another and with the different communities and principal cities of the State and is not a local or special law. (Martens v. Brady, 264 111. 178, followed.)</p> <p>12. Same—the act of ipi7 for State-wide system of hard roads does not delegate legislative or judicial power to department of public works. The act of 1917 authorizing the construction of a State-wide system of hard roads under the supervision of the department of public works and buildings does not delegate either legislative or judicial power to that department but the questions which are left for determination in the supervision of the work are ministerial.</p> <p>13. Same—what is legislative power and what is judicial power. Legislative power is the power to enact laws or declare what the law shall be, while judicial power adjudicates upon the rights of citizens and to that end construes and applies the law.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—•when injury arises out of employment. If an employee is injured while in the performance of any of his duties the injury arises out of his employment.</p> <p>2. Same—claim for compensation may be made orally by attorney. The claim for compensation required by the Workmen’s Compensation act to be made within six months after the accident may be made orally by the attorney for the claimant.</p> <p>3. Same—claim against partners and award against the firm will bind individual partners. A claim for compensation may be filed against certain named persons described as partners and an award be made against them by the same description, and the judgment of the circuit court confirming the award will bind the partners individually.</p> <p>4. Partnership—a partnership is not a legal entity. A partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct from the persons composing it, and although the same parties are engaged in two different lines of business under .different partnership names but conducted from the same office, there is, in law, but one firm.</p>

<p>Workmen’s compensation—Compensation act does not apply to minors who are illegally employed. By section 6 of the Child Labor act of 1897 it is illegal to employ any child under sixteen years in an extra-hazardous employment, and where such child is employed in an occupation declared to be extra-hazardous by the Workmen’s Compensation act the employment is illegal and the act does not apply in case the child is injured in such employment.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.

<p>Injunction—when county may be compelled to remove building erected during pendency of suit. In a proceeding to enjoin a county from erecting a jail building within 200 feet of a school, a decree for perpetual injunction may order the county to remove any part of the building constructed during the pendency of the suit.</p>

Writ oE Error to the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Criminal law—when statements are inadmissible to corroborate testimony of zoitness. Statements or declarations as to the act of a party or witness in corroboration of his theory of the case or any fact favorable to him, whether oral or in writing, are, as a general rule, inadmissible in evidence on his own behalf, except where they are a part of the res gestee or made in the pres-* ence of the other party.</p> <p>2. Same—when alleged stolen articles are admissible in evidence. Where defendants are charged with burglarizing a store, articles of merchandise found the next morning upon a public highway which the burglars might have traveled in leaving town in an automobile are admissible in evidence.</p> <p>3. Same—when jury may be allowed to separate during trial. Unless sufficient cause is shown why the jury should be kept together, the trial court may exercise its discretion in allowing the jury to separate during the progress of the trial of a criminal case for less than a capital offense,' provided the jury are properly instructed concerning their duties while separated.</p> <p>4. Same—word "permitted“ may be used in an instruction as to right of defendant to testify. The word “permitted,” used in an instruction stating that the “defendant is permitted to testify in his own behalf,” is not misleading or erroneous.</p> <p>5. Same—Supreme Court is not bound to search for errors. It is no part of the duty of the Supreme Court to search for errors or of its own motion to enter upon an investigation in order to find material upon which to base a judgment of reversal.</p> <p>6. Same—instructions may be given as modified, without being re-written. Section '74 of the Practice act implies that written instructions may be given as modified, and while it is not good practice to modify instructions so that the portions attempted to be erased still remain legible, such modifications, if not misleading, will not reverse the case.</p> <p>7. Same—indictment constitutes no evidence of guilt. An indictment is merely an accusation or charge against the accused as brought by the grand jury and is not in itself evidence of guilt, but the State must show to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty as charged.</p> <p>8. Same—instructions should be read as a series—erasures. Instructions should be read as a series, and in determining whether the jury were misled by' the giving of an instruction containing a sentence stricken out with a pen but still legible, the instruction should be considered with other instructions on the same subject.</p> <p>9. Same—when judgment of conviction will not be reversed on evidence. Unless the Supreme Court is able to say, from a consideration of the whole testimony, that there is clearly a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused it will not interfere on the ground that the evidence does not support the verdict.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeWitt county; the Hon. George A. Sentel, Judge, presiding. ,</p>

