Volume 29 — Federal Reporter

In Equity. Application to discharge receive!. The opinion of the court, and the decree entered upon this application, which is appended as useful to show what was actually done in pursuance of the opinion, sufficiently state the facts.

<p>Copyright—Notice Printed in Book—Must' Stutotly Comply with Statute —Act op Congress, June 18, 1874, § 1.</p> <p>The ®nly notice oí copyright given in a printed hook was the following, printed upon the page immediately following the title-page: “JBnlered according to act of congress, in the year 1878, by 11. A. Jackson.” Held, on demurrer, that the notice was not such a notice as is required by United States statute, (18 U. H. St. at Large, 78,) and did not entitle the proprietor to maintain an action for infringement of copyright.</p>

In Equity. Hearing on motion of the American Bell Telephone Company to set aside the marshal’s return, and on plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court over said company.

<p>1. Patents bob Inventions—Contributory Infringement.</p> <p>Whore a person makes and puts on the market an article ■which of necessity, and to the knowledge of such person, is to be used for the purpose of infringing a patent, such person will be held liable, under the doctrine of contributory infringement.</p> <p>2. Same—Liability as Infringer.</p> <p>But the doctrine that a party may be held liable as an infringer solely because an article sold by him might be used by tbe purchaser as one element of a patented combination would be too dangerous to be upheld.</p> <p>3. Same—Proof of Contributory Infringement.</p> <p>In order to hold a party liable under the doctrine of contributory infringement, there must be proof that what he did was for the purpose and with the intent of aiding' infringement. Saxe v. Hammond, 1 Holmes, 456.</p>

In Equity. Bill to recover certain real estate, and to have declared void certain tax deeds, etc. Dismissed on demurrer filed by defendants. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>In Equity. Bill for an accounting. Plea of want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>Charity Wiggins, who sues as next friond of Thomas Wiggins, (“Blind Tom,”) is a citizen of New York; James N. Bethune, the defendant, of Virginia.</p>

<p>1. Equity—Jurisdiction — Equitable Owner op Bonds — Suit to Recover Bonds.</p> <p>A suit by an equitable owner of bonds to recover the bonds, or their value, is properly brought in equity.</p> <p>2. Same—Pleading—Joinder on Parties—Personal Representatives oe Deceased Partner.</p> <p>In a suit in equity by the equitable owner of bonds to recover them, or their proceeds, from the surviving members of a copartnership, all the members of which acquired the bonds with knowledge of his rights, it is not necessary to join the personal representatives of a deceased partner as parties defendant, although they would be proper parties, at the option of the defendants.</p> <p>8. Action or Suit—Joinder oe Parties — Representatives oe Deceased Receiver—Suit in .Equity against Surviving Members.</p> <p>A receiver, who had heen appointed in a suit between the equitable owner of the bonds and a third person to hold them pending the determination of the suit, surrendered them to the other party before the termination of the suit, who sold them to the defendants. Held, that in a suit to recover their value the receiver, or, in case of his death, his personal representatives, need not he made a party.</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy—Limitations — Action.by Assignee — Bonds Sold by Bankrupt—Rev. St. U. S. Section 5057,</p> <p>In a suit in equity by an assignee in bankruptcy to recover certain bonds vested in him by parties to whom they had heen sold by the bankrupt, an averment in the hill that the assignee “had no knowledge, or means of knowledge, of the sale of said bonds until about the month of April, 1884,” is insufficient to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations, requiring such suits to he brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued. Section 5057, Rev. St. U. S.</p>

<p>Receiver—Appointment—Laches.</p> <p>An application for Hie appointment of a receiver, which, has been allowed to sleep for six years, will be denied, although some testimony has been taken in the mean time.</p>

<p>1. Statute of Limitations—Negligence—Action fob Damages fob Causing Death.—Code Iowa, S 2527.</p> <p>Section 2527 of the Iowa Code, giving a right of action for a wrongful injury causing death, and declaring that “such action shall bo deemed a continuing one. and to have accrued to such representative or successor at the same time as ii did to the deceased if he had survived, ” gives one and not two rights of action,—one to the deceased and the other to his estate,—but, one which accrues at the same time as il would have accrued had deceased survived.</p> <p>2. Same—Exceptions-Commencement of Action.—Code Iowa, § 2582.</p> <p>Under section 2582 of the Iowa Code, providing that “placing the notice in the hands of the sheriff for immediate service * * ® shall, so far as the statute of limitations is concerned, be deemed the commencement of the action,” the delivery of the notice to the sheriff, and not the filing of the petition. is the commencement of the action.</p>

<p>Courts—United States District Court—Jurisdiction—Arrest of Suitor in One State to Answer Contempt of Federal Court in Another—Rev St. U. S. § 1014</p> <p>The judges of the district courts of the United States have no power or authority, under section 1014 Rev. St. U. S., or under any other law or statute, to cause the arrest of a citizen of the state and district in which the judge resides, and to order his removal to another state, in order that he may he there imprisoned until he obeys ^n order made in a civil case pending in the United States court in that state.</p>

<p>COSTS--"WITNESS NOT SUBPCBNAED—TRAVELING FEES.</p> <p>Traveling fees of witnesses coming voluntarily upon tbe request of a party, without having been subpoenaed, from another district more than 100 miles from the place of trial, and beyond the reach of a subpoena, cannot be taxed as costs against the losing party; following Spaulding v. Tucker, 2 Sawy. 50.</p>

There was a verdict for the plaintiff for $4,000. The facts are stated sufficiently in the opinion of the court. The case was tried before Welker and Hammond, JJ., and the defendant moved for a hew trial upon exceptions to the charge, and because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, etc. The following is the charge of the court: Hammond, J., (charging jury.) The plaintiff sues for the negligent killing of her intestate by the defendant.

<p>Jail and Jailer—Charlestown Prison, Massachusetts--Imprisonment of Persons Sentenced by United States Courts—St. Mass. 1884, Ch. 255, § 7—Rev. St. U. S. §§ 5541, 5542.</p> <p>The state prison at Concord having been in express terms designated by statute as a prison in which offenders sentenced by the United States courls, for terms of more than a year, might bo imprisoned, and the removal of the prison from Concord to Charlestown having taken place under St. Mass. 1884, c. 255, section 7 of that act, making- the laws relating 1o the Concord state prison applicable to the Charlestown prison, authorizes the judges of the United States courts to sentence offenders to imprisonment in the Charlestown prison as a prison allowed in terms of Rev. St. U. S. §§ 5541, 5543, by tbe state legislature for use for tbe confinement of persons sentenced for periods of over one year.</p>

<p>Indictment for Conspiracy to Defraud the United States.</p>

<p>Indictment for Conspiracy to Defraud the United States.</p>

This was an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover money alleged to have been illegally exacted as customs duties upon a quantity of bichromate of soda, imported into the port of Philadelphia by the plaintiffs. Bichromate of soda is a non-enumerated article under the act of congress of March 3,1883.

<p>Trade-Mares—Infringement— “Chatter-Book”-—1“Chatter-Box.”</p> <p>The name “Chatter-book, ’’printed upon the cover of the defendants’ books of the juvenile character of the general appearance of the complainants’ books, being in the opinion of the court an imitation of tho name “Chatterbox,” which, by association, when used upon books of a juvenile character, points “distinctly to the origin or ownership” of the books to which it is applied, an injunction pendente lite is granted against its use.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for injunction and damages.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Libel—Injunction.</p> <p>There is no jurisdiction in the United States courts of equity to enjoin a libel on the rights or title of an owner of letters patent.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Infringement—Preliminary Injunctions—Banner Kod.</p> <p>A preliminary injunction will not be granted to restrain tbe infringement of a “design for a banner rod, consisting of a conventional imitation of a straight twig with the bark, and slantingly cut ends;” the section which relates to design patents demanding, it may be supposed, the exercise of more genius than is exhibited by it.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Infringement—Paper-Bag Machines.</p> <p>Claims 8, 10, and 13 of reissued letters patent No. 8,357, July 30, 1878, for improvements in paper-bag machines, by opening the end of a tubular blank, and forming the first or diamond fold thereof by means of the conjoint action of two adjacent moving surfaces, these surfaces consisting of two revolving rollers into which the blank is fed, the lower roller drawing the free or lipped end of the blank in one direction, while the other roller, moving in another direction, pulls the other side of the blank by the seam connecting it with the preceding blank, this operation extending the mouth of the bag into a diamond fold shape, held not to be infringed by defendant’s machine, which has only one roller, and no second divergent moving roller; the fold not being formed by the conjoint action of two diverging moving surfaces.</p>

<p>At about 24 minutes past 3 o’clock in the afternoon of September 19, 1885, the weather being fine, the sea smooth, the tide flood, and the wind light from the southward, as the steamship 'Republic, of the White Star Line, and the Canard steamer Aurania, both outward bound from this port, and in charge of competent pilots, were about entering Gedney’s channel to cross the bar, they came into collision; the stem of the liepnblic striking the port quarter of the A urania about 50 feet from her stern, and at an angle of about 25 or 80 deg. The Aurania’s stem was, at the time, about 100 feet to the westward of the fairway buoy, which is situated in the middle of the western entrance to that channel. The Aurania, though somewhat damaged, was not so much injured as to prevent the continuance of her voyage. The Republic’s whole stem was carried away to port, compelling her to return to New York for repairs, to her alleged damage of f>85,000. The above cross-libels were filed by the owners to recover their respective damages, each alleging that the collision was by the other’s fault.</p> <p>The Aurania is of 4,030 tons register, and 7,275 tons burden, 480 feet long by 56 feet beam, and she was drawing 26|- feet of water. The Republic is of 2,187 tons register, 3,700 tons burden, 420 feet long by 42 feet beam, and she was drawing 25^- feet. The Republic passed Governor’s island (Fort William) under full headway at 2: 05 p. m. The Aurania was then a little behind, and not under full headway; but she overtook and passed the Republic about midway between Bedloe’s island and Robbins reef. After passing the Narrows, the Aurania kept to the main or Horseshoe channel, around the south-west spit. The Republic tool! the Swash channel, being, at the time she left the main channel, from one to two miles astern of the Aurania. The Swash channel is a short cut to the left; the main channel sweeps around to the right; and the distance to the Fairway buoy is about two and one-half miles greater by the main channel' than by the Swash. The two channels are separated by shoals, impassable to such steamers, until within about one mile of the Fairway buoy, towards which the two channels converge by an angle of 25 deg., and there unite. At the place of widest separation the two channels are about two miles apart.</p> <p>The speed of the two steamers, and the precise direction of their courses, as they approached the buoy, when from half a mile to a mile distant from it, are in dispute. The Aurania’s speed was admitted to be not less than between 14 and 15 knots; the Republic’s between 11 and 12. Their courses differed from one to two and a half points. About the time when the Republic was approaching the end of the Swash, or was already rounding out of it, the Aurania gave her a signal of one short whistle, to which the Republic replied with two, which, if the nineteenth article of the new rules is applicable, would indicate that the one was directing her course to the right, the other to the left. Each did so to some extent, but not enough to avoid collision.</p> <p>Although there is sufficient water on the south side of the Fairway buoy, it is the most common practice for outward bound steamers, like these, to go to the northward of it in order the more easily to make the necessary turn to the southward after passing it; and the channel is not wide enough for two such steamers to navigate safely abreast of each other on the northerly side. The pilot and the master of the Aurania testified that it was their intention to pass on the southerly side of the Fairway buoy; that they steered for that buoy, keeping it, as they approached it, a little on the port bow; and that the blow of the Republic so changed the Aurania’s direction that she passed the buoy close on its northerly side, instead of the southerly side, as intended. Both vessels were under full speed of their engines from the time of passing Governor’s island, about 2: 05, although there was some increase at least in the Republic’s speed as the steamers proceeded down the bay. The Aurania did not slacken speed after her whistle, and prior., to the collision. The Republic stopped and reversed her engines not more than a half minute previous, but without any material effect in checking her speed.</p> <p>Most of the witnesses testified that shortly before the collision, and when the Republic’s stem was from (50 to 300 feet from tho Aurania’s side, her stem seemed suddenly to fall upon the Aurania. The libelants contended that the Aurania was an overtaking vessel, and, as such, bound to keep out of tlio Republic’s way; that she was also in fault for not keeping to the starboard side of tlio channel, in accordance with her signal, and for coming so near to tho Republic’s course, and then porting her wheel, as they allege she did, so as to throw' her quarter upon tho Republic’s stem. The Aurania denies these alleged faults. She denies that she ported at that time, and denies that she was an overtaking vessel. She alleges that the vessels were crossing; that the Republic, having tho Aurania on her own starboard band, was hound to keep out of the way; and that the Republic brought on tlio collision by not doing so, and by porting her helm just prior to the collision, which porting the Republic denies.</p>

<p>Seamen—Wages—Master’s Lien—British Vessel—Law oe the Flag—Mortgagee in Possession, rut Ostensibly Agent Only eor Foreign Owner— British Merchants’Shipping Act.</p> <p>Libelant shipped in New York, as master of the bark P., knowing that she had a British registry, and supposing that she was owned by a British subject residing in Quebec. In fact, one P. was mortgagee in possession, and running the vessel for his own account, though acting ostensibly as “agent for owners. ” Held, that libelant was entitled to the benefit of the British merchants’ shipping act, as the law of the flag that governed the ship, and upon which he relied in joining her, and which was presumably the law contemplated by both parties, and that, under that act, libelant had a lien on the vessel for his wages.</p>

<p>1. Courts — Jurisdiction — United States Circuit Court—Collusion in Joinder or Parties.</p> <p>The statute whioli requires a suit to be dismissed when it appears that a party has been collusively made or joined for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by the United" Stales circuit court is not intended to restrict those who contemplate bringing a suit, from selecting as adversaries all- those ■ against whom any substantial relief may be sought.</p> <p>2. Equity—Pleading—Proeert—Judgment Record—Former Suit.</p> <p>Whore the judgment record, made a proferí in a plea, showed that the decree in the former suit was without prejudice to the right of the plaintiffs to bring a new action against all but one of the several defendants who joined in the plea, held, that the plea was bad.</p> <p>3. Same — Setting up xn Plea Facts Required to be in Bill—Rule 94 in Equity.</p> <p>A plea is bad which sets up matters of fact appearing on the face of the bill, and which sets up affirmatively, by way of defense, a fact which a plaintiff is required to allege in his bill by rule 94 in equity.</p>

<p>Discovert—Parties Competent Witnesses.</p> <p>A bill for discovery in aid of an action at law cannot be maintained where full discovery may be compelled by examination of the adverse party as a witness in the suit at law.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit to vacate patent to land on ground of fraud.</p>

At Law. Action for libel. See S. C. 25 Fed. Rep. 133. The petition states that on or about the sixteenth day of May, 1885, the defendants published in a newspaper called the “Railway Register,” at lite city of St. Louis, in the state of Missouri, the following libelous words concerning tho plaintiff, and of and concerning him in his capacity and occupation of general passenger agent of the, Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company, viz.: “Mr. Shattuc [moaning plaintiff] has grown…

Libel of Information for the condemnation and sale of property for non-payment of customs duties. The opinion states the case.

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement.</p>

In Equity. Bill to restrain the infringement of letters patent for an invention. Plea allowed, with costs, and leave granted to complainant to move to amend his bill. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>In Equity. Motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

In Admiralty. The libelant, on the twenty-eighth of April, 1886, shipped as fire'man on the steam-barge A. H. Jennie, a Canadian vessel, and, with the exception of three or four days, remained on board until the twenty-sixth of June, 1886.

<p>CoTiLisroN—Two Schooners — Attempt to Cross Bows—Fahvgre to Keep Course—Apportionment.</p> <p>"\Vhcre the schooner L., sailing free, and the schooner N. S., sailing close-hauled, approached each other nearly head on, in the night, and, when about abreast oí the Stepping Stones light,'in Long Island Sound, came in collision, it was held that the collision was due to the fault of both vessels,—the fault of the L. being an attempt to cross the bows of the N. S., by putting- her helm hard a-port, when the circumstances did not justify porting-; the fault of the N. S. consisting- of a failure to keep her course, which the fact of her being close-hauled required.</p>

<p>Collision— Canal-Boat in Tow—Steamkr’a Propeller—Unusual Construction of Propeller-—Unjustifiable Position for Canal-Boat—Liability of Tug.</p> <p>The t-ug W., with libelant’s boat in tow. attempted to enter a slip, the opening to which, owing lo vessels along-sido the piers, was only some 60 feet wide. In going in, libelant’s boat was swung under the counter of the steamer B. II., which was lying along the wharf, struck her propeller blade, and sunk. The steam-ship had double screw propellers, which are unusual in the port of Kow York, and project nearer the line of the vessel’s side than ordinary single propellers. Jfeld, on the evidence, that libelant’s boat was swung under the steamer’s stern to an improper and dangerous degree, even in reference to single screw propellers; that the tug was therefore solely in fault.</p>

Libel in admiralty to recover $1,456 for supplies and advances, furnished the schooner by the libelant, a shipping merchant in Boston. Under the libel the vessel was sold, and the proceeds ($1,700). paid into the registry of the court. The mortgagee, George J. Troop, of Halifax, appeared and contested the allowance of $157 of the-amount, on the ground that the sum was paid as premiums for insurance upon the vessel, and no maritime lien existed therefor..

In Admiralty. Action in rem. Seizure of seine-boat of mackerel schooner at the instance of material-men, the furnishers of supplies to the schooner. Libels by T. L. Mayo & Co. and James P. Nyo for repairs and supplies furnished the mackerel schooner Merrimac. A large seine-boat, 87 feet long and 7J feet wide, was seized by the marshal as belonging to the schooner.

<p>Smrs and Shipping—Duty of Master not to Take Average Bond after Adjustment of Loss—Form of Average Bond.</p> <p>The question whether tender of an average bond, reciting that the owners claim that certain losses and expenses had been incurred which might constitute a general average, is sufficient to entitle consignees to a delivery of the goods"from the master, cannol be decided (there being no contention but thattlio losses and expenses made a case of general average) after the adjustment has been made, there being no obligation on the master then to accept any bond.</p>

<p>Removal of Causes—Xationat. Banks—23 U. ft Ht. at Larue. 163.</p> <p>Under section 1 of the act of congress of July 13, 1883, a national bank cannot remove a suit against it 1'roni the state court upon the sole ground that, it is a corporation organized under a law of the United States, and that therefore the suit is one arising under the laws of the United States.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill to foreclose mortgage, and remove receivers.</p>

At Law. Suit on a promissory noto for over $500 by a resident of Illinois, to whom it was transferred by the payee, a resident of Missouri, after maturity, as collateral security for a debt of $400. At the time the transfer was made the indorsee gave the indorser a written agreement to account for and pay over to him the entire amount realized from the suit over and above the amount of his debt.

