Barmann v. McConachie’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Defendant says he knew that plaintiff was asleep and that he was aware of the possibilities of an accident if he went to sleep while driving. With a knowledge of these things, he becomes conscious of the fact that he is sleepy. He is then driving at 40 miles per hour. He undertakes the struggle with himself of keeping awake until he can reach Moffat’s, a distance of 2 or 3 miles. Of course in so doing he did not intend that plaintiff should be injured by reason of his act, but his conduct showed such an intentional disregard of the duty that rested upon him to exercise care and such a conscious indifference to the consequences that might follow from his act that the jury could readily find him guilty of willful and wanton misconduct.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 30 Ill. App. 2d 376 - Turner v. Schaeffer · Smith v. Williams

2. ““Plaintiff testified that she went to sleep after they left Chester, awakened at a stop sign in Sparta, asked defendant where they were and he told her and she again fell asleep and knew nothing until the accident. “The evidence discloses that the road was level for some distance south of the scene of the accident, that defendant’s automobile crossed the pavement to the driver’s left, crashed through a wire fence breaking down two or three posts and coming to a stop against a telephone pole. It had traveled 138 feet from where it left the pavement to the place where it stopped. “Sec. 42-1, par. 47 (5), ch. 95a, Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 85.064 (1) (par b, sec. 58, ch. 95%, Smith Hurd) provides that no person riding as a guest shall have a cause of action for damages against the driver of an automobile unless such accident shall have been caused by the willful and wanton misconduct of the driver and unless such conduct contributed to the injury. “In Walldren Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 Ill. 472, 478 , it was said, ‘The words “wanton,” “wantonly” and “wantonness,” “willful,” “willfully” and “willfulness” have been used to express the same thing. ’ “In Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Jordan, 215 Ill. 390 , it was said, ‘Where there is a particular intention to injure, or a degree of willful or wanton recklessness which authorizes a presumption of an intention to injure generally, the act ceases to be merely negligent and becomes willful or wanton. In such a c”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Marks v. Marks

3. ““Defendant seriously contends that defendant’s failure to judge correctly of his ability to resist sleep was an error of judgment and that it will not support a finding of willful and wanton negligence. Defendant’s act did not arise from an error of judgment. It came about by reason of his failure to exercise judgment. He permitted himself to go to sleep while driving and an act of omission may be made the basis of willful and wanton negligence, the same as an act of commission. “The finding of the jury that the defendant was guilty of wilful and wanton negligence is supported by the law and evidence.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Marks v. Marks