<p>1. Construction—in construing a statute the legislative intention should he sought and given effect. The purpose of construing a statute is to find and give effect to the legislative intention where that can be done without contravening established rules of law, and in seeking for such intention the court should consider not only the entire act and the language used but also the evil to be' remedied and the object to be attained, when such can be gathered from the act.</p> <p>2. Workmen’s compensation-—purpose of paragraph (d) of section 8 of Compensation act. Paragraph (d) of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, giving an injured employee who returns to his employment incapacitated, eighteen months in which ■ to file his claim for compensation, is an exception to the general provision for notice in section 24 and is intended to prevent any advantage being taken of the employee by reason of the relation re-assumed with his employer.</p> <p>3. Same-—paragraph (d) of section 8 of Compensation act can not apply where employee makes no claim and does not return to work within six months. Paragraph (d) of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, construed with section 24, cannot apply to an employee who does not return to his former services within six months after the injury or after the cessation of payments and who does not within that time make claim for compensation.</p> <p>4. Same—injured employee may claim benefit of paragraph (d) of section 8 of the Compensation act although discharged within eighteen months after returning to work. Paragraph (d) of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, giving an injured employee who returns to his employment incapacitated, eighteen months in which to file a claim for compensation, cannot be construed to apply only to those who remain in their former employment for a period of eighteen months.</p> <p>5. Same—paragraph (d) of section 8 of Compensation act does not deny equal protection of the law. Paragraph (d) of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, giving an injured employee who returns to his employment incapacitated, eighteen months in which to file a claim for compensation, while those who do not return are required to file their claims within six months under section 24, does not deny equal protection of the law, as the circumstances of the employee who does not return to his employment are not the same as those where the employee does return.</p> <p>6. Sams—the circuit court, on review by certiorari, cannot enter a money judgment and order execution. The only authority which the circuit court has on a review by certiorari of the decision of the Industrial Commission confirming an award is to affirm the finding and the award of the commission or to set the same aside and enter such a decision as is justified by law or remand the cause, and there is no authority for entering a money judgment and ordering execution, „as the claimant for the award is amply protected by the bond required of the employer on the petition for review.</p>

<p>1. Libel—two separate libels cannot be joined in one count of declaration. Two or more causes for separate libels or slanders may be united in one declaration but should not be united in one count, and when so joined the count is double and demurrable.</p> <p>2. Same—plea of justification should be as broad as the charge. If one is guilty of publishing the whole of the alleged defamatory matter he cannot justify by showing that some part of the defamatory matter, though divisible from the rest, is true, as a plea of justification must be as broad as the charge, requires certainty of averment and should contain no other averments except the matters justified.</p> <p>3. Same—publication may be libelotis per se without charging a crime. Under the definition of libel in section 177 of the Criminal Code it is not necessary to charge one with a crime to make the charge libelous per se.</p> <p>4. Same—what questions are for jury. The question whether or not any particular meaning is libelous is for the court, but the meaning to be ascribed to the words published and whether they referred to the plaintiff are questions for the jury.</p> <p>5. Same—what defense is admissible under the general issue. A denial that certain portions of the alleged libelous matter were spoken of the plaintiff is a defense which is admissible under the general issue.</p> <p>6. Same—when witnesses may testify that they understood a libelous article was published concerning the plaintiff. Witnesses cannot testify that they understood by the language of the article published that the libelous words were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff unless the defendant disputes the fact and offers evidence to prove that the words referred to another person or object, when the plaintiff may offer proof on the question in rebuttal.</p> <p>7. Same—when question as to truth of article published is leading. Where a libelous article charges a political candidate with advocating disreputable policies and presumes to quote from said candidate’s speech at a public meeting, in an attempt to prove the truth of the article published, witnesses, after reading the article, should not be asked whether the plaintiff spoke the words quoted, as such question is leading and relieves the witnesses of testifying to what they really remembered to have been spoken.