<p>Courts—United States Circuit Court—Judgment—Power to Set Aside at Subsequent Term.</p> <p>The United States circuit court has no power, at a subsequent term, to set aside a judgment, in due form, unconditionally entered at a former term, and which has become a final judgment.</p>

<p>On Habeas Corpus.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in rem for supplies furnished partly in home and partly in a foreign port.</p>

<p>1. Carrier—Discharge of Cargo — Customary Wharf — Discharge Elsewhere—Liability.</p> <p>The customary discharge of goods by a carrier at its own wharf, so long as no good reason for a discharge elsewhere exists, though not without occasional discharges for cause at a different wharf, imports no such strict contract obligation to discharge at its own wharf as is violated by a discharge elsewhere, for good reasons,—such as that the usual dock was full.</p> <p>2. Same—Statement.</p> <p>On the thirty-first of January, 1888, the dock of the National Steam-ship Company being occupied by other vessels, the steam-ship Egypt, of that line, discharged her cargo at the Inman dock, three blocks distant, where it was destroyed by fire. Libelant alleged that the loss occurred through the violation on the part of the steam-ship company of its custom to discharge at its own wharf. The proof showed that while it was the practice of the National line to discharge at their own dock, it was no invariable custom. The hills of lading provided simply for a delivery at the port of New York. The Inman Company’s pier was as good and safe from fire as that of the National line, and nothing was shown in regard to the cause of the fire that especially connected it with the unloading at the Inman pier. Held, that the National Company was not liable for the loss on the ground of violation of custom.</p>

<p>4. Admiralty—Jurisdiction in Case of Seizure—Rev. St. TJ. S. § 4499.</p> <p>In a case of seizure, the place of seizure, and not that of the commission of the act on account of which the seizure is made, determines the jurisdiction: and the clause in section 4499 of the Revised Statutes—“may be seized and proceeded against by way of libel in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the offense”—does not change this rule; the court in whose district a seizure is made acquiring thereby jurisdiction of the subject-matter or cause of suit.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Remove ov Cause—Railroads-—Computation op Damages in Condemnation Proceedings.</p> <p>Vken. in condemnation proceedings under state statutes, the only question ren'¡s'niug for determination is the computation of the value of the land, the paries being citizens o£ different stales, the cause maybe removed to the lini «1 States courts, notwithstanding the fact that the right of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and that the statutes provide a special ¡nod" of trial for the assessment of damages, since the amount of compensation "or the land is entirely independent of the right of eminent domain.</p>

In Equity. Application for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance of the village of Alliance, Ohio, prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors. ■The complainant alleged that for the last 20 years he had been engaged in the business of selling distilled, malt, and vinous liquors, lawfully, in the village of Alliance, in Ohio, and in pursuance of said business he had acquired property, a part of which was real estate, in said village, upon which he had…

<p>Motion for New Trial.</p> <p>Action on a life insurance policy. Judgment for'plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>1. .Patents fob Inventions—Infringement—Prior Invention—Sufficiency of Evidence—Patent No. 295,172, for Improvement in Cash and Parcel Carrying System.</p> <p>In a suit ior infringement of a patent, tbe defense being that defendant was the first inventor, the fact tbat soon after the time of his alleged invention he applied for a patent relating to the same subject, which he based on an entirely different principle, overcomes his and his witness’ testimony, that he was the first inventor.</p> <p>2. Same—Hayden Patent of May 8, 1881, No. 241,008.</p> <p>The Hayden patent of May 8, 1881, No. 241,008, describing, among other things, an extensible holder, attached to a frame supported on wheels, the specification of which is as follows: “One of the principal difficulties in constructing a carrier of this character has been to adapt it to retain both large and small articles as well as articles of irregular shape,—a difficulty which I have overcome by connecting the holder, O, flexibly to the frame. I have adopted various modes of securing a flexible connection. For instance, I have used a crate or frame or basket, in connection with elastic straps, suspending it from the frame, A, or I have used a holder made of elastic straps. In either case the article, whether large or small, is pressed up against the frame by the elasticity of the holder, ”—includes a holder extensibly connected to the frame as well as a holder extensible in itself.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Suspender Buckles.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 295,085, of March. 11, 1884, to John W. Bruff, for an improvement in suspender buckles, construed, and its claims sustained.</p> <p>2. Samk—Construction of Claims.</p> <p>The claims of this patent are limited to a suspender buckle having a spring-clamp, and the first claim is limited to a buckle having a spring clamp divided at its center.</p> <p>3. Same—Infringement—What is.</p> <p>Each of the claims of this patent being limited to a buckle having a spring clamp composed of two elastic wings or arms' approaching each other, but not connected, they áre not infringed by a buckle having its wings or arms firmly joined, and possessing no more resiliency than is due to the character of the material, although it performs all the functions of the patented buckle.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Necessity for Allowing Sufficient Margin for Safety.</p> <p>A vessel must allow a sufficient margin for the contingencies of navigation, in undertaking to avoid another vessel, and must take decisive measures in time.</p> <p>2. Same—Vessel at Anchor—Exceptional Circumstances—Necessity for Care by Anchored Vessel.</p> <p>While a vessel at anchor in a proper place, in the day-time, and in fair weather, is not ordinarily required to be on the watch to avoid vessels under way, having control of their motions, yet, under exceptional circumstances, when the vessel under way is subject to special difficulties in her navigation, some care on the part of the vessel at anchor may become obviously prudent and necessary, that would not otherwise be obligatory.</p> <p>8. Same—Statement of Case—Apportionment.</p> <p>The schooner C., while lying, during the day-time, in the middle of the outer entrance to Hampton roads, and heaving upon her anchor preparatory to going to sea, was run into by the schooner K., which, with a large fleet of vessels, had come down from above on her way to sea, and which, owing to the intervening vessels, did not observe the C. until within 200 or 250 yards of her. The evidence indicated that the collision might have been avoided had the C. starboarded her helm, or paid out chain, as she was hailed by the K. to do. No one was at the wheel of the C. and she did nothing to avoid collision. Hdd, that both vessels were in fault, the K. for not avoiding the C., which, on the evidence, she might have done by prompt and effective measures; and the 0. for an entire lack of prudence, attention, and assistance in avoiding danger, while voluntarily suffering herself to remain as an obstruction in the midst of a large fieot'of moving vessels.</p> <p>4. Same—Damages—Putting back fob Kkpaihs.</p> <p>A schooner having had her jib-boom carried away, and fore-chain plate broken, in a collision, is justified in putting back to repair them, before proceeding to sen.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Fog—Steamer Near Line oe Piers—Speed—Ability to Stop.</p> <p>A largo steamer lias no .right to run in a dense log, near piers where boats usually tie up, except under such slow speed as to be capable of being fully stopped within the distance at which they can be seen.</p> <p>3. Same—Statement oe Case.</p> <p>Where the steamer St. John was going up the North river in a fog, within 100 or 200 feet of the line of the New York piers, and when about abreast of Piers 2 and 3 ran into libelant's barge, which was one of a tow hauled'up in that place, where tows customarily make fast, held, that the St. John was solely liable-for the damage.</p>

<p>1. Wharves—Injury to Yessel—Liability of Lessee of Wharf.</p> <p>Defendants occupied the wharf at the fool of One Hundred and Twenty-eighth street, Harlem river, under a lease which reserved to grantor wharfage rights. These rights defendants’ grantor subsequently conveyed to the Consumers’ Coal Company, on whose°invitation libelant brought'his boat to the wharf. The boat being injured while at the wharf, held, that there was sufficient privity between libelant and defendants to entitle the former to relief directly against the latter.</p> <p>S. Same—Leasehold Premises—Covenant to JRepajr—Liability—Notice of Danger.</p> <p>Defendants, in their lease, covenanted to “make such alterations and repairs to the dock and bulk-head as they required.” Libelant’s boat, the day after her arrival at the wharf, was sunk, owing to the dangerous character of the river bottom, of which libelant was not notified. Held, that the covenant meant such repairs as the dools andhulk-head required, and that the defendants were liable for the loss, for neither making the necessary repairs, nor giving notice of danger to the libelant’s boat.</p>

<p>Estoppel—Judgment—Fraudulent Conveyances—Gbnmrat. Assignment.</p> <p>A judgment creditor, who has been defeated in a suit to have conveyances made in payment of indebtedness by an insolvent debtor declared fraudulent and void, is not estopped from subsequently bringing another suit to have such conveyances declared part of a general assignment.2</p>

<p>1. Receivers—Order for Sale by Federal Court of Property in Hards of Receiver of State Court.</p> <p>When, a receiver is in possession of property pending a suit involving the right to its possession merely, as in a suit to redeem from a mortgage, the court is of opinion that a mere sale of such property on the process of another court is not an interference with such possession; but, in deference to the dicta of Mr. Justice Welsoh in Wisivall v. Sampson, 14 How. 53, to the contrary, it declines to direct such sale.1</p> <p>3. Same—Conflict of Laws—Appeal—Mahdate—Extension of Time—Powers of Federal Courts.</p> <p>A decree of the supreme court of the state (Oregon) in Holladay v. Holladay, 11 Pac. Rep. 360, allowed the plaintiff to redeem the property therein mentioned from certain conveyances to the defendant, on the payment of a certain sum of money within 90 days therefrom. The circuit court to which the mandate was sent, on the application and consent of the parties, made an order enlarging the time for redemption to three years, and placing the property in the hands of two persons as receivers during that time. Held, that these persons were not receivers, hut only agents of the parties, and that their appointment would not prevent this court from directing the sale of a certain portion of said property on which the plaintiff herein has a lien hy virtue of the decree heretofore given in this case.1</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

Appeal by the plaintiff from taxation of the clerk disallowing traveling fees for more than 100 miles of a witness residing in Buffalo, who attended the trial of this cause in the Southern district of New York.

At Law. Trespass. Prior to the late civil war the state of Virginia borrowed large sums of money upon her bonds bearing 6 per cent, interest to construct works of internal improvement, such as railways, and so forth. Her bonds being in the main held outside of her own borders,—in the north and in England,—she paid no interest on them during the war and during the period of reconstruction.

At Law. Trespass. The facts in this case were the same as in the preceding one, with the exception that the tax due was nine dollars only, and there was no question relating to the school tax involved in the case; the plaintiffs having paid that part of the tax relating to the public schools in currency, and having tendered coupons for the other part of the revenue solely.

<p>Customs Duties—Importation of Emery Stone—Act of 1883 —When It Took Effect.</p> <p>Emery stone, that arrived by vessel at tbe port of New York on June 80, 1883, too late to go into stores or bonded warehouse on that day, and that was not entered until July 2d, July 1st being Sunday, was not exempted from duties under the act of congress of 1883, (23 St. 488,) but was liable to the duty of six dollars per ton imposed by the act in existence prior to that act.</p>

<p>Evidence—Proof of Handwriting—Comparison.</p> <p>Handwriting cannot be proved by comparison witli letters not admitted to be genuine, nor belonging to the witness testifying as to the party’s handwriting, and produced m court in confirmation or explanation of his testimony.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Letters Patent Ho. 137,765, of April 15,1873— Hydraulic Jack—Improvement in Direct-Action Pumping Engines.</p> <p>Letters patent Ho. 187,765, of April 15, 1873, to Richard Dudgeon, for n improvement in hydraulic jacks, the structure being this: A ram works in a water-tight cylinder, and by the injection of water or other liquid, by means of a force-pump, into a chamber at the bottom of a cylinder, the ram rises, lifting the load; the ram is lowered by permitting the liquid to escape: held, not anticipated, or defeated for lack of invention, by the patent granted to Worthington and Baker, April 3,1849, for an improvement in direct-action pumping engines.</p> <p>2. Same—Letters Patent Ho. 297,975—Hydraulic Jack—Infringement.</p> <p>Letters patent Ho. 297,975, granted to one Richard H. Dudgeon, May 6,1884, and by him assigned to complainant, for an improvement in hydraulic jacks: 1873, Ho. 137,765. By the improved device a smooth bearing 'is given to the plunger or piston while taking its extended stroke when the ram is lowered. This is accomplished by boring the reverse passages in the walls of the independent internal cylinder in which the plunger operates. This cylinder is so constructed that it can be removed, and the apparatus which it contains renewed or repaired. In the defendant’s structure a short section of the ram cylinder is' cut off, and the internal cylinder is so cast as to fill up the space thus left; the result being that the latter is not supported by the screw-threads oí the valve-block as in the patent, but by being made to fit, closely to the ram cylinder. The two methods are equivalent, and plaintiff’s patent hold to be infringed.</p>

<p>Salvage—Seamen as Salvors—Supererogatory Services.</p> <p>When the master and the major portion of the crew have quitted the ship, renouncing all hopes of saving- her, and a few of the crew have remained, in spite of the expostulations, and almost against the commands, of the master, to confront dangers which he and their companions have declined to encounter, and by so doing have saved the ship, justice, as well as the true interests of owners and insurers, demands that the courts should recognize, as a legal right, their claim to compensation as salvors for supererogatory-services.</p>

<p>Demurrage—Bill op Lading—Evidence—Ambiguous Words—Admission op Prior Conversations to Explain.</p> <p>Libelant’s vessel was, while at sea, let by charter-party. By its terms, the vessel, after discharging at A. the cargo then laden, was to proceed to B., there obtain a new cargo, and carry the same to C. The vessel was to pay the cost of discharging cargo, and 15 lay days were stipulated for in which to load and discharge. In unloading at A., and in loading at B., 18 of these 15 days were consumed. Under these circumstances, it was proposed by the shippers of the new cargo, who were the same firm as the original charterers, that three instead of two working days should be allowed for discharging, and that in consideration thereof the ship should be relieved from its obligation to discharge cargo at its own cost, and that the burden should be assumed by the merchant; the vessel’s crow, however, assisting therewith. This modification of the contract was in parol. Bills of lading were subsequently made out and signed. The body of the bills of lading contains the words: “All other conditions as per charter-party of August 1, 1886. ” Upon the margin of the bill there was contained the following clause: “Three working days are left for discharging. ” At the bottom of the bill there was written these words: “The cargo to be discharged for account of the merchant within three .working days, crew to assist, if more time used, demurrage to be paid as per charter-party. ” Eeld, that the written words upon a printed document give rise to an ambiguity which authorizes the admission of the parol agreement, and that, in the light of this testimony, the meaning and use of the words are explained, and that the consignee, to whose order the bills of lading had been assigned, must pay the cost of discharging the cargo.</p>

<p>1. Seamen—Who are^-Wages—Lien—Laborers Claiming as Mariners.</p> <p>While there exists an undoubted tendency to extend to all persons, when necessarily and properly employed as co-laborers on a vessel for the purposes of the voyage, the privilege of mariners, and while, subject to this qualification, the rule is independent of sex, character, or profession, it would be inequitable and unjust to extend the rule, by implication, to laboring men hired by the freighter, and not by, the vessel, whose contract was solely with the former, and to whom the latter was a stranger, and whose only material connection with the vessel was that they were transported in her as passengers to the port of destination for the purpose of excavating cargo. The circumstance of their having, during the passage, of their own motion, rendered occasionally slight and immaterial assistance in working ship, cannot be used as a pretext when from the evidence it appears that the vessel was provided with a full complement of officers and men.</p> <p>%. Same—Pleadings and Prooes—'Variance.</p> <p>While, from the evidence, it is possible that the libelants might, perhaps, have had a claim as salvors or lighter-men, it is unnecessary, under the pleadings, to consider the question. The libelants, having claimed as mariners, must recover, if at all, in that capacity.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in rem for salvage.</p>

<p>Salvage—Tug at Wharf on Fire.</p> <p>A tug took fire while tied to a wharf. Whije the fire was burning, and the firemen on shore were trying to put it out, the tug got loose, and was in danger of escaping beyond the reach of the firemen. Libelants secured the tug, made her fast, and aided in extinguishing the fire. Held, that they had rendered a salvage service, and were entitled to comnensation.</p>

<p>On Motion to Tax Costs.</p>

Assumpsit by Meehan against Valentine, executor of W. G. Perry, upon promissory notes made by L. W. Counselman & Co., of which firm the defendant’s testator was alleged to have been a member. The plea was no partnership. Upon the trial it appeared that the ostensible partners of L. W. Counselman & Co. were L. W. Counsel-man and Charles Scott. In March, 1880, W. G. Perry loaned L. V/. Counselman & Go. $10,000.

<p>Trial—-Ordering Verdict.</p> <p>Where tlie court would set a side the verdict eo instante if found for the plaintiff at the close of his case, it should instruct the jury to find for the defendant.</p>

<p>At Law. Motion by defendants for a new trial.</p> <p>For the report of the trial, see 28 Fed. Rep. 872.</p>

Demurrer to Indictment. This indictment for manslaughter, under section 5344 of the Revised Statutes, against the defendant, as captain of a steam-boat, charges, in the first count, that the defendant, by inattention to his duties as captain, permitted a rail on the saloon deck to be without a guard, in consequence of which Ella Martin, a passenger, stepped overboard in the dark, and was drowned.

