dissent">HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

The majority characterizes the temporary restraining order at issue, which was continued by the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion for interlocutory injunction, as prohibiting the in personam defendants from “among other things, disposing of any of the documents or assets of the businesses.” Op. at. 480. Similarly, the appointment of the temporary receiver, which was also continued by the trial court, is characterized as authorizing the management and control “of the assets of the respective businesses.” Id. Because the scope of these rulings was in fact much broader,15 reaching assets of the in personam defendants beyond those assets listed as defendants in rem and constituting an “ ‘end run’ around our holding in Cisco [v. State of Ga., 285 Ga. 656 (680 SE2d 831) (2009)],” Pittman v. State of Ga., 288 Ga. 589, 594 (706 SE2d 398) (2011) (Hunstein, C. J., concurring), I must dissent. Unlike the majority, I simply cannot turn a blind eye to the blatant and intentional use of OCGA § 16-14-6 (a) in a manner that results in the same type of criminal sanction that we found unconstitutional in Cisco, supra.

*488Decided July 5, 2011.Bryant & Cook, Malcolm F. Bryant, Jr., Paul K. Cook, for appellants.S. Hayward Altman, District Attorney, Michael G. Lampros, Andrew J. Ekonomou, for appellees.

The trial court’s order enjoined the in personam defendants from, inter alia, using or disposing of any assets sought to be forfeited by the State. In its complaint, the State sought the forfeiture of property that “includes, but is not limited to, the property listed as [defendants in rem].” This encompasses all of the in personam defendants’ assets, not just the assets of their respective businesses.

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