</p> <p>8. Same—when books and newspapers are not admissible. Extracts from books which are not public documents, and from newspapers, are hearsay evidence of a low order and are inadmissible as original evidence, and where a libelous article charges a socialist candidate with advocating disreputable policies, books and newspapers on socialism are not admissible to prove truth of the libel.</p> <p>9- Same—truth is a defense only when published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Section 4 of article 2 of the constitution is clear and unequivocal that the truth is a defense in both civil and criminal suits for libel only when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, and said section needs no statute to put it in force but is self-executing.</p> <p>10. Same—newspapers are not privileged to publish libelous matter against candidates for'office. It is not the privilege or duty of one publishing a newspaper to publish libelous matter against any candidate for public office, and such person has no more right in that regard than any other person, as the liberty of free speech and of free press are the same.</p> <p>11. Same—public may freely comment on conduct of candidate for office. Where one becomes a candidate for a public office he is considered as putting his character in issue so far as it may respect his fitness and qualifications for office, and his acts may be canvassed and his conduct boldly censured.</p> <p>12. Same—intention to serve public good cannot justify false defamation of private character of candidate for office. The publication of falsehood or calumny against public officers or candidates is an offense injurious to the people, and an intention to serve the public good in such a case cannot justify a defamation of private character.</p> <p>13. Same—what matters are not a defense but go only in mitigation of damages. To a malicious publication of libelous matter against a candidate for public office there is no defense on the ground that it is privileged, and it is not a defense that it is mistakenly and honestly made but such matters go only in mitigation of damages.</p> <p>14. Same—in the same plea matters of mitigation should not be mixed with matters of justification. Matters in mitigation of damages and matters which amount to a denial of the charge are admissible under the general issue and should not be mixed up in a plea with matters of justification.</p> <p>15. Triai,-—presents should not be given to or received by juror. Presents should not be given to or be received by a juror in any case, as such acts must necessarily produce bad impressions, no matter how good the intentions may be and however harmless they may in fact be to the loser in the case.</p> <p>16. Same—jurors should not be allowed to read newspaper comments on the trial. In a case having much notoriety and which has aroused public feeling it is the absolute duty of the court to instruct the jury so positively and firmly that no juror will be likely to obtain newspapers printing matters of evidence or comments on the proceedings, and the court has full power to take whatever steps are necessary to secure a fair'trial by instructing the jury, holding it together or removing newspaper reporters from the court room.</p>

<p>Taxes—levy of high school tax is invalid after final judgment dissolving district. The levy of a high school tax is invalid when made after a final judgment dissolving the organization of the district, and where the proceedings attacking the organization of the district had ended and were not pending in any court .when the curative act of 1917 was passed, the levy is not valid though made after the passage of that act. (People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 553, distinguished.)</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—declarations of a deceased employee as to how he was injured are not admissible. Declarations made by an injured employee to his attending physician are admissible when they relate to the part of the body injured, to the suffering and the symptoms but not if they relate to the cause of the injury, and the testimony of any witness as to what the injured employee said about when, where and how he was injured is not admissible.</p> <p>2. Same—jurisdiction of courts of review under Compensation act. The circuit court, and the Supreme Court in reviewing a case under the Workmen’s Compensation act, can only pass upon questions of law and cannot reverse an order of the Industrial Commission as not sustained by the evidence unless there is no competent evidence in the record tending to support it.</p> <p>3. Coroner’s verdict—coroner’s verdict is not admissible to establish civil liability. A coroner’s verdict or inquest is not admissible as evidence in civil suits for the purpose of establishing personal liability against any individual where the death of a person is charged or to establish a defense to such suits or for the purpose of establishing other issues between private litigants. (Contrary holdings in United States Life Ins. Co. v. Vocke, 129 Ill. 557, and in all subsequent cases, overruled.)</p> <p>4. Evidence—a judgment is not admissible against a litigant who was not a party to it. The judgment of a court is not admissible against a litigant, either as res judicata or as an estoppel by verdict, unless he was a party to that judgment, and no person can be affected by any judicial investigation to which he is not a party unless his relation to some of the parties was such as to make him responsible for the final result of the litigation.