<p>Pensions—Indictment—Sufficiency—Rev. St. II. S. § 5485—Act of Congress of June 30, 1878.</p> <p>An indictment following the language of section 5485, Rev. St. U. S., charging the accused with receiving an excessive fee for bis services “in prosecuting a pension claim,” sufficiently charges him with receiving the same “in a pension case;” the language setting forth the elements necessary to constitute the crime, and apprise the accused with reasonable certainty of the accusation against him.1</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Infringement—Priority of Invention—What Constitutes—Rotary Drills.</p> <p>Robert Allison, in 1870, conceived of the invention described in his patent, No. 261,978, for an improvement in rotary drills, dated August 1, 1882, and made rough sketches thereof, but no model or machine, and did not consider the invention worth putting into a permanent form, and did not apply for a patent until May 4,1882, after Ball and Case, subsequent, but independent, inventors of the same improvement, had obtained patents therefor, dated October 4 and November 1, 1881, and had putthe patented article on the market. Held, that rightful priority of invention was to be adjudged to Ball and Case.</p> <p>2. Same—Conception, Unless Followed Seasonably by Practical Steps, not Invention.</p> <p>A mere conception, not seasonably followed by some practical step, counts for nothing as against a subsequent independent inventor, who, having complied with the patent laws, has obtained his patent.</p> <p>3. Same—Neglect .to Obtain Patent for Twelve Years.</p> <p>One who has conceived of a new device, and proceeded so far as to embody it in rough sketches, or even in finished drawings, cannot there stop, and yet hold that field of invention against all comers for a period of 12 years.</p> <p>4. Same—Testimony as to Fact of Invention.</p> <p>In an interference proceeding in 1873, upon a different invention of the same general character, Allison had testified to making the invention here in question; but this testimony did not constitute invention, any more than did his previous sketches.</p> <p>6. Same—Pleading—Question of Priority, how Raised.</p> <p>It was sufficient to raise the question of priority of invention for defendants in their answer to deny that Allison was the original and first inventor, and to justify under the Ball and Case patents, without alleging abandonment by Allison.</p> <p>6. Same—Core-Lifters.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 147,492, granted to Gideon Frisbee, February 17, 1874, for core-lifters, held valid, and infringed by defendants.</p> <p>7. Same—Infringement—Similar Operation—Different Construction.</p> <p>Where the claim of the Frisbee patent is for the combination of an annular core-lifter and a tube with an inner tapering recess, and the patent described a loose, elastic cut ring, within a tapering recess in a boring tube, and the defendants use a loose, solid, unelastic ring, in a cylindrical recess in a boring tube, but this ring had four dependent springs, with grasping jaws arranged in an annular position, and equidistant, which are forced into a tapered drill-head at the lower end of the recess, and the purpose and mode of operation of the two devices are similar, held, that the difference of construction is not material, and the claim is infringed.</p> <p>8. Same—Failure as to Part of Complainant's Case—Decree—Apportionment of Costs.</p> <p>Where the suit fails upon one patent, and prevails upon another, the complainant is entitled to a decree; but the costs should be equitably apportioned.</p>

<p>t. Patents for Inventions—Infringement—Evidence—Eppler Natltng-jVTaohine.</p> <p>On ilie evidence, 1tetd, that the pivoted fool-presser improvement on defendant’s nailing-machine, alleged by plaintiffs to have been invented by one Nagle, and used for the first time by him on defendants’ Eppler nailing-machine in September, 1888. had been lised on said machine by defendants prior to that date, and therefore ¡Nagle had not a patent-right therein.</p> <p>2. Satie—Invention.</p> <p>An improvement in the nail-carrier of a nailing-machine, -which consist s in making the edge of the carrier smooth instead of corrugated, cannot he field to be an invention.</p> <p>8. Same—¡Nailing-Machines .</p> <p>Patent No. 808,870 of November 25,1884. to James Nagle for improvements in nailing-machines considered and hold void; part as being anticipated by the owners of the Eppler nailing-maohine patent issued August 14, 1888, and pari as not amounting to an in\ ention.</p>

<p>Patents fob Inventions—Bill in Equity against Licensee—Injunction and Account.</p> <p>A bill in equity which sets forth a license to defendants to use certain patents embodied in machines leased to them by plaintiff, the license, providing for payment of license foes, or purchase and use of license stamps, and for rendering accounts, and which alleges failure of defendants in their obligations under the license, and prays for discovery and account, and decree for payment of fees, and an injunction until such payment, shows a cause for equitable relief.</p>

<p>1 Admiralty—Rule 63—Counter-Claim—Cross-Libel.</p> <p>Tbe original libel was for repairs made to a boiler, wbicb bad been constructed by tbe libelants for tbe respondent under a contract wbicb stipu lated for tbe use of a certain well known brand of iron. A different quality of iron from that agreed on was used, witb tbe consent of tbe respondent, on tbe representations of tbe libelants that it was equally as good and just as expensive as tbe other; and tbe boiler was, on delivery, accepted and paid for by tbe respondent. Subsequently tbe repairs now sued for were put on tbe boiler, and tbe respondent files a cross-libel for a counter-claim for damages for breach of tbe original contract. Held, that such counter-claim does not arise out of tbe same cause of action for wbicb tbe original libel was brought, as contemplated by admiralty rule 53.</p> <p>2. Set-Off and Counter-Claim—Unliquidated Damages.</p> <p>To authorize a set-off, tbe debts must be between tbe same parties in their own right, and be of tbe same kind or quality, and be clearly ascertained or liquidated. ^Neither at law nor in equity can unliquidated damages be allowed under tbe defense of a set-off.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Carriers—Of Passengers—Pall from Gang-Plank of Steamer—Gangway without Ropes or Battens—Vessel’s Liability for Loss of Life.</p> <p>Libelant’s husband, a passenger on the steam-ship Australia, while returning to the wharf from the steamer prior to her departure, fell from the gangplank, and was drowned. The evidence indicated that the gangway was a single narrow plank, without battens or ropes. Suit being brought by libel-ant under the statute of the state of New York to recover $5,000 for the death of her husband, held, that the owners of the steam-ship were negligent in not maintaining a safer gang-plank, and libelant was entitled to recover the amount of the damage, which was fixed at $2,500.</p> <p>2. Same —Right of Passenger to Return from Vessel to Pier—-Duty of Vessel to Provide Safe Means of Passage.</p> <p>A passengeron board a vessel, before her departure from the wharf, has the right to go ashore even to buy tobacco, and it is the vessel’s duty to provide a safe means of passage from the steamer to the pier.</p>

<p>Admiralty. Action in rem for possession.</p>

<p>Collision — Tug and Tow and Steamer — Tug Close to Line of Piers— Steamer Moving Out—Inability of Tug to Avoid Steamer.</p> <p>Where the tug A., with a tow astern, was coming down the North river, in the vicinity of Pier 1, and about 175 yards from the line of the piers, and saw another tug ahead moving a steamer out from along-side that pier, but was unable to avoid collision with her, it was held that a tug with a tow is bound, in this locality, to be under such control as to be able, by stopping, to avoid a steamer seen to be moving out from a pier half a mile ahead, and that the A. was consequently solely responsible for the collision.</p>

<p>CoiujsroN—Floating Logs—Austsnom ov Light—Passing Tug — Entangling oe Sornesw.</p> <p>Libelant, allowed logs to remain floating in the water along-side his derrick, with no light upon them. In the night the propeller of a passing tug, whose pilot had no knowledge of the presence of the logs, caught in the logs, whereby libelant’s property was damaged. On suit brought against the tug for the damage, held, that she was not liable.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Two Tugs—One at Rest Near Line oe Piers—Attempt to Pass Inside—Fault.</p> <p>The tug M. was lying at rest in the East river, some 150 feet from the line of the piers, when the tug A., coming down the river, ported in an attempt to pass between the M. and the piers, and collided with the M. Heldfimi, if the original course of the A. would have carried her outside of the M., the A. was in fault for porting. The A. insisted that her porting was when the vessels were close together, and collision was inevitable. Held, in that event, that the A. was in fault for not starboarding in time to pass outside of the M.; and, in either view, the A. was solely responsible for the collision.</p> <p>2. Same—Vessel at Rest—Applicability of Rule 19.</p> <p>Rule 19 does not apply where the vessel having the other on her starboard hand is at rest.</p>

<p>In Chancery. Bill to enjoin the collection of a tax levied to aid the construction of a railroad. Demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>Patents—Improvement in the Construction of Refrigerators—Infringement—Want of Novelty.</p> <p>A suit was brought to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 361,786, for improvements in the construction of refrigerators, the particular feature being this: The ice-floor being in tbe usual position, two sets of cleats are attached to the inside of the refrigerator case, at each end of the ice-floor, and extending perpendicularly from the ice-floor to the top of the case, and are in pairs. These cleats are arranged by twos, and parallel to each other, but a little distance apart, so as to form a groove. Into these grooves, and from the top, is slid the partition wall, which descends so as to touch the ice-floor; but, being narrower than the height of the chamber, leaves the necessary opening for the warm air to pass over at the top, the advantage claimed being that the wall is thus made “removable, ” whereby cleansing the walls-of the flue is facilitated. Held, invalid for want of novelty, and not infringed by defendant's patent, No. 395,359.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit for infringement.</p> <p>The bill, based upon letters patent No. 293,545, was filed April 24, 1886. In July, 1886, the defendants filed a plea, alleging that the complainant, when he commenced the action, did not hold the legal title to the patent. Issue was joined on the plea. It appears from the record that on the thirteenth of February, 1884, the complainant assigned the patent to Sarah E. Waterman. On the twentieth of November, 1884, Sarah E. Waterman granted to the complainant a license to manufacture and sell the patented article. On the twenty-fifth of November, 1884, she assigned the patent to Asa L. Shipman’s Sons, and on the same day they transferred it to Asa L. Shipman. On the sixteenth of April, 1886, Sarah E. Waterman assigned to the complainant all her right, title, and interest in and to the patent. The assignment to Asa L. Shipman’s Sons contains the following language:</p> <p>“I hereby sell, assign, transfer, and set over unto the said Asa L. Ship-man’s Sons, their successors and assigns, all the right, title, and interest, claim or demand, of any character or description, legal or equitable, which I have, in, to, under, or by virtue of the said invention, and in, to, under, or by virtue oí the letters patent therefor aforesaid, the same being the entire interest in said loiters patent.”</p> <p>It then recites that complainant and Sarah E. Waterman have made a joint note for $6,500, payable in throe years, and provides as follows:</p> <p>“If the said Lewis E. Waterman and myself, or either of us, shall well and truly pay the said note according to its tenor, tiion this assignment and transfer shall be null and void; otherwise to be and to remain in full force and effect.”</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Straw-Stackers.</p> <p>The sixth and eighth claims of reissued letters patent No. 10,847, (original No. 274,940,) issued November 22,1888, to Lewis w. Hasselman, for a straw-stacker, held anticipated by patent No. 152,760, of July 7,1874, to Morey, for hay and grain elevator.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Claim 8 of letters patent No. 290,050, issued December 11,1888, to Lewis W. Hasselman, for a straw-stacker, does not cover a new combination, and, as added to a straw-stacker, is nothing but an aggregation of well-known devices, which in their new relation perform no new office, and such claim is therefore void.</p>

In Equity. Demurrer to Bill. This is a bill for injunction and damages for the alleged infringement of three reissued letters patent, all for improvements in lumber driers, viz.: (1) Reissued letters patent No. 9,309, issued July 20, 1880, to E. J. Sumner’s assignees, being reissue of original letters patent No. 125,-098, dated March 26, 1872; (2) reissued letters patent No. 8,846, issued August 12,1879, to J. J. Curran and C. Wilcox, originally granted March 30, 1875, aud…

<p>1. Patents for. Inventions—Clover-Hullers—Seed-Cleaners.</p> <p>On the same record and evidence as in Wewa/i'k Machine Co. v. 3a/rgett, 28 Fed. Rep. 567, the decision in that case followed.</p> <p>2. Same—Construction of Claims—Infringement.</p> <p>If the patentability of the devices claimed in letters patent No. 822,465, of July 21, 1885, to Miller, for recleaner for grain-separators, be conceded, the claims must, in view of the prior art, be construed strictly; and, not being found in defendants’ machine, held, there was no infringement.</p>

<p>Patents por Inventions—Patentee an Kmploye—Letters Patent No. 232,-9T5—Improvement in Cutting-Pliers.</p> <p>A patent was issued to plaintiff, Henry G. Thompson, as assignee of Moses C. Johnson, for an improvement in cutting-pliers, and he filed a hill for damages and an injunction against one Hall. It appeared that Hall was president of a company engaged in making cutting-pliers under a patent issued to Hall. The writ turned on the question whether a certain model was made by Johnson while he was in the employ of the company, or after he had been discharged by Hall. Held that, on tiie evidence, it was not made till after the discharge; that Johnson was not the first inventor; and that the bill must be dismissed.</p>

<p>Admiralty—Wrecks—Forcible Taking and Wrongful Sale by Wreck-Master—Action to Recover—Necessary Parties.</p> <p>On November 8, 1883, the bark Margaretta took fire, and was towed to the Kill von Kull, where she was scuttled and sunk. The place where she sank was within Richmond county, New York. Her owners sold her, as she lay, to G., the libelant, who began operations to raise her. On November 23 the person occupied in raising her received notice from Luby, the wreck-master of Richmond county, to desist from work on the vessel, and, this notice being disregarded, Luby took possession of the wreck by force. A statute of the state of New York authorizes wreck-masters to take possession of wrecked property within their counties, when no owners shall appear, and, if the property is perishable, to obtain an order from the county judge, and sell the wreck at auction. Luby, having taken forcible possession of the wreck, obtained an order of sale from the county judge, and sold her to the claimant, and this action was brought by G. to recover possession. Held, that it is only of property abandoned by the owner, and upon such abandonment, taken possession of by the wreck-master, that a county judge has the power to direct a sale. Here there had been no abandonment by the owners. Held, therefore, that Luby’s possession was unlawful; that the order of sale was void, and the sale itself invalid; and that libelant was entitled to the possession of the bark. Reid, also, that Luby was improperly made a party to this action.</p>

<p>1. Demurrage—Consignee and Shipper One Person—Liability—Action in Personam.</p> <p>The respondents, ice-dealers in Baltimore, purchased ice to he delivered free on board, in the Kennebec river, the sellers agreeing to procure the vessel, the respondents to pay the freight. Held, that the respondents, being both consignees and shippers, were liable in an action m personam for damages for unreasonable detention of the vessel upon arrival in Baltimore, Before the discharging of the ice was commenced.</p> <p>2. Same—Dispatching Too Many Vessels—Principal and Agent.</p> <p>The detention was caused by the accumulation of vessels in Baltimore consigned to respondents, and resulted from the sellers of the ice dispatching too many vessels at about the same date. Held, that the dispatching of so many vessels, even though contrary to respondents’ instructions, was the act of persons acting in their behalf, and was no defense to libelants’ demurrage for damages for detention.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Carriers op Goods—Damage to Cargo—Duty op Ship Where Cargo Requires Extraordinary Protection.</p> <p>Where cargo about to be shipped needs extraordinary protection, it is the duty of the ship-owner to provide the stevedore with the means for such protection.</p> <p>8. Same—Improper Stowage—Owner’s Knowledge of Method op Stowage-Liability op Stevedore.</p> <p>Certain hogsheads of molasses were sent to a vessel for shipment. The vessel was already stowed with bacon. With the knowledge, and by the implied direction, of the agent of the vessel, the molasses was stowed above the bacon, no tarpaulins or other means of protection for the bacon being furnished to the stevedore. On the voyage the leakage from the molasses injured the bacon, and the ship-owner, having made good the loss, brought this suit against the stevedore to recover the money so paid. Meld, that the stevedore was not liable.</p>

<p>Collision—Steamer and Tug—Overtaking Vessel—Loss of Life and Property-Liability.</p> <p>The tug Glen 'Island, while proceeding down the bay of New York, was overtaken and run down by the steam-ship Oephalonia, of the Cunard line. T-he tug was sunk, and several lives were lost. Prior to the collision the tug did not alter' her course. On suit brought against the steam-ship to recover for the loss of life and property, held, that the Oephalonia, as the overtaking vessel, was Tbomid to have avoided the tag; that the fact that she Mow whistles in time to enable the tug to got out of her way did not furnish her any excuse i'or the collision; and'that she was solely responsible for the collision.</p>

<p>Carriers—Of Goods — Ships — Stowage — Opening Bales for Purposes of Stowage—Consequent Reduction in Value—Liability.</p> <p>Certain bales of cork-wood were skipped in good order, on board of the bark Augusto. While on board, some of the bales were opened, apparently for the sake of stowage. In rebaling, woods of different sizes and quality were so mixed as to reduce their market value. The consignee refused to give a receipt for the same in good order, whereupon the ship-owner sold the goods. On suit brought by the consignee to recover the sound value of the goods, less the freight on the whole shipment, held, that libelant should recover that value.</p>

<p>Goimstoít—Vessel sot at Axotiob—Storm.</p> <p>Failure to see that a vessel is securely fastened when a storm arises will render her responsible in damages if, during the storm, the vessel breaks loose, and collides with another.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Steam-Boat and Small Boat Astern of Tug—Overtaking Vessel—Liability for Personal Injury.</p> <p>Libelant’s small boat, wbicb was being towed astern of tbe tug W., was run down by tbe steamer S., wbicb was on a course overtaking tbe tug. Libel-ant’s arm was thereby broken, and bis boat damaged, for wbicb injuries be brought suit against both the steam-boat and tbe tug. Held, that tbe steamer, being tbe overtaking vessel, was bound to have kept out of tbe way, and was in consequence solely liable for tbe collision.</p> <p>2. Same—False Testimony—Allowance for Injury to Property—For Injury to Person.</p> <p>Libelant swore falsely that bis boat was wholly destroyed. Held, that nothing should be allowed for tbe injury to property. Held, also, that be should recover §500 for tbe breaking of bis arm.</p>

<p>In Equity. On plea in abatement.</p>

<p>1. Discovery—Probuction of Documents—Rev. St. IT. S. § 724.</p> <p>liev. St. IT. 8. S '724, relative to the production, of documents, does not ap-. ply to suits in equity. In equity sucb production, by one not, summoned as a witness, can ordinarily bo compelled only by appropriate allegations in bill or cross-bill, upon the answer to which allegations a motion for production is based, and upon such motion the materially of the evidence sought for can be controverted.</p> <p>2. Same—When Material.</p> <p>The only issue between plaintiff and defendants in a suit in equity was whether a'trust fund, received by defendants under certain agreements made between plaintiff and some of the defendants and between plaintiff and a, third party, was appropriated by them pursuant to the agreements. Held, that the • production by plaintiff of books and documents relating to transactions prior to the date of the agreements would not be compelled.</p>

<p>On Trial by the Court without a Jury.</p>

The plaintiffs sue to recover for goods sold and delivered. The defense is that the goods were sold to one Pedro Garay, and not to the defendants. The cause was tried at the December circuit, and the plaintiffs had a verdict. The defendants now move for a new trial.

This was an action of ejectment, brought by David M. Hyman, of Cincinnati, Ohio, as the owner of the Durant mining claim, situate on Aspen mountain, near the town of Aspen, Pitldn county, Colorado, against J. B. Wheeler,, of New York city, and his co-defendants, as claimants of the Emma mining claim, situate on the west slope of the same mountain, on the ground that the defendant had sunk a shaft from the surface, and, by means of drifts, levels, and under-ground workings,…

Action at Law for the infringement of letters patent No. 77,920, is-' sued to the plaintiffs, May 12, 1868, for a machine for treating hides. The machine described in the patent consists of a vertical shaft, surrounded by a vertical circle of pins or rollers, constituting a crib. The shaft contains slots, and set-screws projecting into the slots.

