Conrad v. Pender’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

36 federal appellate · 9 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 212 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The manifest purpose of the provision is to safeguard the assets of those who are acting in contemplation of bankruptcy, so that these assets may be brought quickly and without unnecessary expense into the hands of the trustee, and to provide a restraint upon opportunities to make an unreasonable disposition of property through arrangement for excessive payments for prospective legal services, [citing Wood and Henderson ] We said in the case of Wood and Henderson that the statute ‘recognizes the temptation of a failing debtor to deal too liberally with his property in enabling counsel to protect him in the view of financial reverses in probable failure. It recognizes the right of such a debtor to have the aid and advice of counsel, and, in contemplation of bankruptcy proceedings which will strip him of his property, to make provisions for reasonable compensation to his counsel.” (emphasis added).”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Perrine · In Re Rheuban

2. “"In the exercise of jurisdiction, all questions bearing upon the reasonableness of the transaction, including the purpose and nature of the services, are open to consideration. But it is insisted, in the instant case, that the payment to appellants could not properly be regarded as made in contemplation of bankruptcy, and hence within the jurisdiction to reexamine, because the payment was for the purpose of engaging appellants to conduct negotiations with creditors in order to arrange for an extension of time, and, if necessary, for the operation of the business under the creditors' supervision, and thus to avoid a forced liquidation and ultimately to restore the business to a sound basis. We find no ground for saying that the fact that such purposes were in view establishes, as a matter of law, that the payment was not in contemplation of bankruptcy. On the contrary, negotiations to prevent bankruptcy may demonstrate that the thought of bankruptcy was the impelling cause of the payment. `A man is usually very much in contemplation of a result which he employs counsel to avoid.'" (citations omitted).”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Young (In re Gregory & Goldberg, Inc.) · In Re Mayeaux

3. “(a) PAYMENT OR TRANSFER TO AN ATTORNEY BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF CASE. On motion by any party in interest or on the court's own initiative, the court after notice and hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of property by the debt- or, made directly or indirectly and in contemplation of the filing of a petition under the Code by or against the debtor, to an attorney for services rendered or to be rendered is excessive. (b) PAYMENT OR TRANSFER TO AN ATTORNEY AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF THE CASE. On motion by the debtor or on the court's own initiative, the court after notice and hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of property, or any agreement therefor, by the debtor to an attorney after the commencement of a case under the Code is excessive, whether the payment or transfer is made or is to be made directly or indirectly, if the payment, transfer, or agreement therefor is for services in any way related to the case. See also the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 2017: “This rule, like § 60(d) of the Act and § 329 of the Code, is premised on the need for and appropriateness of judicial scrutiny of arrangements between a debtor and his attorney to protect the creditors of the estate and the debtor against overreaching by an officer of the court who is in a peculiarly advantageous position to impose on both the creditors and his client.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Perrine · In Re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd.