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← 288 SO2D 234 - Rojas v. State

Rojas v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1973

Citation profile

24
cited by 24 later decisions
6
states following
October 2008
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 21 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently October 2008

1 federal appellate · 21 state decisions

1101973198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Hoffa · 106 So. 2d 407 - Armstrong v. City of Tampa · State v. Covington · Windom v. United States · 286 So. 2d 532 - Seay v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““None of the motions involved in either portion of the grand jury challenge was supported by affidavits, and, other than the conclusory statements contained in the motion itself, there was no showing of any facts sufficient to raise any suspicion that the grand jury pool was improperly constituted. The motions for production of the grand jury master list and for an evidentiary hearing were denied by the trial court, as were the motions seeking dismissal of the information and the underlying indictment. “. . . As stated in 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 182, one objecting to the composition of a jury panel must allege such discrimination as is here asserted by asserting facts to show the existence of the discrimination. Additional support may be found in United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (C.A. 6, 1965), and in Windom v. United States, 260 F.2d 384 (C.A. 10, 1958), both of which stand for the proposition that before a court will be required to permit a full-scale investigation of its jury panel, the panel must be shown to be suspect. This does not, of course, require that the challenge show that the panel is improperly constituted; but what it does require is that the challenger assert facts that tend to raise a doubt as to whether the panel may be improperly constituted. Then follows the inquiry to see if such suspicion, duly alleged, is supported by proof. . . In the instant case, we have neither a showing that the panel was suspect nor an affidavit showing any factual basis upon ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “* * * * * * "Appellant has asserted by various motions that the grand jury which returned the indictment against him was improperly constituted in that it discriminatorily excluded certain `identifiable groups' (specified in the motion) from the grand jury master list, and sought to prove his charge of discriminatory selection of the grand jury pool by deposing the grand jury commissioners and clerk of the grand jury commission and by examining the Dade County Grand Jury Master List. The motion for production of the grand jury master list was denied, as was the motion for permission to depose the chairman and clerk of the grand jury commission." * * * * * * "Before a court will be required to permit a full-scale investigation of its jury panel, the panel must be shown to be suspect, and no such showing was made in the instant case. This requirement of showing a factual basis for the challenge in order to require a full-scale investigation of the panel does not, of course, require that the challenger show the panel to be improperly constituted, but it does require that the challenger assert facts tending to raise a doubt as to whether the panel may be improperly constituted; if such factual assertions are made, in inquiry will then follow to see if such suspicion, duly alleged, is supported by proof. In the present case, no such factual basis was asserted for the challenge, and the trial court merely ruled upon a motion which it found not to be well founded." * * * * * *”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Although our direct appeals jurisdiction includes cases in which the trial court inherently passes upon the constitutionality of a statute, we may not accept a direct appeal based upon an inherent construction of a constitutional provision; * * * * * * In ruling upon the motions to suppress, the trial court merely applied undisputed propositions of law to the facts it found to exist in the instant case, and in so doing found the motion not to be wellfounded. Even if the trial court ruling on the motion is erroneous, it would not support a direct appeal to this Court. At 634-636.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.