<p>1. Carriers—By Sea—Bill of Lading—Stipulations Exempting from Negligence-Foreign Ships—Conflict of Laws—Law of the Flag.</p> <p>The federal law of this country, by which stipulations of a common carrier exempting him from the consequences of his own negligence are held to be extorted without any real assent of the shipper, and to be against public policy, and void, is controlling in suits brought here upon shipments made here on hoard foreign ships, under bills of lading signed by foreign masters, though such stipulations be valid by the law of the ship’s flag.</p> <p>2. Conflict of Laws—Law of the Flag—Comity.</p> <p>The “law of the flag, ” so called, expresses no principle of construction. _ So-far as it differs from the general maritime law, it is but the mere municipal law of the ship’s home, and has no authority abroad, except by comity, and will not be adopted in a different forum when against the policy, or prejudicial to the citizens, of the country of the forum.</p> <p>3. Same—Intention of Parties—Torts.</p> <p>Independently of the intent of the parties, the law of the flag has no application to cases of tort, as between ships or persons of different nationalities and conflicting laws; and as a matter of contract, under the hill of lading, no-intent to be governed by the law of the ship’s flag, as respects acts'of negligence committed in this country, or on the high seas, is to be reasonably inferred from the mere fact of shipment here in a foreign hottom.</p> <p>4. Same—Sun? Supplies—Master’s Powers—Personal Liability of Owners.</p> <p>Whether the mere municipal law of the ship’s home contrary to the general maritime law should be held, in foreign forums, to limit the master’s ordinary authority, under the general maritime law, to hind the ship in ordinary maritime contracts, as distinguished from an unlimited personal liability of the owners, to the prejudice of foreign citizens in dealing with a ship in their own ports, upon the faith of the ordinary maritime law, qumre. Bemble, the decisions in respect to maritime liens for supplies indicate the contrary.</p> <p>5. Carriers—By Sea—Limitation of Liability—“Perils of the Seas Arising from Negligence”—Cattle Fittings—Imprudent Navigation—Evidence—Conflict of Laws—Lex Fori.</p> <p>The libelants, at Boston, shipped on board the British steamer B. C. 260-cattle, to he carried to Deptford, England, pursuant to a previous contract made in Boston with the resident agent of the line. The bill of lading, delivered shortly after the ship sailed, excepted “death, however caused,” and loss from “stowage, or from perils of the sea, arising from negligence.” Negligence was found by the court as respects the cattle fittings prepared at Boston, the stowage there, and navigation on the high seas, in consequence of which, in a storm of no unusual severity on the day after the steamer sailed, upon a lurch of the ship, the cattle fittings gave way, the cattle were thrown in heaps to leeward, and the vessel thrown nearly upon her beam ends, through which 93 per cent, of the cattle died, and were cast overboard before they reached England. Held, (1) that the loss arose by negligence of the ship; (2) that -the insufficiency of the cattle fittings was a breach of her implied warranty that the ship should be fit for the voyage, and for the cargo, and not covered by the exceptions of the hill of lading; (3) that the stipulation as respects negligent stowage and negligent navigation was invalid in our courts, whether the case were viewed as a case of tort, or as a case of the proper construction of the contract in a conflict of laws; and (4) that the law of the flag—that is, the law of England—which upholds such stipulations was not controlling, (a) because there was no sufficient evidence that the parties intended a purely English contract; (b) because such stipulations were deemed by our law extorted, and, being without the assent necessary to prove a legal contract, the alleged contract, pro tanto, was not proved, as a matter of evidence, according to the law of the forum; and (e) because our national policy, which disallows such stipulations in favor of our own carriers, cannot permit the adoption of the foreign law, in favor of foreign carriers, by comity.</p>

<p>Champerty—“An Obliging Advance” by Proctor—Code Civil Proc. ET. Y. §§ 78, 74</p> <p>The essential characteristic ingredient of champerty is the intent to promote litigation. Therefore, where proctors in a suit in admiralty, by the arrest of the vessel, and stipulation given for her release, had secured the payment of the demand, and had informed the libelant that the claim was secured. and the latter afterwards, supposing the money had been collected, gave to a third person an order for the amount upon the proctors, and the latter honored and paid the order while the suit was in progress, and before collection, held, upon the evidence, that this was not for the purpose of prosecuting the suit, but was an obliging advance only, and did not violate, in letter or in spirit, the statute against champerty and maintenance.</p>

<p>Carriers—Ou Goons—Ships—Damage to Cargo—Leaky Hold — Obligation op the Carrier.</p> <p>The presence of a leak in a vessel’s hold, and injury to tho cargo in consequence, is sufficient to charge the carrier with negligence, unless it can he shown that tho direct cause of the damage was a peril of tho sea. The ship is bound to provide the means necessary to enable her hold to be kept free from water, and will be liable for the failure in this regard, from whatever other cause it may occur.</p>

<p>1. Carriers of Goods—Ships—Limitation of Liability—Bill of Lading— Rev. St. U. S. § 4281.</p> <p>A stipulation in a bill of lading that the carrier will not he responsible for certain specified articles of value contained in any package shipped under the bill of lading, unless the value thereof be expressed, and extra freight paid therefor, is authorized by section 4281, Rev. St. U. S., and the reasonableness of it cannot be questioned.2</p> <p>2. Same—Concealment of Yalue—Subsequent Loss—Carrier’s Liability. .</p> <p>Libelant shipped a trunk containing jewelry on the steam-ship B., under a hill of lading which contained the stipulation that the carrier would not he responsible for the loss of valuables, unless the value thereof were expressed in the hill of lading, and extra freight, paid therefor. Libelant did not disclose the valuable nature of the contents of the trunk. On the voyage the trunk was broken open, and the contents stolen. Held, that the carrier was not liable for the loss; affirming 27 Fed. Rep. 476.</p>

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>Sur motion by tho Metropolitan National Bank for leave to file a hill in the nature of a supplemental bill.</p>

<p>In Equity. Exceptions to answer.</p>

<p>1. Fraud—Forged Deed—Tax Sam—Kkdiími’tjox—By whom.</p> <p>B. purchased complainants’ lands at tax salo. M., by moans of a forged deed from complainants' grantor, procured an assignment of tho fax certificates to himself after the time of redemption had expired, and had the treasurer's deed made out to himself. Held, that the purchase by M. of the tax certifícales could not he a redemption of the land, because M. had no real title to tho land.</p> <p>2. Same—Trust.</p> <p>Held, that M. could not be held as a trustee of complainants, because complainants had no interest under the tax sale.</p> <p>8. Same—Who May Comma rx.</p> <p>Held, that M.’s fraud was one of which 13. could complain, and for which he might rescind the contract of sale, but that complainants’ rights were not affected thereby.</p>

<p>Injunction—Pendente Lite—Receiver.—Corporations.</p> <p>Where a plan for the incorporation and consolidation of certain joint-stock associations was being carried out, by consent of nearly all the stockholders, under a charter from the legislature, and one of the stockholders, who had previously favored the scheme, sought by suit in equity to prevent it, and to compel an accounting, and the winding up of the old companies, held, that, as the charges of fraud made in the bill appeared to be baseless, and no harm was likely to ensue to any one from allowing the proceedings to go on, questions of law arising concerning the validity of the proceedings in several respects would not be decided upon a motion for an injunction and receiver pendente lite, and that such motion would be denied.</p>

In Equity. On motion for the appointment of receivers. The defendant Brown, being largely interested in a railroad then undergoing foreclosure in this court, entered into negotiations in New York with the American Einance Company, J. B. Mason, and E. Gr. Jillson for the purpose of raising the money to re-establish the enterprise.

<p>1. Partnership—Partnership Property—Title in Partner—Heirs Subject to Partnership Trust.</p> <p>A. S. and ~W. S. were partners under tíre name of A. & W. S. A. S. died, and, by the agreement of his administratrix, his wife, the business was continued under the same name, with the joint capital, and as the joint property, under the management of W. S. W. S. purchased, with joint funds, for the partnership, the B. M. property, on which a factory was erected, on which was expended SSI,000,000 of the partnership funds, and took the deeds in his own name. After taking into the partnership his son and two nephews, he died, leaving, among others, four minor heirs, children of his daughter. Subsequently tbe partnership was changed into a corporation, and the various interests in the property conveyed to the corporation in exchange tor stock, all by the consent and agreement of all interested; the minors being represented in the transaction by their legall3 appointed guardian. _ After-wards the corporation failed, and its property was conve3>'ed to plaintiff in trust for its creditors. Plaintiff, by this bill, seeks to restrain the said minor heirs from.bringing ejectment on the ground that the conveyances as to them were unauthorized, and for a decree giving him the legal title. Held, that W. S. held the legal title subject to the partnership trust, and that the heirs received the same subject to the trust.</p> <p>2. Same—Partnership Realty, for Partnership Purposes, Personalty.</p> <p>Held, also, that, for the purposes of the partnership, the real property was personalty.</p> <p>3. Same—Corporation Formed of Partnership Takes Its Equities in Realty.</p> <p>Held, also, that the corporation having been formed by consent out of the partnership, the corporation taking the property as well as the debts of the firm, and the owners having the same interest in the property of the corporation that they had had in the partnership, the transaction gave the corporation the same equitable estate in the property in question that the partnership had had.</p> <p>4. Equity — Decree — Conveyance of Title —' Power of United States Courts. , ■ ></p> <p>Held, also, that courts of equity of '¡he United States for the district of Connecticut, having the power to administer the remedies provided by a statute of the state of Connecticut, and by virtue of that statute to vest the title to real estate by decree, without any act. of the respondent, the trustee is entitled to a decree vesting in him the legal title to the estate.</p>

<p>Rule to Show Cause.</p>

<p>At Law. Demurrer to answer and counter-claim.</p>

<p>1. Innkeepers— Liability— Goods for Sale —Special Deposit for Safekeeping—Pub. St. Mass. Oh. 102, § 12.</p> <p>Under Pub. St. Mass. a. 102, § 12, where there is no evidence tending- to show that the loss resulted from the willful default or neglect of the innkeeper or his servants, the innkeeper is not, liable for the loss of a trunk belonging to a commercial traveler, and containing goods for sale, unless there was the special agreement or deposit for safe-keeping contemplated by the statute.</p> <p>2. Witness—Impeachment—Failure to Make Consistent Statement.</p> <p>The admissibility of testimony, for the purpose of impeaching a witness, by showing his failure to make statements consistent with his testimony, is in the discretion of the trial judge, subject, to the power of the court to grant a new trial, if it should appear on a review of the testimony that there was no ground for the inference that the witness whose credibility was in issue would have made the statements in question to the impeaching witnesses, if they had been true.</p>

<p>Sur Motion to open judgment, and let the defendant into a defense.</p>

<p>Action at law to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent.</p>

In Equity. Suit for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 104,318, granted June 14,1870, to John H. Irwin, for an improvement in lanterns, and letters patent No. 151,703, granted to the same person, June 9, 1874, for ■an improvement in lamps. The defendant’s lantern is constructed in accordance with the specification of letters patent No. 246,774, granted September 6, 1881, to Heith.

<p>Í. Patents for Inventions—Joint Invention—Evidence.</p> <p>Tlie mere fact that two or more persons unite in an application for a patent, as the product of their joint inventive efforts, creates a very strong presumption that the device sought to be patented is the result of their united ingenuity, and to overthrow this presumption the evidence should be clear and unequivocal; citing Gottfried v. Phillip Best Brewing Co., 5 Ban. & A. 9.</p> <p>2. Same—"Format. Defense.</p> <p>The defense that two persons to whom a patent lias been issued were not in fact joint inventors, is so purely formal that it cannot be regarded with favor, unless it be shown that the action of the patentees in that regard was disingenuous, or calculated to mislead the defendants; citing Butter v. Bainbridge, 29 Fed. Rep. 142.</p> <p>8. Same—Who are Joint Inventors.</p> <p>If one conceives the entire invention, and another makes a suggestion of practical value which the lirst one failed to think of, but which is needed to make the conception a success, this will be sufficient to constitute them joint inventors.</p> <p>4. Same—Prior Use—Patent Relates Back.</p> <p>Where the defendant attempts to defeat a patent by showing that the patentee was not the original discoverer of the thing claimed, the patent will, for the purpose of meeting of such proof, be considered as relating back to the date of the original discovery; citing Dixon v. Moyer, 4 Washb. C. C. 68, and other oases.</p> <p>5. Same—What Constitutes.</p> <p>An old device will not be considered sufficient, to defeat a patent, when its construction is such that radical changes and additions would bo required before it could be made to perform the work of the patented device satisfactorily.</p> <p>6. Same—The Zwietusch and ITeitman Patent.</p> <p>The distinguishing feature of the Zwietusch and Heitman patent of December 30,1859, for automatic pressure relief apparatus for beer vessels, stated to be its water chamber or chambers, and such patent held to be valid, and to be infringed by the Woerle bungs.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Infringement—No. 244,944.</p> <p>Patent No. 244,944, to Joseph. B. Stetson, dated July 26, 1881, for device raising the glass globes of lanterns, contains an upper plate above the globe, with a central draft-tube that bends over and comes down to the bottom of the lantern, as two tubes, one on each side. Beneath the glass globe is a perforated plate, connected with the upper plate hy wires supported laterally by guides on the side draft-tubes, so that, when tho upper plate is raised, the globe is raised with it. The raising and lowering are effected by a wire spring attached to the upper plate, and curved to form a thumb-piece. Defendant’s lantern has the side-wires hooked into the perforated plate, instead of wound round or under it, and, in place of guides, they are supported laterally by being bent partly round the side tubes. Tho spring connecting the upper plate to the globe is somewhat different in form; otherwise it is an exact counterpart. Ileld, an infringement.</p> <p>2. Same—Novelty Comfared with Other Patents.</p> <p>The above patent compared with Ford’s, No. 117,309, dated July 25, 1871; Colony’s, No. 200,176. February 12, 1878; Betts’, No. 218,917, August 26,1879; Irwin’s, No. 89,770, May 4,1809; and Beidlor’s, No. 187,085, February 6,1877; and held not void for want of novelty.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Reissue No. 9,743—Electrical Apparatus for Lighting Street Lamps.</p> <p>Claims 2 and o oí reissued patent No. 9,743, granted to Jacob P. Tirrell, as- • signee, dated January 7,1881, for electrical apparatus for lighting street lamps, held void, because broader than those of the original patent. Electric Gas-lighting Co. v. Tillotson, 21 Fed. Rep. 568, and Same v. Smith & Rhodes Electric Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 195, followed.</p> <p>2. Same—Infringement.</p> <p>In a suit for infringement of the above patent the plaintiff claimed: “In an apparatus for lighting gas by electricity, in combination with a circuit-breaker located at the gas burner, a lever a dapted and arranged to open and clqse the stop-cock or valve of the burner, and carrying the circuit-breaker. ” In defendant’s apparatus two armatures operate to open and close the gas valve, but there is no separate lever to open and close the valve and carrying the circuit breaker. Held, no infringement; the construction and mode of operation of the two devices being entirely different.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Infringement—No. 16,312—Easel Design.</p> <p>In an action for infringing patent No. 16,312, dated October 6, 1885, for a design for easels, the plaintiff’s design consisted in the upright standards crossing at the upper ends, representing the stems and flowers of the cat-tail plant. Easels made of the natural cat-tails thus crossing are old. In defendant’s design, the standards are not crossed, but held together by a band. Meld, no infringement, since the plaintiff was not the first to use cat-tails, and defendant’s design did not infringe his specific device of crossing them.</p>

<p>1. Collision—East River Navigation — Two Tugs —Tug and Pier—State Statutes—Failure to Keep in Mid River—Overtaking Boat—Close Approach to Other Steam-Vessel—Sheer—Crowding.</p> <p>The tug S., going up the East river with a car-float in tow along-side, sheered to within 100 feet of the New York piers, preparatory to rounding to on the Brookly shore against the tide. The tug N., which was also coming up river nearer the New York shore, had followed the sheer of the S. towards New York, and, when close to the latter shore, found herself in a pocket, between the S. and the piers; and, being unable to back, for fear of being thrown against the piers, went ahead full speed, and ran into the end of Pier 42, whereby both the tug herself and the tow wore damaged. Meld, that, the N. was in fault for violating the state statute, which required her to go as near mid river as may be: and also the statute which forbids a steam-vessel under way from approaching and passing another nearer than 20 yards. Held, further, that the S. was in fault for unjustifiably sheering, and crowding the N., without even a warning whistle. The damages were therefore divided.</p> <p>2. Evidence—Settlement op Claim—Subrogation.</p> <p>The settlement by a tug of her tow’s claim for damages is evidence of fault on her part, in a subsequent suit by her against anal her vessel. Without fault or liability, there would be no subrogation on payment of the tow’s demand. Being held liable, as in fault, she is entitled to recover half of the tow’s damages.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Steamer and Ferry-Boat—Crossing and Following Vessel Distinguished—Failure to Signal.</p> <p>Theforry-boat R. started out of hei slip when tbe steamer V. was directly opposite. The speed of tbe steamer bad been checked by the stopping of her engines, but her headway had not entirely ceased. Her ability to maneuver was further diminished by the presence, close aboard, of one or more vessels which it was her duty to keep clear of. When the ferry-boat started out of her slip, her bow was pointing astern of the steamer. When clear of the slip she proceeded to cross the steamer’s bows in. a circling course, at full speed. With the exception, of the starting whistle of the ferry-boat, no signal was made by either vessel. Both vessels, when a collision became imminent, endeavored to avoid it by reversing their engines. Held, that the steamer had done all that devolved upon her under the circumstances; that, as the ferryboat was a following vessel when the situation first opened, the steamer was not bound to foresee that, by a violation of the rules of the'road, the ferryboat would become a crossing vessel; and that no duty to signal the latter as a crossing vessel devolved upon the former.</p> <p>2. Same—Steamer and Ferry-Boat.</p> <p>A ferry-boat must not cross a steamer’s path, when the latter is abreast of her slip, and is hampered in her ability to maneuver. If, upon starting out of the slip, theferry-boat’sbow is astern of the steamer, and if she subsequently crosses the bows of the latter vessel, she will be considered as a following, not as a crossing, vessel.</p>

