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29 Barb. 243

Mitchell v. Cook

New York Supreme Court

Decided May 9, 1859

New York Supreme Court · decided 1859-05-09

<p>Where a party brings a suit, as assignee of a mortgage, to foreclose the same, and fails in such, suit in consequence of a defect in his title as assignee, the judgment of dismissal is no bar to a second action of foreclosure, brought by him after he has perfected his title by taking the requisite assignments.</p> <p>The defendants executed a mortgage for $1400 to C., an individual banker, doing business under the name of the White Plains Bank. C. transferred the mortgage to the comptroller, to secure the redemption of the circulating notes of the bank. After such transfer was made, the defendants, with notice thereof, paid $1000, upon the mortgage, to the cashier of the bank. The plaintiff advanced $1400 to C. on an agreement that C. should procure from the comptroller a reassignment of the mortgage, for the plaintiff’s benefit. C. paid that sum to the comptroller, and took a transfer of the mortgage, to himself, and delivered the security to the plaintiff, but without executing any formal assignment to him. In an action brought by the plaintiff, as assignee of the mortgage, to foreclose the same, the court of appeals decided that the assignment from the comptroller to 0. was void, for want of authority in the comptroller to make the same, and that the plaintiff therefore had no title as assignee. The plaintiff having subsequently procured assignments of the mortgage, from C. and from the bank, brought this action to foreclose the same mortgage.</p> <p>Meld, 1. That the judgment of the court of appeals, in the former suit, was not a bar to the present action, on the ground of the question being -res adjudicóla.</p> <p>2. That after the assignment of the mortgage, to the comptroller, the cashier of the bank had no right to receive a payment thereon; and that the plaintiff, being a bona fide assignee without notice, was not bound thereby.</p> <p>3. That after the mortgage had been reassigned, by the comptroller, to O., the latter, and the then owner of the bank, had a right to assign and deliver the mortgage to the plaintiff, who had furnished the mopey to pay it, upon the faith of an agreement that he should become the owner.</p>

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently January 1886

4 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1859-05-09

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By the Court, Brown, J.

¶1The judgment of the court of appeals, in the suit originally instituted in the late court of chancery, between Minott Mitchell, complainant, and Miles Cook and Bhoda his wife, defendants, (a) is not a bar to this action. Ifris not an adjudication between the same parties for the same cause of action. The complainant failed upon his title to the subject in controversy, and not upon the merits, as against the defendants. The bill in that suit was filed by the same plaintiff, against the same defendants, to foreclose the same indenture of mortgage as in the present suit. The plaintiff also, in that action as in this, prosecuted as the assignee of the mortgage security, but the decree of this court was reversed Upon the sole ground that Minott Mitchell was *254not the assignee, and could not maintain his suit in that character. He had furnished the circulating notes of the White Plains Bank, upon an agreement with Elisha Crawford, the mortgagee, that they were to be delivered to the comptroller of the state and the mortgage reassigned for his benefit. With these notes the reassignment was consummated, and the bond and mortgage delivered to Minott Mitchell as his own property. As the comptroller, however, held them under a special statute, for a special purpose, he could do no more than follow the express injunctions of the act and reassign to the person from whom he received them. The facts were not sufficient, in the opinion of the court of appeals, to constitute Minott Mitchell the owner of the bond and mortgage, in law or equity. This is all. The decree was reversed and the hill dismissed, because, without an assignment from Crawford, Minott Mitchell had no standing in court. How when he reappears, with the bond and mortgage and the deed or deeds of assignment in his hands perfect and complete, it cannot be said that the question which he proposes to litigate is res adjudicata.

¶2The judge at the special term found as a fact, that Elisha Crawford, the mortgagee, was an individual banker transacting business under the name and designation of the White Plains Bank. This is a material fact in the case; for if Richard Cadmus was the owner of the White Plains Bank, and the mortgage in question was part of its assets, the case would assume quite a different aspect. I do not see, however, that the court at special term could have reached any other conclusion. The documentary evidence derived from the bank department, the positive testimony of Elisha Crawford, the omission of Cadmus and his assignees to make any claim as owner or proprietor, without referring particularly to the other proof, could hardly leave a doubt of the fact found by the judge. It follows, as a result, that Crawford, and those who held the bank from him, had an undisputed right to assign and deliver the mortgage to Minott Mitchell. He had-*255furnished the circulating notes upon the faith of the agreement that he was to become the owner of the mortgage. The agreement was so far executed that the notes were applied to the uses contemplated, and the bond and mortgage obtained and delivered over to him. And had he made the bank and Elisha Crawford parties to his bill in chancery, and framed it with a view to his equitable title as assignee, I can hardly doubt but that his claim to relief would have been affirmed.

¶3The validity of the alleged payment of $1000, made by Miles Cook on account of the mortgage, on the 1st January, 1846, and for which he holds the receipt of Richard Cadmus, the cashier, depends upon the authority of Cadmus to receive the money. The mortgage is dated on the 4th of September, 1844, and is made to secure the payment of $1400, with the interest, seven years from the date. At the time the money was paid, the mortgage had been assigned to, and was then in the hands of, the comptroller. Of this transfer Cook had full notice, as appears by his written admission of the date of September 10th, 1844, which is amongst the exhibits. It was no part of the cashier’s business to receive the principal moneys secured upon mortgages assigned to the comptroller to assure the redemption of the circulating notes of the bank. Whenever the notes were returned and the security reassigned, it became the property of Crawford, the mortgagee. And as cashier, even then I do not see how Cadmus could have legally accepted the money and discharged the mortgage, without special authority for that purpose. Crawford, as president of the bank, had power from the comptroller, given in pursuance of the 5th and 10th sections of the “ act to authorize the business of banking,” to receive the interest on the bonds and mortgages held for the bank. So Cadmus, by a like power from Crawford, the president, dated January the 21st, 1844, had authority to receive the interest. Cook could hardly have been deluded with the idea that he was making a valid payment upon the mortgage. He knew that neither *256Cadmus, nor the bank of which he was cashier, possessed the bond and mortgage. He knew that the money was not due, and that the sum paid was only a part of the sum secured. When Minott Mitchell advanced the money in the circulating notes of the bank, under the agreement with Crawford that he should receive the bond and mortgage from the comptroller, neither of them had notice, or was aware, that the payment had been made. Surely they are not bound by it. The subsequent tender of the balance of $400, on account of the principal, could under no circumstances be available to discharge the lien of the mortgage, unless the $1000 received by Cadmus was a valid payment.

[Dutchess General Term, May 9, 1859.

¶4Brown, Davies and Clerke, Justices.]

¶5I do not think it worth while to pursue the subject further. It was carefully and thoroughly examined, in all its aspects, by the judge at the special term, and his conclusions are in my judgment entirely right.

¶6The judgment should be affirmed.

¶7 Reported in 3 Selden, 538.

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