</p> <p>5. Same—testimony of witnesses taken before coroner’s jury is not admissible in a civil suit. As the testimony of a witness in any suit, although prosecuted to final judgment, is not admissible against any third party in another suit who was not a party to such judgment, the testimony of witnesses taken before a coroner’s jury is not admissible against either party in a subsequent civil suit for damages.</p> <p>6. Stare decisis—when former rulings on admissibility of evidence will not be followed. Former rulings on the admissibility of certain documents as evidence or on mere questions of procedure ought to be followed unless they are manifestly wrong, but they may and should be changed when the ends of justice «and the public good will be better served.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. T. M. Harris, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Richardson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Drainage—a judgment may be collaterally attacked where court is without jurisdiction. Where the court in an original proceeding to levy a drainage assessment is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, a judgment against land in such proceeding is void and may be attacked in a collateral proceeding without resorting to an appeal or writ of error.</p> <p>2. Same—when judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. Under the Levee act of 1879 the county court is vested with authority to hear and determine petitions for the organizing, improving, extending and protection of drainage districts, and an objection that a judgment in such proceeding was erroneous because the petition gave discretionary power to the district engineer cannot be raised in a collateral proceeding to collect a delinquent assessment.</p> <p>3. Jurisdiction—jurisdiction of subject matter does not depend on correctness of decision rendered. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is authority to hear and decide a cause and does not depend on the correctness of the decision rendered.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Foell, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Mortgages—error in decree for foreclosure can be corrected only in direct proceeding. Where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties in a proceeding for foreclosure, any error in the decree, whether in the amount or in any other respect, can be corrected only by a direct proceeding to reverse it.</p> <p>2. Judicial notice—when fact that court has judicial notice will not charge individuals with the same knowledge. The circuit court sitting in a certain county will take judicial notice that a certain city is the county seat of the county, and it will also take judicial notice of the official character of the officers of that county; but this rule does not go to the extent of holding that every individual who happens to be within the limits of the county has the same knowledge.</p> <p>3. Process—defendant is entitled to deñnite notice in summons where he is to appear. The defendant has a right to know definitely from the summons itself where he is required to appear when served, and a summons issued by a justice of the peace with a venue laid in the “State of Illinois,............ county,” requiring the defendant to appear at the office of the justice “in Benton, in said county,” does not give sufficient notice and confers no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.</p> <p>4. Res judicata—a former adjudication must be pleaded in equity. Where a former adjudication of a controversy is relied upon as a defense in equity it must be pleaded when an opportunity has been afforded to the defendant to plead it.</p> <p>5. Cloud on title—laches cannot be charged against owner in possession for failure to remove cloud. Laches cannot be charged against the owner of property in the undisturbed possession of it, for his failure to engage in litigation to remove unfounded claims as clouds upon his title.</p> <p>6. Same—void sheriff’s deed may be removed as a cloud—redemption. A court of equity will entertain a bill to remove a void sheriff's deed as a cloud upon the title of the owner of real estate, but where the purchaser at the sale has in good faith redeemed from a prior foreclosure sale, the owner will be required, before he can have the void deed set aside, to reimburse the purchaser for the amount he paid to redeem from the foreclosure sale.</p>

<p>1. Wills—simple devise of land will convey fee unless contrary intent is shown. Under section 13-of the Conveyances act a simple devise of land without any words of inheritance will convey an absolute estate in fee, unless a clear intention to limit or qualify the estate granted is shown in other parts of the will.</p> <p>2. Same—any part of will may show intention to limit fee devised. While it is the disposition of courts to adopt such a construction as will give an estate of inheritance to the first devisee, if it is clearly shown by any other clause or part of the will that the testator intended to- limit the fee granted in a particular clause such intention must prevail.</p> <p>3. Same—-principal rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to intention of testator. The intention of the testator, gathered from the whole will and all its parts, must govern in the construction of a will, and every clause and provision, if possible, should have effect given to it according to such intention.