<p>Salvage—Specific Sum Agreed upon—Dispute as to Amount—Unreasonable Amount—Award.</p> <p>As the tug W. was cruising in the neighborhood of Sandy Hook she learned that the steamer S. was lying disabled some 15 miles down the Jersey coast, and proceeded to her assistance. The S., with a valuable cargo on board, was lying some eight miles from the beach, unable to proceed, an accident having-happened to her machinery. The weather was intensely cold, both vessels were covered with ice, and a thick fog prevailed. A bargain was made between the masters of the tug and the steam-ship to tow the latter to New York. The libel alleged that the agreed compensation was $4,000; the answer alleged that it was $400. The value of the tug was claimed to be $30,000; the value of the S. $75,000 or $100,000, her cargo $80,000, and her freight about $11,000 or $13,000. Held, on the evidence, that the sum agreed on was $4,000; and, as this was not such an unreasonable price for the salvage service as to require the court to set aside a contract deliberately made to pay that sum, the libelants should recover $4,000, but without costs.</p>

<p>Collision—Schooner and Tug—Overtaking Vessel—Liability.</p> <p>Where a collision occurred in the North river between a schooner and a tug, whereby tbe latter was run down by the sailing vessel, it was held, on the evidence, that the schooner was the overtaking vessel, should therefore' have avoided the tug, and was in fault for the collision.</p>

<p>Negligence—Neglect of Those in Charge of Infant—Improper Place— Liability of Vessel—Rudder Chains.</p> <p>Libelant’s -ward, an infant three years old. was injured on hoard of the steam-ship Burgundia, by the rudder chain, which ran in an open box on the main deck. Previous to the accident, the infant’s nurse had left him to himself, and, when hurt, he was in a part- of the ship where he had no right to be. Held, that the fault rested with those who had charge of the child, and that the vessel was not liable for the injury.</p>

<p>Removal of Cause—Ray. St. § 639, Subd. 3—Diversity of Citizenship.</p> <p>It is a condition requisite to removal under Rev. St. U. S., § 639, subd. 3, that the diversity of citizenship must exist, both when the suit was begun and when the petition for removal is filed. Gibson v. Bruce, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873, S. C. 108 U. S. 561, followed.</p>

<p>In Equity. Motion to remand.</p>

<p>Action for damages for infringement of a patent. Demurrer to petition.</p>

<p>1. Courts— Federal-Foreclosure Suit—Parties—Procedure.</p> <p>To a suit to foreclose a mortgage, brought in a federal court in one state against a corporation of that state, by bondholders, citizens of another state, other bondholders who are citizens of the state where the suit is brought cannot be made parties plaintiff, the jurisdiction being dependent upon citizenship? but, under such circumstances, the plaintiffs can foreclose the mortgage separately, and the proceeds of sale, if a sale is made, will be distributed according to the rights of all.</p> <p>2. Same—Time to Redeem—Practice nsr State and Federal Courts.</p> <p>_A right of a mortgagor to have time to redeem on suit to foreclose recognized by the laws of a state where the mortgage was made, is a property right, which will be regarded in a suit to foreclose brought in a federal court. Held, accordingly, in the case of a Vermont mortgage foreclosed in a federal court, that defendant would be allowed a year from the first day of the term in which to redeem, in accordance with the practice of the state courts, and (it being doubtful whether a sale should be ordered) that meanwhile no decree for sale would be made, and no decision as to whether plaintiffs were entitled to a sale.</p> <p>8. Interest—After Maturity—Bonds.</p> <p>Under the Vermont law, bonds will bear interest after maturity, as well as before, at a special rate of interest mentioned in them.</p>

<p>1. Courts—Federal—Appointment of Receivers.</p> <p>When, under the statute of Georgia, it is right to appoint a receiver, the equity courts of the United States may administer and enforce 'that right, where they have jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Equity—Master’s Report—Exceptions—Presumptions.</p> <p>In the determination of exceptions to a master’s report, the presumptions are in favor of the findings of the master, and such findings will not he disturbed, unless shown to be erroneous.</p> <p>3 Same—Treatment of Exceptions.</p> <p>Exceptions to tho master’s report arc regarded so far only as they are supported by the statements of the master, or by evidence to "winch the attention of the court is called by reference to the particular testimony.</p> <p>4: Same—Setting Aside Report—Weight of Evidence.</p> <p>The power of the court to set aside the report of the master is not to be exercised, except for good cause, and mere difference of opinion as to the weight of the evidence, when there is a substantial conflict, is not such good cause.</p> <p>5. Same—Sales under Order-of Court — Interference by Parties—-Distribution of Proceeds.</p> <p>When parties to the bill, having claims against a stock of goods in the hands of a receiver, unwarrantably interfere at a sale of such goods under the order of the court, and, by pretended bids, occasion a loss to the fund arising therefrom, the amounts otherwise clue to them on the general distribution will be mulcted by the court, to protect other creditors from loss on account, of their condnct.</p> <p>6. Mortgage—Validity—Description of Property Covered—Code Ga. § 1955.</p> <p>A mortgage must clearly indicate the property upon which it is to take effect. Code Ga. § "1955.</p> <p>7. Same—General Description Insufficient—“Entire Stock,’’etc.</p> <p>The following description: “Our entire stock of dry goods, boots, shoes, hats, clothing, and notions, and such other goods as are usually kept in a first-class country store,”—without any indication as to the whereabouts of the goods, or without any other language of identification,—is not a sufficient description.</p> <p>8. Sale—Rights of Vendor—Rescission for Fraud—Recaption—General Creditors.</p> <p>Where goods are obtained by fraud, the sale is void, and passes no title, and the right of the vendor to retake the goods in the hands of the fraudulent vendee, who is insolvent, is superior to the claim of a general creditor of the latter.1</p> <p>9. Sam e—Purchase with Intent not to Pay.</p> <p>A contract for tho purchase of goods on credit, made by the purchaser with, intent not to pay for them, is fraudulent; and, if he lias no reasonable expectation of being able to pay, it is equivalent to an intent not to pay.1</p> <p>10. Same.</p> <p>The facts of this case abundantly show such fraud as will vitiate the sale,, under the rules above given.</p> <p> (llyttabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Entity—Accounting—Advances on Security or Irrevocable Power oe Attorney.</p> <p>In an action for an accounting wherein the complaint alleged a partnership, it appearing- that there was no partnership, hut that complainant, after taking from defendant an irrevocable power of attorney, authorizing complainant to take possession of the lands then owned, or which might thereafter be owned, by defendant,, advanced the money to be put into real estate and a newspaper, on the security thereof, the court directed that the defendantbe adjudged the owner of the real estate and newspaper, that complainant have an equitable lien on the property for his advances, with interest, and that the property be soldto satisfy the same.</p>

<p>Action on the case against a railroad company for damages. Motion for direction of verdict.</p>

<p>At Law. Motion for new trial.</p>

<p>Fire Insurance—Policy—Forfeiture—Sole, Unconditional Fee-Simple Ownership—Contract for Purchase—Deed not Passed.</p> <p>A policy-bolder wbo bolds tbe property insured under a contract for its sale and conveyance to bim by tbe owner in fee-simple by deed of quitclaim, on payment of tbe purchase money named therein, and wbo lias fully paid tbe purchase money, but has not yet received the deed, is tbe sole, unconditional, and fee-simple owner of the property, within tbe meaning of the usual condition in insurance policies, rendering tbe policy void in case tbe assured is not tbe sole and unconditional owner of tbe property insured, and owns it in fee-simple at law.</p>

<p>1. Banks—Theft of Bonds Deposited—Special Deposit—Used for Collaterals—Liable as Pledgees.</p> <p>Plaintiffs, bankers, deposited with defendants, other bankers, certain government bonds as a special deposit. They afterwards asked defendants “to discount for them up to par of the bonds.as collateral. ” On this loan being paid, defendants asked what they should do with the collaterals, and, being directed to hold them as formerly for plaintiffs’ use, replied, “ Weliold $12,000 U. S. as special deposit;” and that they held them subject to plaintiffs’ further orders. _ The two banks were in uninterrupted business relation for 10 years. The plaintiffs informed defendants that they wished, from time to time, to overdraw their account on the security of these bonds as collaterals, and plaintiffs, from time to time, made overdrafts on defendants, which were paid. The bonds were afterwards stolen by defendants’ assistant cashier. Held, defendants’ liability was that of pledgees.</p> <p>2 Same—Defaulting Cashier—'Warnings—Gross Negligence.</p> <p>In this case it was shown that plaintiffs’ bonds wore kept in the “treasury” part of defendants’ bank safe, where the securities and reserve or surplus funds, not in active use, were kept; that Ker, the defaulting assistant cashier, had access thereto; that defendants examined their cash and counted their securities every month, and examined their special deposits twice a year, to see that they corresponded with the amounts marked on the envelopes, and were otherwise correct; that the collaterals and special deposits wore kept together; that no record of'the number of bonds held on special deposit was kept, and they could not be counted and checked off. More than a year before Ker fled, defendants were warned that some one in their bank was speculating on the board of trade, of which Ker was accused, and admitted the fact, and on promising not to do so again, was retained in his position. Two months before Ker fled, defendants were again warned, and commenced an examination of their books and securities, but made no effort to see whether the special deposits wore disturbed, because, as defendants testified, no record was kept of them by numbers or otherwise, although the numbers of plaintiffs’ bonds did appear on defendants'bond register, having; been sold by them to plaintiffs. Held, defendants were guilty of gross negligence in not discharging Ker, or placing him in a position of less responsibility, and were liable for bonds belonging to plaintiffs, stolen by him, whether such were held by them at law or special deposit.</p>

<p>1. Criminal Law—Weight of Evidence—Reasonable Doubt.</p> <p>In criminal trials simply, a preponderance of testimony is insufficient. A greater degree of mental conviction than in civil cases is held to bo necessary, and the evidence must produce such an effect on the mind of the individual juror that, after its consideration, he can, in view of his oath, have no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the party accused, before a conviction is justified.1</p> <p>2. Same—Plight of Accused—Assumed Name.</p> <p>The flight of the accused under an assumed name, coincident with the theft of letters traced to his possession unexplained, tends strongly to show guilt.</p> <p>8. Post-Office—Robbing the Mails—Registered Letter Stolen—• Indictment—Allegation of Ownership.</p> <p>When the indictment alleges ownership in the person to whom a registered letter was directed, and it appears in proof that when it was stolon the sender had deposited it with the postmaster, talcing his receipt therefor, and it had, by due course of mail, left the mailing office, held, that its custody by the post-office department was for the benefit of the person to whom it was addressed; that it was his property, the sender had no control over it, and there was no variance.</p> <p>4. Criminal Law—Evidence—Good Character.</p> <p>In a criminal trial the good character of the accused is generally a fact fit, like all other facts proved in the cause, to be weighed and estimated by the jury, for it may render that doubtful which otherwise would bo clear.</p> <p>8. Same—Weight of.</p> <p>If the guilt of the accused is plainly proven to the satisfaction of the jury, notwithstanding proof of good character is made, and has been given its due weight, it would be their duty to convict, irrespective of such proof of character; but, where the evidence is doubtful and conflicting, the importance of the character of the accused is increased.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Patents fob Inventions—Infbingement—Patent Ho. 98,505—Claims 1, 2, and 3—Patent to James .1. Spencek.</p> <p>Letters patent Ho. 98,505, granted to Samuel P. Kittle, January 4,1870, for an improved spiral spring for mattresses and furniture, as limited to the first two claims under such patent, are valid; and the patent granted to James I. Spencer, July 24, 1877, for an improvement in spring bed bottoms, is an infringement upon them. The third claim, for a flexible border of rattan attaehed to the outer edges of the springs as a support to keep the ticking in line, in combination with the springs, frame, webbing, etc., is not valid for the reason that it was inserted more than four years after the application was filed, and more than two years after the structure covered thereby had gone into public use.</p> <p>2. Same—Seven Yeans’ Delay—Notice to Defendants—No Defense.</p> <p>In an action for infringement of letters patent, whore it is shown that, defendants took a license from plaintiff to make and vend the patent, and subsequently denied plaintiff's rights, and claimed to make under another patent; that shortly after such denial plaintiff became bankrupt, and the assignee in bankruptcy sold the patent after two years; that plaintiff entered into negotiations to get the patent back from the vendee; that, though the vendee took no strips to'prevent the patent being plundered, plaintiff gave defendants notice he intended to hold them accountable for their infringements; that, after his discharge from bankruptcy, and when he had reacquired the patent, plaintiff commenced action against defendants for infringement,—the court, sitting in equity, will, considering all the circumstances, lake jurisdiction of the cause, notwithstanding a delay of about seven years in the prosecution by plaintiff of his rights.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Letters Patent No. 230,590 — Electric Gas-Lighting Apparatus—Earlier Inventions.</p> <p>Tlie in volition contained in letters patent No. 230,590, granted July 27,1880, to Geo. B\ Pinkliam, assignee of Jacob P Tirrell, for electric gas-lighting apparatus, held not anticipated by the Tirrell inventions of 1871 and 1872,"con-tained in patents No. 121.302 and No. 130,770, nor by the Cutler patent No. 220,704; none of these prior devices being so constructed that by the action of the electric current the gas-cock is turned by a single impulse and a succession of sparks is produced at the burner tip without further motion of the gas-cock.</p> <p>2. Same—Invention.</p> <p>Held, also, that this improvement over prior devices constitutes invention.</p> <p>3. Same—-Infringement—Difference in Details.</p> <p>The patent held infringed by defendants’ apparatus, although the latter differs somewhat in construction from that described in the patent. The fact that the main features in the patented apparatus, such as the circuit breaker, single circuit, operating the gas-cock directly by the armature, are old, should not limit the patentee to the exact form of mechanism found in the patent.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions —No. 105,290 —Pipe Couplings — Scopf, of Claim— 1N FI! INOEMENT.</p> <p>The claim of letters patent No. 105,290, granted July 12, 1870, relating to an improvement in pipe couplings, is for rods or tubes “having tapering ends, and tapering threads upon the same, in combination with a sleeve having-tapering sockets, and t hreads corresponding to those of the rods. ” Held, that the terms “tapering ends” and “tapering sockets,” considered in connection with the descriptive part of the specification, are tobe interpreted as describing- a rod with a tapering screw, and a socket with a tapering chamber, and that the patent is not infringed by a coupling using rods in which the threads of the screw surround a cone-shaped stem, but tho exterior lines of the threads form a cylinder, and not a cone-shaped or tapering end or screw, and in which the exterior lines of the sleeve form a cylindrical chamber, and not a cone-shaped or tapering chamber.</p>

<p>1. Charter Party—Bill op Ladino—Inharmonious Clauses—Construction.</p> <p>Where the provisions of a charter party are inharmonious, the general intent, as evidenced by its written portions, and its evident lending purpose, should control the minor provisions. Similar incongruities between the bill of lading and the charter party will also be controlled, as between the ship and the charterer, by the charter-party, as the more deliberate instrument in expressing the intent. Unless there is sufficient evidence of a waiver of the provisions of the charter, or of some new contract, mere loose and inharmonious expressions in the bill of lading, which refer to the charter, will not supersede the latter, as respects matters which the charter was clearly designed to cover.</p> <p>3. Same—Delivery at One op Several Ports “as Ordered on Arrival”— Alternative Ports—Different Collection Districts.</p> <p>On January 11, 1880, at Middlesbro’ on Tees, the libelants chartered the C. to take 1,300 tons of iron, and “proceed to the port of (New York, Perth Am-boy, Hoboken, or Brooklyn, andtbere to deliver the same as ordered on arrkal. Two days after, the cargo was loaded, and a hill of lading signed hy the master, stating that the steamer was “hound for New York, and the cargo to he delivered at said port of New York to 0. L. P., 30 Pine street, or his assigns;, all other conditions as per charter-party. ” The vessel, on arrival at quarantine, New York, was ordered hy the charterer’s agents to go to Perth Amhoy, a neighboring collection district. The master refused, and this suit was brought for the difference in price on a sale of the iron, for its non-delivery at Perth Amhoy. Held that, under the circumstances, New York was presumably the primary port at which the order for ultimate delivery, according to the alternative contained in the charter-party, was to he given; that the privilege secured by the charter was a valuable one; that the bill of lading was intended to be but a receipt for the iron and a direction to the primary port only; that the option as to the place oE final delivery was not waived, nor intended to be waived, by the bill of lading, and the master was not authorized so to treatit; and that there were no such difficulties, through the naming of different collection districts in the charter, as prevented or.excused the ship from delivery at Perth Amboy, as directed at quarantine; and that the ship was therefore liable.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Steamebs—Signals—Hell Gate.</p> <p>In view of the rule of the board of supervising inspectors and the particular circumstances of this case the exchange of signals between steamers passing through Hell Gate, one of which is astern of the other, amounted to an agreement that the vessel astern might precede the vessel ahead by passing upon the port side of the overtaken vessel. Such an agreement implies that the overtaking vessel will in passing fulfill her statutory duty of keeping out of the way of the overtaken vessel, and that the latter will keep her course so far as practicable consistently with tbe knowledge that the overtaking vessel is to pass her to port. The overtaken vessel has the right to keep in mid-channel so long as there is sufficient room on the port side for the overtaking vessel to pass her.</p> <p>8. Same—Rules of Subebvistng Insbeotoks.</p> <p>The rules of the board of supervising inspectors, when within the scope of their authority, have the force of statutory rules; but their violation will not charge the vessel violating with damages'if the proximate cause of the collision was a faulty maneuver of the other vessel, and the violation of the rule was a remote and not a contributory cause.</p> <p>3. Same—Appeal—Costs. .</p> <p>If there he enough in the circumstances of the cause to justify the libelants in joining both vessels as respondents in the district court, ana if, upon appeal by one of the respondents to the circuit court, the appellant is adjudged to be without fault, it is in accordance with equitable principles to so frame the decree that the costs in the circuit court shall be adjudged against the guilty vessel, and in favor of the appellant.</p> <p>4. Same—Signals by Whistle—Vessel’s Duties.</p> <p>_ Response to a signal by whistle does not imply any relinquishment of the right of way, excepting so much as maybe necessary to enable the overtaking vessel to execute her maneuver.</p>

