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← 289 U.S. 238 - Hurn v. Oursler

Hurn v. Oursler’s Empirical Analysis

289 U.S. 238 · 1933

Citation profile

2,299
cited by 2,299 later decisions
75
cited 75 times by the Supreme Court
13
states following
October 2011
most recently cited

874 federal appellate · 257 district · 55 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 2,299 later decisions (75 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2011 · most notably United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs (1966), United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948)

874 federal appellate · 257 district · 55 state decisions — followed in 13 states

7440193319401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from Second Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Osborn v. President Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States · Baltimore Co v. Phillips · Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange · Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad

Cited together with United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs · Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp. · Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad · Bell v. Hood · Baltimore Co v. Phillips

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2,299 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question ... the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the nonfederal ground.”
    36 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Upon principle, it is perfectly plain that the respondent suffered but one actionable wrong, and was entitled to but one recovery, wheth er his injury was due to one or the other of several distinct acts of alleged negligence, or to a combination of some or all of them. In either view, there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily safety, whether the acts constituting such invasion were one or many, simple or complex. “A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong. The mere multiplication of grounds of negligence alleged as causing the same injury does not result in multiplying the causes of action. ‘The facts are merely the means, and not the end. They do not constitute the cause of action, but they show its existence by making the wrong appear. “The thing, therefore, which in contemplation of law as its cause, becomes a ground for action, is not the group of facts alleged in the declaration, bill, or indictment, but the result of these in a legal wrong, the existence of which, if true, they conclusively evince.” ’ ””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““But the rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct nonfederal cause of action because it is joined in the same complaint with a federal cause of action. The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the ease upon the nonfederal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the nonfederal cause of action.” At page 590 of 53 S.Ct. the court said: “The bill as amended, although badly drawn, sets forth facts alleged to be in violation of two distinct rights, namely, the right to the protection of the copyrighted play, and the right to the protection of the uncopyrighted play. From these averments two separate and distinct causes of action resulted, one arising under a law of the United States, and the other arising under general law. For reasons that have already been made manifest, the latter is entirely outside the federal jurisdiction and subject to dismissal at any stage of the case. It is hardly necessary to say that a federal court is without the judicial power to entertain a cause o”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.