</p> <p>4. Same—later clause will modify former provision. A later clause of a will, when repugnant to a former provision, is to be considered as intending to modify or abrogate the former.</p> <p>5. Same—when devise of fee is limited by subsequent clause. Where a testator devises all his property, both real and personal, to his wife, and in the next two clauses bequeaths $10,000 to his daughter, to be paid out of the estate three years after his wife’s death, and after the payment of said sum devises the remainder of the estate to his son, the two subsequent clauses clearly show an intention to limit the estate of the wife to a life estate and to give the fee to the son after the daughter is paid her legacy.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hosea W. WELLS, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. N. Hoover, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the City Court of Granite City; the Hon. M. R. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake county; the Hons. C. C. Edwards, and R. K. Welsh, Judges, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Public utilities—zuhat must be shown before commission can establish a through route and joint rate. Before the Public Utilities Commission is authorized to establish a through route and a joint rate for the shipment of freight, the proof should show, and the commission should find, that the public convenience and necessity demand such route and rate, either because the rate charged is unjust, unreasonable or excessive or because there is no satisfactory through route or joint rate in existence.</p> <p>2. Same—when finding that rate is too high does not authorize establishing a through route and joint rate. The convenience and necessity of the public are the controlling considerations in a hearing before the Public Utilities Commission, and the mere finding of the commission that freight rates are too high does not authorize it to establish a through route and joint rate, where it is not shown and found that public consideration demands such order. (Public Utilities Com. v. Toledo, St. Louis and Western Railroad Co. 286 Ill. 582, followed.)</p> <p>Carter, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Negligence—owners must take precautions to protect children playing with attractive device on premises. Where an owner creates upon his premises a device which from its nature has a tendency to attract children and is either dangerous in itself or is in a dangerous locality, the law requires such reasonable precautions as the circumstances admit of to prevent children from playing with the thing or to protect them from injury while playing with it.</p> <p>2. Same—plaintiff must prove ordinary care by parents with respect to child going to dangerous locality. An administrator suing to recover for the death of a child who was run over while playing near a railroad must prove that the parents, whose home was near the railroad, exercised ordinary care with respect to the child going near the tracks, and an instruction stating such proposition should not be so modified as to put the burden on the defendant to prove that the parents did not exercise such care.</p> <p>3. Same—what must he shown to render a negligént act the proximate cause of injury. To make a negligent act the proximate cause it is not necessary that -the particular injury could reasonably have been foreseen, and where the consequences follow in unbroken sequence from the wrongful act, to the injury, without an intervening efficient cause, it is sufficient if at the time of the negligence the wrongdoer might by the exercise of ordinary care have foreseen that some injury might result from his act or neglect.</p> <p>Farmer, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—injury need not have been foreseen or expected to arise out of employment. While there must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury, it is not necessary, in order for an injury to arise out of the employment, that it be one which ought to have been foreseen or expected, but it must be one which after the event may be seen to have had its origin in the nature of the employment.</p> <p>2. Same—when an injury while defending employer’s business arises out of employment. An injury to an employee while defending his employer’s business from a mob of strikers who have rushed into the place of employment to interrupt the work going on arises out of the employment, where the employee acts as any man ordinarily would in such an emergency.</p> <p>3. Same—ivhcn it is the duty of an employee to save lives of his fellow-workmen. It is the duty of an employee to do what he can to save the lives of his fellow-workmen when all are at the time working in the line of their employment, and the fact that the fellow-workmen are not actually in danger of losing their lives cannot change the rule, if the danger is clearly apparent to the employee and he acts as any man would under the circumstances.</p> <p>4. Same—when assault arises out of employment. An assault arises out of the employment in a case where the duties of the employee, under the particular situation, are such as are likely to cause him to have to deal with persons who are likely to attack him.</p> <p>5. Same—rules of evidence apply to hearing before arbitrator. The usual rules for producing evidence in any legal proceeding apply to a hearing before an arbitrator under the Workmen’s Compensation act.</p> <p>6. Same—proceedings under Compensation act are statutory. Proceedings under the Workmen’s Compensation act are purely statutory and the requirements of the statute must govern them.</p> <p>7. Same—circuit court cannot enter money judgment for compensation and order execution. Under paragraph (/) of section 19 of the Workmen’s Compensation act the circuit court, on writ of certiorari, has authority only to confirm or set aside the decision of the Industrial Commission and is not authorized to enter a judgment directing the payment of the amount of the award and ordering execution to issue, as the employee is fully protected by the bond required of the employer by the act.</p>