<p>1. Carriers—Of G09DS— Ship—Evidence Reviewed—Vessel Held Unseaworthy.</p> <p>On the evidence stated, the vessel is adjudged unseaworthy.</p> <p>3. Same—Damage to Cargo—P armad Injury—Measure of Damages.</p> <p>If the damage complained of is the partial injury or destruction of the property shipped, in the absence of proof of fault or fraud on the part of the carrier, the difference between the actual value of the goods at the point of destination at the time and in the condition in which they did arrive, and their actual value at the time and in the condition in which they ought to have arrived, is the proper amount of recovery.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>In other words, when there is a breach of contract, the amount that would have been received had the contract been kept is the measure of damages, if the contract is broken. Pollock, C. B., in Alder v. Keighly, 15 Mees. &W, 117.</p> <p>4 Same—Market Value—How Ascertained.</p> <p>Held, under the facts of this case, that the market value of the damaged rice was to be determined by the price it actually brought after it was beaten and prepared for market, and not by the testimony of the experts.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Clerk of Court—United States District Court—In Admiralty—Jurisdiction—Trespass .</p> <p>If the clerk of the United States district court issue process under a standing admiralty rule of the court, he cannot be regarded as a trespasser, even though the court had no jurisdiction in the premises.</p> <p>2. Seamen—Controversy between Seamen and Officers—Jurisdiction — Justices of the Peace—Consuls—Treaty between United States and Italy—Rev. St. U. S. §§ 4546, 4547.</p> <p>Under the treaty between the United States and the kingdom of Italy, stipulating that “consuls general, consuls, vice-consuls, and consular agents shall have exclusive charge: '!f * * and shall alone take cognizance of questions, of whatever kind, that may arise, both at sea and in port, between the captain, officers, and seamen, without exception, and especially of those relating to wages, and the fulfillment of agreements reciprocally made,” a justice of the peace has no power, under sections 4546 and 4547 of the Revised Statutes of the United States to compel the clerk to issue admiralty process against an Italian ship for the wages of a seaman thereon.</p> <p>3. Same—Assault on Seaman in United States Port — District Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where the master of an Italian vessel, in one of the ports of the United States, is guilty of a barbarous and malicious assault upon a seaman on such vessel, he is not protected by the terms of the consular compact above quoted, and the district court may, in its discretion, take jurisdiction of the case, for the protection of the seaman, and the redress of his wrongs.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Admiralty—Distinction between Appeals and Writs of Error.</p> <p>In suits against joint tort-feasors, if the defendants answer severally and not jointly, their interests are severed, and, if a judgment be recovered against one, he may sue out a writ of error without joining the other defendant. The writ of error is, in effect, the foundation of a new suit; and the only questions brought up for review are those arising between the person who takes out the writ and the opposite party, because the party who is not joined in the writ is no longer in the case. This is not so, however, in admiralty, when the appeal suspends the operation of the decree, andbrings up the whole cause for a new hearing. The appellant alone can be heard in support of the appeal, but all parties interested in supporting the decree appealed from are entitled to be heard.</p> <p>2. Same—Decree on Appeal.</p> <p>The libelants proceeded against two vessels for damages by collision. The district court dismissed the libel, with costs, as to one, and awarded the libelants their whole damages, with costs, against the other. An appeal was taken by the latter vessel, and also by the libelants. The libelants subsequently abandoned their appeal. Upon the hearing in the circuit court all parties appeared, and litigated the cause. The decree of the district court was reversed, andboth vessels pronounced in fault. Held, that although the libelants were in the position of not having appealed, they were entitled to a decree against both vessels, such a decree being necessary to protect the appellant and do full justice between all parties; but that the libelants were not entitled to costs of the circuit court.</p> <p>3. Collision—Appeals—Libelants not Joining in Appeal—Form of Decree.</p> <p>When, in a cause of collision, a libel against two vessels has been dismissed as to one and sustained as to the other, and if therefrom the latter alone appeals, the libelants, though not appealing, will be entitled to the same form of decree as if they had appealed, though not to costs.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Sunken and Abandoned Wreck—Liability or Former Owner.</p> <p>The canal-boat Eureka No. 5, owned by defendants, was sunk in New York harbor through no fault of her owners, and was abandoned. Libelants’ boats thereafter were damaged by running upon the wreck. Held, on suit brought against the former owners of the wreck, that they wore not liable, although they had afterwards removed the wreck, on being notified by the pilot commissioners to do so.</p> <p>2. Waters and Water-Courses—Duty oe Owner to Remove Wreck—Laws N. Y. 1860, On. 522.</p> <p>Chapter 522 of the Laws of New York of 1860 provides that, after notification from the pilot commissioners to the former owner of a wreck to remove it, if the owner fails to do so, he shall be liable to pay to the county any sum that the pilot commissioners may have expended in their removal’ of the wreck; but the law does not create a duty on the part of the owner to remove the wreck.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Motion for new trial. Reported 27 Fed. Rep. 113.</p>

<p>Towage—Neguigenob—Pkesi-ottlon.</p> <p>Where a flat-boat,, when delivered under a towing contract into the custody of a tow-boat, was in good order, but when it reached the port of destination was in a broken and sinking condition, and tito owner did not accompany the flat-boat either personally or by agent, it is fhe duty of those owning or'navigating the tow-boat, to show how the injury occurred, and, in the absence of explanation or proof on that subject, negligence will be presumed, and damages decreed against the tow-boat.</p>

<p>Removal oe Cause—Assignment oe Non-Negotiable Contract.</p> <p>"Where an action is brought by a party to a non-negotiable contract for the use of liis assignee, citizenship of the party to the contract, and not that of his assignee, determines the question of the removability of the cause.</p>

<p>1. Contract—Construction—Punctuation.</p> <p>Where the meaning of a contract is doubtful, the punctuation maybe taken into consideration, in deciding upon the proper construction.</p> <p>3. Same—Context.</p> <p>A single sentence of a contract should not he construed as if standing alone, but with reference to the context.</p> <p>3. Same—Public Policy—Railroad Companies.</p> <p>Railroads perform a quasi public service, and, so far as vested property interests are not impaired, such construction should be given to all contracts made by them as -will make them most fully subserve the interests and welfare of the general public.</p> <p>4. Same—Consideration—Compromise.</p> <p>The law favors compromises, and upholds them as considerations of the covenants of the compromising parties.2</p> <p>5. Same—Performance—Mutuality.</p> <p>A party who has been paid for a privilege cannot resist its enforcement on the mere ground that he cannot compel the other party to continue in its enjoyment.</p> <p>6. Equity—Practice—Jurisdiction—Decree.</p> <p>Where a court of equity takes jurisdiction of a controversy, it is bound to continue that jurisdiction up to the final determination of the entire controversy.</p> <p>7. Specific Performance — Equity—Jurisdiction — Railroad Companies— Risiit of Way.</p> <p>Where a railroad company binds itself by contract to allow other companies to use its right of way under such reasonable regulations and terms as may bo agreed upon by such companies, and thereafter refuses to recognize the right of another company to use such right of way upon any terms, a court ol' equity has power to enforce the contract., determine the amount of consideration, and decide upon the regulations.</p> <p>8. Same—Contracts Indefinite as to Details.</p> <p>Where a fight is absolutely contracted for, but the details are left unsettled, either because they cannot he determined at the time the contract is made, or because the changing condition of affairs indicates that details' must ho sub j ect to modification, and should therefore be left to settlement by agreement or decree at tbe time the right may he insisted upon, a court of equity will not hold the contract incomplete, when called upon to enforce it, if the details are of a nature which it can properly fix and settle, but will determine tbe right, and prescribe and settle the details. The decree should he subject to modifications, however.</p> <p>9. Railroad Companies—Lease—Rroirr of Way—Compensation for Use.</p> <p>The defendant company having contracted to allow another company to use its right of way and track upon reasonable terms, held, that such latter company desiring to use such right of way and track j ointly with the owner should, under the circumstances of this case, pay interest on half their value, and that the share of the expenses of keeping up the track to bo paid by each company should be fixed upon a whoelage basis.</p> <p>10. Mortgage—Notice—Reference in Recorded Deed to One not Recorded.</p> <p>Where a deed conveying a right of way to a railroad company recited that it was executed in pursuance of a contract between the grantor and grantee, and stated, towards its close, that, the conveyances “of the said right of way in the deed mentioned are made subject to the terms and conditions upon which the same were granted to the party of the first part, ” and the contract referred to was not recorded, but another contract of even dale therewith, referring to it, and limiting the grantor’s rights, was recorded, htfd, that persons t o whom the grantee’s successor mortgaged its road are chargeable with notice of the terms and conditions of said contracts, and are bound thereby.</p> <p>11. Railroad Companies — Right of Way, Defined—Construction of Contract.</p> <p>The tripartite agreement of August 11, 1875, between the Forest park commissioners, the St. Louis County Railroad Company, and the St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railroad Company, construed, in connection with the contract of even date therewith between the last two parties; and held (1) to form a pari of the latter contract; (3) to he upon sufficient consideration, and binding; (8) to have bound the St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railroad Company to permit other railroads to use its right of way and track, not only through Forest park, and the non-contiguous tracts, through which the St. Louis County Railroad Company had a right of way, but also through all tracts intervening between said park andtheUnion depot, in St. Louis, through which the St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railroad Company might thereafter obtain a right of way from other parties; (4) to have meant by the term “right of way” the strip of land upon which a railroad company constructs its roadbed; (5) to have entitled the St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railroad Company, and Us successors, to the first right to use its right of way, not limited to its necessities, but as broad as its conveniences, and to have entitled other roads, subject to such prior right, to the use of said right of way, including, if necessary, the owner’s tracks.</p>

<p>Corporations—Receiver—Mortgage Sale—“Operating and Supply Materials” Construed.</p> <p>A receiver was appointed to wind up a corporation engaged in the manufacture and supply of gas. By the order appointing him he was directed to keep the works in operation, to make necessary repairs, and to pay and discharge the debts of employes, and bills for supplies and operating materials contracted within sixty days prior to his appointment. Pursuant to the orders of the court, lie made improvements and extensions on the gas-works of the company, part of which was paid by money raised on receiver’s certiiicates, and part out of the earnings of the company Default having been made in the payment of interest on bonds secured by mortgage given prior to his appointment, the trustee in the mortgage intervened, and a decree of foreclosure was entered on a cross-bill tiled by him. The property was sold, and the proceeds paid into court for distribution. Held, that meters supplied to the company were not operating or supply materials, but of the nature of materials used in the construction of the work's; and, being supplied more than 60 days prior to the appointment of the receiver, the creditors supplying them were not entitled to be paid out of the fund in court, in preference to the bondholders, on the ground that, the receiver having, under orders of the court, applied part of the income of the company to the improvement and extension of the works of the company, the claim for the meters should be paid out of the proceeds of the res.</p>

<p>Fraudulent Conveyances — Chattel Mortgage — Stock in Trade — Mortgagor in Possession.</p> <p>In August, 1884, P., a merchant, mortgaged to defendant bank, to secure the payment of three notes due in September, October, and November for $3,500, his goods then in stock, and that might thereafter be added thereto, together with the furniture and fixtures, ana all notes, book-accounts, and evidences of indebtedness owned by P. The mortgage, by its terms, permitted P. to sell the property in the usual course of trade. It was delivered to the bank at the time of its execution, but not recorded till March, 1885, seven months after. The notes were not paid when due. In September, 1884, P. purchased of plaintiff, on credit, goods of the value of §3,704.56, which were added to the mortgaged stock. Plaintiff, at the time of the sale, was ignorant of the mortgage, and made the sale in the belief that the stock was unincumbered. The bank had a $5,000 mortgage on P.’s homestead, which was exempt from execution. It applied $2,000 deposited with it by P., proceeds of the sale of this stock of goods, in part payment of this mortgage. Plaintiff recovered judgment against P. for his claim, attached the goods, and sued to set aside the mortgage. Held, that the chattel mortgage was void as against plaintiff, because it, and the transactions under it,-operated as a fraud on him.</p>

In Equity. Bill and cross-bill. For a statement of the facts in this case, see 25 Fed. Rep. 791. Coburn & Ewing applied for a rehearing, see post, 586.

<p>1. Equity—Supplemental Bill—When Necessary.</p> <p>Matters transpiring after tbe filing of tbe original bill or cross-bill in equity, changing or affecting tbe issues, should be presented by supplemental bill.</p> <p>2. Same—Compromise—Matters of Form—Estoppel.</p> <p>But;where it appears that after tbe issues were joined tbe parties entered into an agreement of compromise, and a dispute having arisen as to tbe true meaning and intent of that agreement, tbe parties appeared before tbe court, presented a petition for a decree, and submitted all tbe facts as fully and clearly as this might have been done under a supplemental bill, no objection on account of form being suggested, and where the court, upon such hear ing, construed the agreement of compromise, and entered decree in accordance therewith, neither party will be permitted thereafter to raise a mere question of form. The decree thus rendered cannot be attacked on the ground that there was no supplemental bill filed, nor upon the ground that, the proof submitted was in the form of affidavits, and no cross-examination was had, all this having been done without objection.</p>

<p>1. Equity— Gross-Bill—Necessary to Complete Decree.</p> <p>Plaintiff, by bis bill in equity, claimed to be tbe equitable owner of certain notes in tbe possession of defendant P., and asked that P. be compelled to deliver tbe notes to bim, and that defendant S., tbe maker, be restrained from making payment thereon to any one but plaintiff. Defendant S., in bis answer, averred that V. bad an interest in tbe notes, and asked that V. be made a co-defendant, which was granted. V. appeared and answered, setting up bis interest. He asked leave to file a cross-bill, in order that tbe court might make a complete decree. Held, that be should have leave to file bis cross-bill, as, since tbe plaintiff sought to restrain defendant S. from making payment to any one but himself, that was tbe only way in which defendant V. can obtain full relief.</p> <p>2. Same—Service.</p> <p>A cross-bill being auxiliary to tbe original bill, service may be bad on tbe attorney of record, and it is no objection to it that tbe party "is out of tbe jurisdiction of tbe court.</p>

<p>1. Carriers—Of Goods—Lien for Freight — Railroad Coaepanies—Transportation beyond Lines — Special Instructions to First Carrier as to Forwarding.</p> <p>A carrier receiving goods for transmission over his own line, and consigned to a place beyond, has the apparent authority to forward the same to the place of destination by any of the ordinary routes thereto, and a second carrier, receiving the goods in the usual and ordinary course of business, without notice of any special instructions to the first carrier, and transporting them to the place of destination, is entitled to demand the ordinary and usual freight therefor.</p> <p>2. Same—Notice of Special Instructions.</p> <p>The fact that, when the second carrier received the goods from the first, they were loaded in an appropriately marked car of the particular railroad over which the first carrier was instructed to forward them, does not amount to implied notice to the second carrier of such instructions.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

Collision. Libel in rem by tbe owners of one of the colliding vessels and the underwriters of her cargo against the other vessel and her freight.

<p>1. Maritime Lien—Material-Man—I-Iowe Port—New Jersey Act March 20. 1857.</p> <p>The lien given the material-man by state statutes will be enforced -by proceedings in rem in admiralty, provided the transaction be based on the credit of the vessel. No lien exists for materials furnished to the. charterer in the home port of the vessel, under an agreement to accept in part payment the note of the charterer, if from the evidence it appears that the material-man was aware of the terms of the charter-party, and did not suppose or believe, at the time the work and materials were contracted for, that they were to be supplied on the credit of the boat or its owners.</p> <p>2. Same—Lien.</p> <p>State statutes confer no lien in the home port, if from the evidence it appears that the vessel's credit was not an element of the contract.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Exceptions to libel, and motion to amend.</p>

<p>Cahethrs—Oi? Goods—Ships—Damage to Cargo—Improper Stowage.</p> <p>On tlie delivery qf a consignment of eight drums of glycerine, two wore found 1o he broken! On suit brought for the loss, held, that if all eight were stowed in an equally proper place, then the stowage of the two could not, in detail and arrangement,, have been proper or sufficient. If the two were stowed in a less safe place than the-six, considering the peculiar character of the drums, that was improper stowage; and therefore that the carrier had not relieved himself from the presumption of negligent stowage as the cause of the loss, and that the vessel was liable for the loss.</p>

<p>At Law.</p> <p>Action in debt sur judgment. Sur rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.</p>

<p>1. Principal and Agent—Del Ckedf.be Commission—Lien—Bill of Sale— Insolvent Principal.</p> <p>An agent under a del credere commission has a lien for all commissions and advances io Ms principal, and, if those exceed the value of the goods, a bill of sale to him by insolvent principal, though perhaps technically illegal, will be sustained as a foreclosure of the lien.</p> <p>2. Same—Set-Off.</p> <p>In such a case, where the agent has used large acceptances of his principal for Ms own benefit, he is not obliged, for the benefit of creditors of his principal, to sot those off against his acceptances l'or his principal, and release the security of Ms lien to that extent.</p>

<p>Conflict of Laws—Champerty—Contract to Collect a Legacy on Shares —Made in Maine—Suit to Enforce, Brought in New York.</p> <p>An agreement was entered into in the state of Maine between plaintiff, a resident of the state of New York, and defendant, a resident of Maine, whereby plaintiff, in consideration of prosecuting defendant’s claim to a certain legacy, was to receive one-third of what money defendant might recover. A statute of the state of Maine makes criminal the act of making an agreement to prosecute a suit on shares. The suit was brought in the state of New York, where such agreements are legal. Held, that the validity of the contract was to be determined by the law of Maine, and that the effect of the above statute of Maine was to render the agreement void. Whether New York could be held to be the place of performance of this agreement, qumrefi.2</p>

<p>Post-Office—Money-Order Department—Employment of Clerks—Power of Postmaster.</p> <p>A postmaster has no authority to employ clerks to assist him in the money-order department, and to pay them out of government funds in his hands, without the authority of the postmaster general.</p>

In Equity. Application of the receivers for instructions as to the surrender of certain properly to Thomas M. Cooley, who has been appointed Wabash receiver by the circuit court of the Seventh circuit, in the foreclosure suit of Atkins v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 161.

<p>At Law. Motion for new trial.</p>

In Equity. On May 12,1873, Steams & Co. recovered a judgment in the state court against Gardner, Blish & Co., principals, and Bowser, Prentis, and Falls, as sureties, for $2,212.85. At that time Bowser owned real estate in Allen county, Indiana, worth from $20,000 to $30,000, on which there were liens'amounting to about $6,000. On December 31, 1873, the principal debtors paid $354.93 on the judgment, and on January 1, 1874, the same parties paid $145.07.

<p>Indictment for Mailing Obscene Letters. Sur motion in arrest of judgment.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On exceptions to reports of lions by special commissioner.</p>

<p>Patents son Inventions—Inebingement—Salb of Matebial by Licensee to Non-Licensees.</p> <p>Where a licensee to sell materials for use in a patented process to other licensees, sells said materials, to be used for such process, to other persons known not to be licensees, he is guilty of infringement.</p>

<p>Patents for Intentions—Disclosure of Intention by Prior Patent—Failure to Claim—Abandonment.</p> <p>The fifth and sixth claims of letters patent Ho. 283,031, issued to Allen W. Swift, for an improvement in lubricators, are invalid by reason that the invention covered thereby was disclosed by letters patent Ho. 253,353, issued to the same person, for an improvement in lubricators, and was abandoned to the public by failure to claim the devices sot out by such claims.</p> <p>2. Same—Fifth Claim of Patent Ho. 237,320.</p> <p>The fifth claim of letters patent Ho. 257,326, issued to Boss J. Hoffman and owned by defendants, is for the same invention as that covered by the fifth and sixth claims aforesaid, and is also void.</p>

A. few minutes after 7 o’clock in the evening of December 4, 1875, as the steam ferry-boat John S. Darcy, coming from the Pavonia ferry, Jersey City, with a strong flood-tide, was about entering her slip at Twenty-third street, North river, she came into collision with the tugboat I. L. Fisher, striking with her bows the starboard side of the tug, a little aft of the engines, doing both vessels some damage, for which the above cross-libels were filed.

<p>1. Ships and Shipping—Respondentia Bond—Master’s Lien—Subbogation— Rate of Interest.</p> <p>The brig L., while on a voyage from Pensacola to Philadelphia, put into St. George’s, Bermuda, in distress. The brig was subsequently condemned and sold, and the cargo was reshipped to Philadelphia. At St. George’s the master incurred charges, which, with the freight, were liens on the cargo. To meet those charges the master borrowed money, and gave a respondentia bond, in which he agreed to hold the cargo until the bond was paid. The bond was for the amount advanced, plus a marine premium of 13J- per cent., the lender taking tho risk of the cargo to Philadelphia. In a contest between the holder of the bond, the owners of the cargo, and the owners of the brig, held, that, although tho validity of the respondentia bond was open to doubt, the libelant must be regarded as an equitable transferree of the master’s liens on the cargo, and was entitled to the benefit of them as a moans of reimbursement; bntTin view of all the circumstances of the case, it was deemed just to confine him to the ordinary rate of 6 per cent.</p> <p>2. Same—Place of Adjustment.</p> <p>In this case it was proper to adjust the losses at Philadelphia.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Steamers—Rules of Navigation—Loss of Cargo—Damages.</p> <p>Where two steamers, approaching each other from opposite directions, both failed to comply with a rule of navigation, and in consequence a collision ensued, in a suit against the two boats, the damages resulting to the owner of a cargo in the charge of one of them will be equally divided between the boats.</p> <p>2. Same—Measure of Damages.</p> <p>Where a cargo is thus lost by a collision, in a suit against the wrong-doer, standing in no contract relation to the party injured, the prevailing rule is to allow only the actual damages sustained at the time and place of the loss, with interest thereon.</p> <p>3. Same—Suit against Both Vessels.</p> <p>And this latter rule applies whore, for such loss, the injured party elects to bring a joint suit against two colliding boats, one of which stands in such contract relation to him, and the other not; the damages in such joint suit being assessable on the footing of the marine tort, for which both boats are answerable, and not on the basis of the contract, to which one of the boats is a stranger.</p> <p>A Carriers—Of Goods—Loss—Damages.</p> <p>In the case of carriers or others under contract to deliver goods, the measure of damages for their loss in transitu is their net market value at the place of destination,'at the time when they should have arrived there.</p>

<p>1. Charter-Party—Lien for Freight and Charges under—Fraudulent Bills of Lading.</p> <p>Where the charterer of a ship, under a charter-party giving the owners a lien on any part of the cargo for all freight and charges named therein, issues, fraudulently, a bill of lading for the goods of a third party, who had no knowledge of the charter-x>arty, the goods so shipped are subject to the lien given by the charter-party, where the master acted in good faith.</p> <p>2. Same—Effect of Bill of Lading.</p> <p>The acceptance of cargo, as by general ship, from one ignorant of the fact that the ship is chartered, or signing bills of lading inconsistent with the charter-party, would estop the enforcement, against that part of the cargo so received, of any claim for freight, except that specified in the bills of lading.</p>

<p>1 Courts—Federal—Jurisdiction—CiTizTSNsrnr—Assignment op Judgment.</p> <p>In a suit to enjoin the assignment o£ a judgment in a federal court, the court has jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties to such suit.</p> <p>2. Same—Original Suit. '</p> <p>Such suit is not an original suit, but is auxiliary to, and dependent, upon, the original suit.</p> <p>3. Same—Parties.</p> <p>Parties to f.lie original suit, or persons who are not parties to such suit, and who arc entitled to any relief in connection with or growing out of the original suit, may come into court, by hill in equity, and have a remedy regardless of citizenship.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Taxation—Exemption—Property Used for Purposes of Interstate Commerce. ></p> <p>Property is not exempted from liability to an equal and uniform property tax by the fact that it is used, either partially or exclusively, for interstate commerce.</p> <p>2. Same—Vehicles of Transportation—Domicile.</p> <p>Vehicles of transportation, used constantly and continuously upon a single run, acquire a situs, for purposes of taxation, independent and irrespective of the domicile of the owner.</p> <p>3. Same—Effect of Vehicle’s Use in Different States.</p> <p>Such situs is not destroyed by the fact that the owner, owning many vehicles of like character, and having lines in various parts of the United States, transfers from time to time such vehicles from one line to another, providing a constant and continuous use of such vehicles is preserved upon the single run.</p> <p>4. Same—Conflict between Two States.</p> <p>Where such vehicles are used upon a run extending through two states, there is a situs for taxation in each state to a fair proportion of the value of the property so used.</p> <p>5. Same—Restraining Collection or Payment of a Tax.</p> <p>Where a state tax is assessed and levied against a railroad company owning and operating a line of road within the state, based upon the rolling stock used by it in the operation of such road, a third party cannot enjoin the st ate from collecting, or the railroad company from paying, a portion of such tax. on the ground that a part of such rolling stock included in such assessment is the property of such third party, and exempt from taxation.</p>

<p>1. Equity—Hecessary Parties.</p> <p>All persons wlio are necessary parties to a suit must be made parties.</p> <p>2. Same—Parties Interested in Bes cut.</p> <p>All parties whose interests are affected by the suit, or whose concurrence is necessary to a complete determination of the suit, or who have a substantial interest in the subject-matter of the suit, are necessary parties to it; and it cannot proceed without their being made parties.</p> <p>3. Same—Plaintiffs—Defendants.</p> <p>The law is that those whose interests are in harmony should bo joined as plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be.</p> <p>4 Courts—Jurisdiction, how Conferred.</p> <p>To give jurisdiction, there must bo subject-matter upon which the court has a right to-pass, place over which it can exercise its powers, and all the proper and necessary parties. All of these requisites must exist; and in this suit the interests of all the heirs are in harmony, as against the defendant, and all of such heirs must be made parties plaintiff.</p> <p>6. Samis—Federal Courts—Partif.s.</p> <p>To give a federal court jurisdiction, on the ground of a dispute or controversy between citizens of different states, it must appear that all the necessary plaintiff's are citizens of states different from all the necessary defendants. If this state of facts does not exist, there is a failure of jurisdiction. They must exist, before the court-, under the law, can exercise the power of hearing and determining a controversy. Proper and necessary parties are as much an element of jurisdiction as any of the other elements of it,. If there is a failure of either one of these elements, there is a failure of jurisdiction.</p> <p>6. Equity—Parties—Heirs.</p> <p>All the heirs to an estate of a decedent, in a suit against an administrator of such estate charging him with having fraudulently converted the assets of the estat e, are necessary parties to such suit.</p> <p>7. Same—Pleading—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Under the law, and the rules of pleading as they existed in equity before the passage of the act of Marché, 1875, a plea to the jurisdiction in the nature of a plea in abatement, because of the joinder of parties who could not sue in the federal court, must have been filed before an answer to the merits, as an answer to the merits, without a plea previously filed, was a waiver of the objection. A plea filed simultaneously with an answer to the merits came too late. Put this rule is abrogated by the act of 1875.</p> <p>8. ' Same—Dismissal.</p> <p>Under this act it is made the duty of the court, at any time after suit has been brought, to see to it whether the suit really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction. If it does not do so, it is the duty of the court to dismiss the suit. This may be done when the question is raised by the pleadings, or it may be done by the court suasponte.</p> <p>9. Courts—Federal Jurisdiction—Parties.</p> <p>Parties to a suit cannot artificially arrange themselves so as to create a fictitious ground of federal jurisdiction. The court will disregard all such arrangement of parties, and arrange them according to their interest in the suit. It will look to the real facts of the case, as shown by the pleadings.</p> <p>10. Same—Citizenship.</p> <p>When a court has properly acquired jurisdiction of a cause by reason of the proper citizenship of the parties, some or any of such parties may, by cross-bill, assert a necessary defense, or set up a right or claim which puts such party in antagonism with his co-defcndant. Such cross-bill is treated as ancillary to the main cause properly before the court. Even other persons who are not parties, if the court has first lawfully acquired jurisdiction of the cause, if necessary to protect their rights, may intervene in the suit, regardless of citizenship.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Ikjunction—Trespass—Title.</p> <p>A party stowing an equitable title to realty will be protected against trespassers by injunction, tbougb the location of the legal title lias not been finally determined.</p>

On the trial of this cause the eourt directed a verdict for the defendant after the opening statement of plaintiffs’ counsel to the jury and before the introduction of any testimony. No witnesses had been subpoenaed by defendant, but a witness was by him in good faith procured to attend for the purpose of testifying, but had not been sworn.

<p>Motion for Relaxation of Costs.</p>

This action was commenced Jrnie 80, 1881, to recover alleged excessive duties exacted of the plaintiffs by the defendant, as collector of customs, upon four importations of sugar made by them by the steamer Newport, March, 23, 1881; the Giles Loring, March 14,1881; the Niagara, April 28, 1881; and the Venerata, May 31,1881.

<p>Customs Duties—Chemical Compounds and Salts—Rev. St. § 2499.</p> <p>The term “chemical compounds and salts,” in Schedule A of the tariff act of 1883, does not enumerate bichromate of soda, within the moaning of the statute. Bichromate of soda is. a non-enumcrated article, and in its similitude to bichromate of potash is provided for under Rev. St. § 2499, and dutiable at three cents per pound.</p>

This was an action to recover alleged excessive duties, exacted by the collector of customs at the port of New York from Peter P. T. Hansen, the plaintiff, on his importation by the steamer Moravia, December 5, 1883, of certain fish, known in the trade as “Russian Sardines.” The collector levied duty thereon at 25 per cent, ad valorem, under Schedule G. of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, (22 St. at Large, U. S. 504,) under the following clause: “Salmon, and all other fish,…

Ex parte. Indictment under Rev. St. U. S. § 5480, for taking letters from the post-office in the execution of a scheme to defraud.

<p>Counterfeiting — Government Bond—National Bank Note—Recovery oe Penalty—Qui Tam Action—Indictment.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. §§ 5188, 8708, the penalties provided for the making and uttering business cards in the likeness of a government bond or national banknote is only recoverable by a qui tam action, brought by an informer, and cannot be recovered by indictment at the instance of the government.</p>

<p>Indictment under Rev. St. § 5440.</p>

<p>1. Post-Office—Intercepting and Opening Letters—Delivery—“In Care of. ”</p> <p>Tlie words. “In care of F. Kressel, ” on a letter directed to A., indicate that it is to be delivered through Kressel; they mean that A., and not Kressel, is the person to whom the letter is to go.</p> <p>3. Same—Kev. St. IT. S. § 3893.</p> <p>One who, with the purpose of obstructing a correspondence, or of prying into the secrets of the person to whom a letter is directed, takes the letter from tlie party in whoso care it is sent through the mails, and opens it, is guilty of the oil'onse defined in Rev. St. U. S. §3892, and liable to the penalty iherein denounced.</p>

<p>Indictment under Rev. St. U. S. § 5467, for secreting and embezzling a registered letter.</p>

<p>In Equity. On Demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>1. Payments—Application of—Bottomry Bond —General Account—Ship’s Agents—Necessary Advances—Master’s Draft Discounted.</p> <p>. Payments by the debtor will be applied according to the intent of the parties, where that can be determined with reasonable certainty.1</p> <p>2. Same—Case Stated.</p> <p>The steamer M., belonging to the Stettin-Lloyd line, having arrived in New York, subject to a bottomry bond, S., the owner of the line, being in embarrassed circumstances, engaged W. & Co. to act as resident agents of the line in New York, provided they would arrange to take up and hold the bottomry bond, to which W. & Co. agreed; having first arranged that the master of the M. should draw upon S. for £1,700 in favor of W. & Co. payable in Germany, four days after the M.’s arrival there, which draft was to be discounted forW. & Co.’s benefit. A draft was drawn by W. & Co. also in order to procure the discount, and the next day W. & Co. took up the bottomry bond, advancing therefor about $5,000, the excess over the moneys received upon the draft. The proceeds of the draft were put by W. & Co. to the credit of S. in their “general account. ” A different special account was kept, as respects the bottomry. W. & Co. soon after made large advances in fitting out the vessel, and accepted various accommodation drafts for S. in the current business. Held, upon the circumstances and conflicting evidence, that the draft was designed to aid W. & Co., both in taking the assignment of the bottomry bond and also in making their necessary advances in fitting out the ships of the line for their voyages from this port; that it was designed to be applied, first, against these necessary advances and liabilities incurred by W. & Co. in the current business, and the balance only, together with any balance of profits from the current business, was to be applied upon bottomry; that the proceeds of the draft were not a payment by S., nor his moneys, until the draft was actually paid by him; and at the date of such payment, W. & Oo.’s advances and liabilities in the current business being equal to the proceeds of the' draft, none of it was then applicable upon the bottomry lien; that, an account having been made up to the first of January following, upon which a balance was stated as due to W. & Go, upon “ all the various accounts, ” the credit to S. appearing in their general account, must be deemed applicable to the bottomry lien, after discharging the debts belonging to the current business. Held, further, that two special debit accounts, one of them being a draft of £600, the subject of one of the above suits, being found to belong strictly to current business, properly formed a part of the general account, and the credit balance on that account was first applicable thereto, anil that the draft of £600 was thereby paid and extinguished.</p>

<p>1. Charter-party-Charterer to Enter Vessel—Liquidated Damages.</p> <p>Where the act tor which damages are stipulated or estimated, by the contract, is one calculated to produce injury, and the damages are of a nature not susceptible of easy proof, the amount stipulated will be given, if not cl early unreasonable.</p> <p>53. Same—Case Stated.</p> <p>The bark I. G. was chartered to the respondents from Smyrna to New York, the charter providing that the vessel should be “entered at New York, Irythe respondent’s agents, or, on default thereof, the owner should pay £30 estimated damages. ” On arrival at New York, the captain did not, report to the charterer's agents at once, nor until the day after the vessel had been reported to oilier agents, and entered by them at the custom-house. Held, that, the stipulation was a reasonable one, in view of the liability to injury to the charterers through delay in reporting the vessel at once, on arrival; and that the stipulated damages'should be allowed without further proof of specific damage than the delay of one day.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Proximate and Remote Causes—Navigating near Piers and Slips—State Statute.</p> <p>Although navigating contrary to the statute does not necessarily charge the vessel with fault in a collision, where her position was perceived in time, and there was plenty of space and opportunity for each to avoid collision, yet it will he deemed a fault, and one of the proximate causes of the collision, when the violation of the statute has created embarrassment in the movements of either vessel.</p> <p>'2. Same—Rule 19—Assenting Signals.</p> <p>A steamer having another crossing steamer upon her own starboard hand is not relieved of her duty to keep out of the other’s way, under rule 19, merely from receiving first a signal of two whistles from the other, which are assented to, indicating that they will pass starboard to starboard. She remains, as before, bound to do all that she reasonably can to keep out of the way.</p> <p>8. Same—Ferry-Boat—East River—Circling Course—Not Stopping and Backing.</p> <p>The ferry-boat C., on leaving her slip in Brooklyn, bound for the Catharinestreet slip, New York, observed the tug W. coming up with the flood-tide, close to her New York slip. The river is so narrow that on that tide a fenyboat, under a hard a-starboard helm, is sometimes scarcely able to make her necessary downward turn, circling around somewhatinthe shape of the letter “S. ” The C. gave the W. a signal of two whistles, indicating that she should go outside of her, to which the W. replied with two. The W. properly sheered somewhat further towards the New York shore, and as near as was prudent with a tow along-side, and slowed, but did not back. The danger of collision was perceived when they were from 600 to 900 feet apart. The C. was all the time under a hard a-starboard wheel, but did not turn fast enough to clear the W.’s tow, striking her with her starboard wheel or wheel-house, and sinking her immediately. Held, both were in fault,—the ferry-boat as being specially charged with knowledge of what she could do or not do in turning, and therefore bound to stop and back in time, when the danger was perceived; and the tug (1) for navigating unlawfully near the piers and slips, which created an embarrassment to the ferry-boat, and prevented her going to the westward of her, following her ordinary course, while she was not able, without stopping, to turn rapidly enough to go to the eastward; (2) for not backing’wlien the danger of collision was perceived; and (fi) that it was immaterial that the two whistles wore given first cv the G, and that the lug was not thereby relieved from her duty to keep out of the way, having the other on her starboard hand, by the use of all reasonable means within her power.</p>

<p>■Motion to Remand Cause.</p>

<p>1. Executors and Administrators—Parties to Bill for Accounting.</p> <p>Where a bill in equity prays account against executors, and a general settlement of the trust, ali the executors are necessary parties.</p> <p>2. Same—Demurrer for Want of Parties.</p> <p>A defendant may object to the bill for the want of proper parties; and, if such defect is -not apparent on the face of the bill, the defendant may plead the matters necessary to show it.</p> <p>3. Same—Plea for Want of Parties.</p> <p>A plea for the want of proper parties is a plea in bar, and goes to the whole bill.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Partnership—Assignment eor Benefit of Creditors.</p> <p>B. and K., partners, agreed upon an assignment, for tlie benefit of creditors, and directed an attorney to prepare the necessary papers, and draw up a schedule of assets, November 6,1886. November 8th, at 8 a. m., the deed of assignment was executed in the firm name by B. November 8th, at 10 a. m., J£., without the knowledge or consent of his partner, executed a chattel mortgage of the firm stock to secure a note given for indebtedness of the firm to the plaintiffs, and payable November 9, 1886. Held that, the assignment having been agreed to by the firm, each partner was authorized to execute the deed thereof, and the same was valid.</p> <p>2. Same—Chattel Mortgage.</p> <p>' Held, further, that, the chattel mortgage not being in furtherance of the business, neither partner had authority to execute the same without the consent of the firm, and therefore it was invalid.</p>

<p>1. Railroad Companies—Eminent Domain—Crossing of Right of Way—Laws of Kansas—Pacific Railway Act U. S. 1862, § 15.</p> <p>Section 15 of tbe Pacific Railway act of July 1,1862, incorporating the Union Pacific Railway, and providing “that any other railroads now incorporated, or hereafter to be incorporated, shall have the right to connect their road with the road and branches provided for by this act, at such places and upon such just and equitable terms as the president of the United States may prescribe, " does not place the right of way of the Union Pacific Railway beyond the roach of the power of eminent domain of the state of Kansas, nor exempt it from the operation of the laws of the state respecting the crossing and connecting of railroads, and the condemnation of property for these purposes; following Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 1 McCrary, 452; S. C. 3 Fed. Rep. 106.</p> <p>2. Same—Condemning Crossing over Another Railroad—Special Proceeding—Pleading—Comp. Laws Kan. 1879, Ch. 23, § 47.</p> <p>A proceeding instituted under section 47, Comp. Laws Kan. 1879, a. 23, in the district court, by one railroad company to condemn a crossing over the right of way of another railroad, is not a civil action, but a special proceeding, and, as such, the ordinary rules of pleading do not apply.</p> <p>3. Same—Selection of Commissioners.</p> <p>In a proceeding begun by one railroad company to-have commissioners appointed to ascertain the compensation to be paid to another railroad company for crossing the latter’s right of way, and the points and manner of such crossing, the defendant should be heard in the selection of such commissioners," although their action is not final, but subject to review by the court.</p> <p>4. Same—Bailed ad Mbs'.</p> <p>. . , . , The duties imposed upon such commissioners are beyond the mere valuation of properly, and some, at least, of their number should be railroad men.</p> <p>J). Same—Point or Crossing—Ditty oe Commissioners.</p> <p>The demand by the petitioners for a crossing at a particular point is not conclusive, and does not limit the inquiry. It is the duty of the commissioners to determine the points and the manner of crossing', as well as the amount of compensation.</p>

In Equity. Sur exceptions to master’s report on petition of John A. Verner for an order on receivers of Pittsburgh & Western Railroad Company to pay judgment for damages from construction of railroad, obtained by him in the court of common pleas of Allegheny county, Pennsylvania.