<p>1. Police power—act of ipi3 to provide wash-rooms in certain employments is valid as a police regulation. The act of 1913 to provide wash-rooms in certain employments applies to all places of employment where the prescribed conditions exist, and as a police regulation and applied to such conditions it is constitutional.</p> <p>2. Master and servant—what employments must provide washrooms under act of ipi3. The act of 1913 to provide wash-rooms in certain places of employment does not apply to every place of employment in which men become dirty or perspire, but only to those places where they become covered with grease, dust, grime and perspiration to the extent specified in the act.</p> <p>3. Same—what evidence sufficient to render place of employment subject to act of ipi3 for providing wash-rooms. To render a place of employment subject to the act of 1913 for providing wash-rooms for employees who become covered with grease and dirt in their work it is not necessary that there be expert or opinion evidence of probable consequences of ill-health to employees or of offense to the public, but the evidence must be sufficient to justify a jury in drawing an inference of such consequences in the light of common experience.</p> <p>4. Railroads—when evidence does not show wash-rooms are required in round-house and machine shop. A round-house and machine shop of a railroad company are not within the act of 1913 for providing wash-rooms in certain places of employment, where the evidence does not show that the employees are in such a condition after leaving their work that without washing and cleansing their bodies and changing their clothing their health will be endangered or their condition be offensive to the public.</p> <p>Thompson, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. W. Pinckney, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation—evidence may be reviewed to determine jurisdiction of cormnission. While the sufficiency of evidence before the Industrial Commission is not subject to review where there is any evidence tending to establish the findings of the commission, yet the evidence certified in the record may be reviewed and weighed to determine whether or not the commission has jurisdiction to apply the act iñ any given case.</p> <p>2. Same—what is presumptive evidence of filing notice of election to operate under Compensation act. A certificate from the Industrial Commission approving an employer’s compliance with section 26 of the Compensation act, together with his testimony that he had taken out indemnity insurance under the act in response to a notice from the commission and that he concluded to work under the act, constitutes presumptive evidence of the filing of notice of election to come under the act.</p> <p>3. Same—when commission must determine persons entitled to compensation for death of an employee. Where there is no voluntary payment on the part of the employer and the Industrial Commission must determine the compensation for the death of his employee, it is the duty of the commission to determine the person or persons entitled to compensation, although there is no contest between the respective relatives as to the dependents entitled to the award.</p>

<p>1. Specific performance—right to specific performance rests in discretion of court, subject to principles of equity. The right to a specific performance of a contract is not absolute but rests in the discretion of the court, subject to the settled principles of equity.</p> <p>2. Same—contract to convey may be enforced although inconvenient to grantors. The object of courts of equity, as well as courts of law, is the enforcement of contracts rather than their evasion, and where a contract for the sale of land is fairly and understandingly entered into, a court of equity will enforce the contract although its performance may require the grantors to purchase from a third party before they are ready to do so.</p> <p>3. Same—performance may be enforced where beneficial owner contracts to convey. In equity the vendor of land contracted to be sold is regarded as a trustee for the vendee, who is regarded as the equitable owner, and where the purchaser disposes of his interest in the land, either by an assignment, of the contract for a deed or by the execution of a new contract to convey to a third party, a court of chancery will decree specific performance of the contract by the beneficial owner or the one who holds the title for his benefit.</p>

<p>1. Waters—owner of land bordering river has title to center of stream. Grants of land bordering upon a river give title to the grantee to the center of the stream unless by the terms of the grant an intention is clearly shown to stop at the stream’s edge; and this is true even though plats or descriptions attempting to describe 'the property state that it is of a certain width or length.</p> <p>2. Same—fact that a stream was me'andered by governmental surveyors tends to show it was a river channel. Meander lines are used ordinarily only in surveying lands adjacent to a stream, whether navigable or not, and the fact that a stream was meandered by government .surveyors tends to show that they considered it a river channel when the survey was made.</p> <p>3. Same—owners of land bordering river have easement for discharge of water from tail-race. The owners of land bordering upon a river have a right to have water flow into the stream from the tail-race of a mill on their property.</p> <p>4. Ejectment—plaintiff in ejectment must recover on strength of his title. The plaintiff in an ejectment proceeding must recover 'on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the title of his adversary, and unless the plaintiff proves title in himself he cannot take any advantage of the failure of the defendant to prove title.</p> <p>5. Same—proof must correspond with declaration. The proof must correspond with the declaration in an action of ejectment, and where the declaration distinctly states that the plaintiff asks only for the recovery of property west of the west boundary of certain lots the plaintiff cannot recover any portion of the lots.</p>

<p>InEormation to disbar.</p>

<p>1. Mortgages—when court is warranted in setting aside sale of property en masse. A provision in a foreclosure decree that so much of the land shall be sold as is necessary to discharge the amount due is a clear direction to sell in parcels, and if the sale of the entire property is not necessary and it is susceptible of division the chancellor may set aside a sale of the property en masse and order a re-sale in separate tracts.</p> <p>2. Same—wife is entitled to protection of court against foreclosure sale in fraud of her rights. A wife who has a homestead right in property involved in a foreclosure proceeding is entitled to the protection of the court against any sale that will result in a fraud upon her marital rights.</p> <p>3. Same—when a wife does not waive right to complain that property was not sold in separate tracts. A wife who has a homestead interest in property involved in a foreclosure proceeding does not, by attending the sale and bidding on the property en masse, waive her right to complain that it was not sold in separate tracts, as directed by the decree of sale.</p> <p>4. Judicial sales—if possible, only such property will be sold as is necessary to discharge lien. The statute relating to sales under foreclosure decrees as well as under executions, contemplates that only so much of the property involved shall .be sold as is necessary to discharge the lien, where the property is susceptible of division.</p> <p>5. Same—chancellor has discretion in approving master’s sale subject to decree. The chancellor has a broad discretion in the matter of approving a master’s sale made subject to the court’s approval by the terms of the decree of sale.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marshall county; the Hon. Clyde E. Stone, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error fo the Circuit Court of McDonough county; the Hon. Harry M. Waggoner, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Plats—when deed of vacation may be executed. Under section 7 of the Plats act a deed of vacation may be executed by the owner of the territory within the part of the plat sought to be vacated if the vacation does not violate the rights of other proprietors in the plat and does not close or obstruct any public highway laid out according to law.</p> <p>2. Same—when deed of vacation does not obstruct public highways. The maker of a plat cannot compel the municipality to accept the streets and assume the burden of maintaining them, and unless something is done by the public authorities to indicate an acceptance of the streets and alleys platted, a deed of vacation which includes the streets and alleys indicated on the plat does not close or obstruct public highways “laid out according to law.”</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ogle county; the Hon. Oscar E. Heard, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Mechanics’ liens—meaning of words "the owner," in section 30 of Mechanic’s Lien act. The words “the owner,” in section 30 of the Mechanic’s Lien act, giving a right to file a bill for general settlement, have the same meaning as they do in section 1 of the act, and have reference to anyone having an estate, right or interest in property, either in fee, for life or for years, or any other interest against which a lien is sought to be enforced.</p> <p>2. Same—who must be made parties to a bill for general settlement. A party filing á bill for a general settlement under section 30 of the Mechanic’s Lien act must make parties to his bill all persons claiming liens against the premises and all persons interested in the premises, including other owners, if any, whose interests may be subject to such liens or affected thereby.</p> <p>3. Same—who may file intervening petition or cross-bill to bill for general settlement. Any of the parties claiming liens and made parties to a bill for a general settlement under section 30 of the Mechanic’s Lien act may file an intervening petition or an answer in the nature thereof, or a cross-bill, and may make parties defendant thereto any owners who were not made parties to the original bill, for the purpose of determining whether the interests of such owners are subject to said liens.</p> <p>4. Same—burden is on lienors to establish right to lien. The burden is upon the lienors to prove every fact required by the Mechanic’s Lien act to establish their right to a lien on the premises, either against the interest of the lessee or against the interest of the owner of the fee.</p> <p>5. Same—when owner submits to jurisdiction of court. Where a bill is filed by a lessee for a general settlement under section 30 of the Mechanic’s Lien act and the court has properly permitted parties claiming liens to file intervening petitions and a cross-bill, a party who is made a defendant to the petitions and cross-bill as an interested owner, and who was not a party to the original bill, submits to the jurisdiction of the court by filing pleas and answers to the petitions and cross-bill, and permission of the court to make said owner a defendant is given by trying the issues and entering the decree.</p> <p>6. Same—zvhen liens are not barred by Statute of Limitations. Where a new party is introduced into a suit by amendment, the suit is brought, as to such party, from the date of the amendment; but where the owner of premises is not brought into a suit by the lessee, under section 30 of the Mechanic’s Lien act, until she has been made a defendant to intervening petitions and a cross-bill by parties claiming liens, the liens are not barred by the Statute of Limitations though said owner did not answer the petitions or cross-bill until after the period of limitation had expired.</p> <p>7. Same—meaning of word “repaid’ when used in lease. In a provision in a lease that the lessee shall keep the premises in good repair, the word “repair” is used in its ordinary sense and means restoration after decay, injury or partial destruction, and does not include alterations or additions that the lessee may choose to make.</p> <p>8. Same—interest of lessor in building cannot be subjected to lien for unauthorized alterations by lessee. The interest of the lessor and owner of premises cannot be subjected to a mechanic’s lien for the subsequent making by the lessee of alterations and additions to the building thereon, in the absence of any showing that the lessor authorized or consented to the same, where the lease expressly requires consent in writing by the lessor to the making of alterations or additions.</p> <p>9. Same—object of sections 8p and po of Torrens act, requiring filing of notice of lien.' Sections 89 and 90 of the Torrens law, requiring the filing of a claim for a mechanic’s lien in the registrar’s • office, were not intended to enable any record owner to defeat a lien given by the Lien act, but were enacted in the interest of parties who might become purchasers or otherwise interested in' the lands of the owner of the registered title after mechanics’ liens had attached.</p> <p>10. Same—rule as to filing claim for mechanic’s lien where Torrens law is in force. In counties where the Torrens system of registering titles is in force, a claim for a mechanic’s lien, as against subsequent purchasers and creditors, must be filed within the four months’ period provided for in the Mechanic’s Lien law, in the office of the registrar of titles, and a memorial of the claim be entered in the register of titles, but as against the owner of the premises the claim may be filed at any time within two years after the completion of the contract.</p> <p>11. Same—provisions of the Mechanic’s Tien act of 1895, reenacted in 1903, have remained in force. While the Mechanic’s Lien act of 1903 repealed the act of 1895, all provisions of the act of 1895 that were re-enacted in the act of 1903 are to be construed as remaining in force and not as being a new enactment.</p> <p>12. Registration oE title—object of Torrens system of registration. The object of the Torrens system is to create an independent system of registration of land titles by requiring that all instruments intended for the purpose of passing or affecting any title to real estate shall be filed and registered in that department and no other, in order that subsequent purchasers or parties dealing with the title may have notice of the interest registered.</p> <p>13. Statutes—former act will not be repealed by later statute on same subject if both acts can be given effect. Two acts covering the same subject should be construed, if possible, so that each shall have due effect, and in such case the later act, or the act varying in some minor degree the requirements necessary to obtain the relief given by the statute, instead of being construed to repeal the former or other act should be held to be an amendment or modification.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Disbarment—diligence to client does not allow attorney to make a false affidavit. There is nothing in the duty of diligence which a lawyer owes to his client which in any way makes it permissible for him to' practice or attempt to practice a fraud on the court or to swear to that which is not true.</p> <p>2. Same—when Ming false affidavit will be ground for disbarment. Where an attorney is willing to procure the filing of an affidavit Which he knows to be false and in which he attacks the fairness of a trial judge without cause, such conduct will amount to subornation of perjury and of itself constitute sufficient ground for disbarment.</p> <p>3. Same—general charge of reputation for dishonesty may be considered in connection with specific charges. While a general charge of bad reputation for fair dealing and professional honesty is not, of itself, sufficiently specific to comply with rule 40 of the Supreme Court so as to form a basis for disbarment, it is competent to consider the respondent’s general reputation for truth and ethical practices in connection with specific charges against him.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.