A bill of complaint is filed by the complainant asking that a promissory note signed by him as a joint maker bo declared void, and that the defendant bo required to deliver up the note for cancellation.

<p>Suit for Partition.</p>

<p>1. Waters and Water-Courses—Dock on Lake Shore.</p> <p>Tbe owner of the adjacent land has a qualified proprietary interest in the soil under the edge of the shore of a lake, so as to give him the right to construct and maintain a dock along the shore, and extending the necessary distance under the water; and, when thus erected, the dock is an appurtenance of the real estate.</p> <p>' 2. Chattel Mortgage—Not Filed—Mortgage on Dock—Execution Levied upon Land—How. St. Mich. § 6193.</p> <p>A chattel mortgage upon a dock of which the mortgagor is left in possession, no interest in the land upon which the dock is situated being transferred to the mortgagee, is void as against an execution levied upon the land by a judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the mortgage not being filed till after the levy of the execution. How. St. Mich. § 6193.</p> <p>8. Equity—Creditors’ Bill—Levy of Execution—Filing Mortgage after Levy.</p> <p>The filing of a chattel mortgage on a dock situated upon land belonging to the mortgagor, after an execution has been levied upon the land, puts such an obstruction in the way of the judgment creditor realizing his just satisface tion out of the property of the defendant in execution as is calculated to inspire doubt and apprehension in the minds of purchasers, and prevent their bidding upon the property; and the judgment creditor may maintain a creditors’ bill to have such mortgage declared fraudulent and void, and to have it set aside.</p>

<p>At Law. Petitions for mandamus.</p>

<p>1. Courts—Federal—Action by Marshal on Forthcoming Bond.</p> <p>In an action by tbe marshal on a forthcoming bond, given after claim to property levied on by attachment, and payable to him, the marshal is merely a formal party, and his residence in the same state with the defendant will not defeat the jurisdiction of the United States courts.</p> <p>2. Same—Marshal may Sue, where.</p> <p>Generally, it may he said that whenever the marshal performs, in the enforcement of remedies given by state laws, the same duties which are imposed by the law of the state upon the sheriffs of the state courts, he is entitled to maintain the same actions in the circuit court that the sheriff has in the state court.</p> <p> (,Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Fraudulent Conveyances—Intent—Question por Jury—How. Comp. St. Mich. § 6306.</p> <p>Under How. Comp. St. Mich. § 6306, the question of the intent in conveyances alleged to bo fraudulent is one of fact, and not of law; and, where a conveyance of bis stock in trade by a married man to his wife is impeached as fraudulent, the value of the stock being largely in excess .of the claims of the wife for advances to the husband, it is not error to refuse to charge that that fact is a “badge of fraud,” and that the jury might And from that fact that the transfer was fraudulent and void, the jury having been instructed that such facts were for their consideration in determining whether there was fraud or not.</p> <p>2. Estoppel—By Conduct—Trover against Sheriff—Consent to Levy.</p> <p>Where the sheriff’s certificate made no mention of the mortgage, nor indicaled any lion subject to which the levy was made, the mortgagee of a stock of goods attached by creditors of the mortgagor is not estopped, in trover against the sheriff, from maintaining that the taking, under the attachment, was tortious, by the fact that his attorney consented to the levy, provided that it should contain a recognition of the mortgage.</p> <p>3. Same—Husband and Wipe—Partnership—Debtor and Creditor.</p> <p>While the facts that a married woman, apparently occupied as a helper in the same shop where her husband had his general store, had assorted no claim of interest in the goods, but on the contrary had suffered him 1o deal with them as his own, might estop her from claiming, as against creditors of the husband who had attached the stock, that she was a partner, and so entitled to an interest, when her assertion of an interest in it would disappoint the creditors, who had become such while the appearances hold out were that the property was that of the husband, yet she is not estopped from asserting against such creditors that the husband was a debtor to her for actual advances to him as a loan.</p> <p>4. Trover and Conversion—Tortious Taking—Demand.</p> <p>Where a transfer of goods by a debtor, on the fraudulent character of which attachments are based, is shown to be tona fide and valid, the taking under the writs is tortious, and a prior mortgagee of the goods may maintain trover against the sheriff without demand.</p> <p>5. Partnership—Question for Jury.</p> <p>When there is nothing in the testimony which would warrant the jury in finding that a husband and wife were partners, more than a vague recognition by the husband of an interest in the wife, (not amounting to a legal one,) and a sort of moral lien for the, amount of the money of the wife which she had permitted the husband to invest in the business, the question of partnership between them should not be submitted to the jury.</p> <p>6. Sheriff—Seizing Mortgaged Goods—Measure of Damages—How. Comp. St. Mich. § 7682.</p> <p>A sheriff who, with actual notice of an existing mortgage, prima facie valid, on a stock of goods, attaches the goods at the suit of creditors of the mortgagor, who claim that the mortgage is fraudulent and void, and takes and maintains possession of them, in disregard of the mortgage, instead of seizing the property subject to the mortgage, and keeping possession only so long as was necessary to appraise and inventory it, and then returning it, if required, to the mortgagee, as provided by How. Comp. St. Mich. § 7682, is liable in trover, at the suit of the mortgagee, in damages to the amount of the mortgage, not exceeding the value of the mortgaged property.</p> <p>7. Same—No Indemnifying Bond—How. Comp. St. Mich. § 7711.</p> <p>The failure of a sheriff to take from attaching creditors the bond of indemnity provided for by How. Comp. St. Mich. § 7711, is his own neglect, and cannot be allowed any consideration to relieve him from liability for damages resulting from a wrongful seizure.</p> <p>8. Same—Order of Court Based on Void Law—Laws Mien. 1883, No. 193.</p> <p>The fact that No. 193, Laws Mich. 1883, was unconstitutional and void, will not render a sheriff liable who obeyed a mandate of the court, made under authority of that act, and turned over to a receiver property which he had attached.</p> <p>9. Same—Damage by Pire.</p> <p>A sheriff is not liable for the damage to attached goods in his possession, done by fire, although his seizure was wrongful, where it appears that the fire was accidental and was not caused by his negligence.</p>

This action is brought to recover damages for personal injury caused by negligence as alleged. The plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Minnesota, and the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Wisconsin.

<p>Costs—Taxation—Plea Amended by Order of Court—Cost of Surveys of Land—Compliance with Order.</p> <p>Where, in an action at law to recover the possession of certain lands, the defendant is ordered by the court to make his.plea more certain, and, in order to enable defendant to file a proper plea in accordance with such order, it becomes necessary for him to make surveys and plans, the expense of such, surveys and plans is not a part of defendant’s taxable costs.</p>

<p>1. Life Insurance—Action—Parties.</p> <p>Where, on the application of 8. as the declared beneficiary, he also paying the premiums, a policy of insurance was issued upon the life of B., the sum insured to he paid to the “assured, ”held, thatS. was the assuredand promisee, and an action on the policy by the personal representative of B. was not maintainable.</p> <p>2. Same—Assi&nment— Consent of Company.</p> <p>The fact that after the date of the policy an assignment thereof by B. to S. was indorsed thereon, without the concurrence of the insurance company, is an immaterial circumstance, neither changing the contract relations of the parties, nor importing their mutual understanding of their contract.</p>

<p>Attachment—Fraudulent Cony eyance.</p> <p>Defendant, finding himself in failing circmnstancos, sold liis stock, nominally worth $8,000, to liis son for $6,000, taking therefor three notes of 83,000 each, duo in one, two, and three years, respectively, without, interest, which notes he transferred to the bank, to apply the collections thereof on his indebtedness to the bank of §6,040. No inventory was made, and the son had no means. But the son was 88 years of age, had been clerk in the business formally years, and was named as devisee of property worth $5,000 in the will of his grandmother, who since making the will had been demented, and whose health was so poor that she could not live long, immediately after the sale defendant's sign was taken down, and that of his son was in a few days put up. The property sold would to any one else than the son have been worth no more than $4,000 or $5,000, and was not worth more to the son than what he paid for it. .Held that, in the absence of a statute forbidding preferences, that, was no attempt to defraud, hinder, or delay defendant's creditors that would sustain an attachment.</p>

<p>1. Benevolent Societies—Proceedings—Records—Evidence.</p> <p>WMle it is permitted to contradict tlie record of a voluntary society, or show that such records do not fully disclose all the proceedings of a body which ought to he recorded, proof of that kind must be so convincing and satisfactory as to leave no doubt but what the matter attempted to be interpolated into the records of the proceedings actually occurred.</p> <p>3. Same—Rules—Suspension oe Members.</p> <p>In a voluntary society in which the standing of its members, and the mode of suspending and reinstating them in membership, is regulated by its laws, if the records of the proceedings of the body show that a member is not in good standing, he must bo bound by these records, and the action of his society in that regard; especially when hé has exercised his right of appeal, and the action of which he complains has been affirmed by the appellate tribunal.</p> <p>3. Life Insurance—Benevolent Societies—Assessments—Payment—Insanity.</p> <p>The rule that insanity is no excuse for non-payment of premiums or assessments of life insurance policies applies to the payment of assessments of benevolent societies.</p>

On Habeas Corpus for tho body of Oscar L. Baldwin. The petition for habeas corpus in this case was presented to Joseph P. Bradley, an associate justice of the supreme court of tho United States, allotted to the Third circuit, on the thirtieth of December, 1886, and alleges that the petitioner, Oscar L. Baldwin, is imprisoned in the state’s prison of the state of New Jersey, in custody of John H. Patterson, the keeper thereof, under judgment, sentence, and commitment thereon…

At Law. Suit to recover back $417.75, duties paid under protest upon iron castings intended to form part of an ice-machine. All parts of the machine were not imported, and the parts imported had to be put together, and others added after their arrival in this country. The parts imported ■were classed as manufactures of iron, and a duty of 45 per cent, ad valorem charged, under clause 216 of Heyt’s Compilation.

At Law. Motion to amend bill of particulars. The moving affidavit of the plaintiffs showed: (1) That two suits between the same parties were ponding,—one numbered 9,187, and the other 10,072. (2) The first suit was brought within 90 days after the decision of the secretary of the treasury on the appeal to him under section 2931, Rev. St. U. S. (3) The second suit was not commenced until more than a year had elapsed after the decision of the secretary of the treasury.

<p>Bankruptcy—Debts Provable—Infringement of Patent—Profits—Bev. St. IT. S. § 5067.</p> <p>A claim ior an account of profits against an infringer of a patent-right is provable against his estate in bankruptcy, under Rev. St. U. S. § 5067.1</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—License—Termination of License.</p> <p>A licensee of letters patent, under a contract by wbicb. be is permitted to manufacture and sell the article covered by said patent, cannot without the consent of the licensor, terminate the rights conferred by the license, and, there being no limitation on its face, the license continues until the expiration of the present letters patent.</p> <p>2. Same—Infringement—Improvement in Sulky-Plows—Action against Licensee.</p> <p>The first claim of letters patent No. 154,293, dated August 18, 1874, for ar. improvement in sulky-plows, covering the combination of a crank-bar, plow-beam, and axle, for the purposes set forth, so as to enable the horses to pull the plow out of the ground by the adjustment of the lever in the notches of the curved bar, held to be infringed by defendants in the manufacture of plows in which the mechanism used is only such mechanical changes as increase the power of the lever from a single to a compound action, reversing-its movement from a lever moving forward to one pulled towards the driver, and in which a perforated segment and spring-dog are used, in connection with which the lever operates to raise and lower the plow-beam, these being only mechanical changes and equivalents; and a change in the device for depressing the plow-beam in front will not defeat the right of the patentee to an action for breach of contract against a licensee of his patent.</p> <p>3. Same—Novelty.</p> <p>In an action against a licensee for breach of a contract of license for the manufacture and sale of sulky-plows, covered by letters patent No. 154,293, dated August 18, 1874, when the contract of license contained no recital or adnission by the licensee that the licensor had invented the improvement in sulky-plows, and plaintiff having joined issue on the defense of want of novelty set up in the answer, no estoppel being pleaded, and the defendants hav,ng introduced in evidence letters patent No. 116,956, No. 120,560, No. 123,505, No. 132,772, No. 134,121, and No. 148,147, held that plaintiff’s improvement was not anticipated by either of 1hese patents, neither of them having the combination of the plaintiff, for the purposes described in his patent.</p>

<p>1. Carriers—Of Goods by Vessel—Bill of Lading—Presumptions—Exceptions—“Weight Unknown”—Short Delivery.</p> <p>The stamping of the hill of lading by the master, with the words “weight unknown, ” repels the prima facie presumption as to the weight shipped, which otherwise arises from the statement of the weight in the margin of the bill of lading; and, in case of alleged short delivery in weight, other proof of the weight shipped must be made.</p> <p>2. Same—Sea Damage—Evidence—Extent of Loss—Negligence.</p> <p>Where sea damage may arise from different causes, either with or without negligence in the ship, the nature and extent of the damage may be material in determining to which cause it should be assigned. Held, in this case, not sufficient damage proved to establish presumptive negligence in the ship.</p> <p>3. Same—Damage to Cargo—Dunnage—Sweating.</p> <p>The bill of lading for 4,800 bags of sugar, loaded at Havana, to be delivered at New York, stated in the margin the aggregate net weight. In the body of the bill of lading it was stated, “Weight and contents unknown;” and across the face, of the bill of lading there was also stamped, “Ido not know the weight or contents, and am not liable for sea damage.” Upon a libel filed against the ship, alleging short delivery in weight, and injury through want of dunnage, it appearing that the ship had met with very heavy weather, being for a time nearly upon her beam-ends, when the pumps would not suck; and some loss thereby necessarily arising through drainage in the bilges, without the ship’s fault; and only 1 bag being empty, and only 30 bags being apparently “slack;” and the stains upon some 1,600 bags being shown by proof, and the circumstances, to have arisen mostly from sweating, a sea peril; and no evidence of the weight shipped being given, other than the bill of lading; and the whole number of bags shipped being delivered: held, that there was no sufficient proof, either of the amount of loss in weight, or of the number damaged by sea water, as distinguished from sweating, to establish either any actual loss through want of customary and sufficient dunnage, or any negligence of the ship, as the cause of loss.</p>

<p>Coumsios—WnABvas akd Slips—Weak Boats—Want of Notice.</p> <p>Il is negligence and a fault- for old and weak "boats, without giving notice-of tlieir weakness, to expose themselves along the wharves and slips to the hazards of ordinary contacts and blows from other vessels; and upon injury from a blow, unjustifiable as respects a good boat, they should in such cases recover but half their damages.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.</p> <p>Appeal from district court. See 24 Fed. Rep. 302.</p>

<p>■Carriers—Of Goods—Contract to Furnish Cargo—Breach—Damages.</p> <p>A. contracted with B., a ship-master, to furnish him a cargo “of about 150 tons of bones. ” He furnished 106 tons, but failed to supply the remainder. In an action by B. against A., for damages for breach of contract, held, that 5 tons was a fair allowance, and that B. was entitled to recover what he would have made by carrying the additional 39 tons.</p>

In Equity. On April 6., 1874, John W. Walker and his wife entered into the following contract: “I, John W. Walker, have this day bargained and sold, and do hereby alien, convey, and confirm, to Martha 0.

<p>Witness —Master Appointed in One District Compelling Attendance in Another. .</p> <p>The United States circuit court in one district has power, under rule 78 m equity, to issue a subpoena requiring a person living in that district to appear and testify before an oxaniiner, or before a master appointed in another circuit, and who is discharging the duties of his office in the former district, and may also, under that rule, punish the witness for refusing to obey the subpoena.</p>

<p>Deposition—Refusal of Witness to Sign—Removed Case.</p> <p>In a cause begun in a state court, and subsequently removed to a federal court, the deposition of a witness was taken previous to removal by a shorthand writer. Before the short-hand notes were written out for reading to the witness and signature by him, according to the requirements of the state statute, the cause was removed. Then the witness refused to sign his deposition. Held, that the federal court had no jurisdiction over the taking of the deposition, and could not compel the witness to sign it.</p>

<p>Equity—Belief against Judgment at Law—Perjury—Conspiracy and Surprise.</p> <p>It is not sufficient ground for relief in equity against a judgment at law that 1he verdict was obtained by perjury; and the addition, in a bill praying such relief, of allegations of conspiracy and surprise, does not make a case for interference in equity, with the enforcement of the judgment.</p>

<p>At Law. Action to recover damages for a libel.</p>

<p>Action to Recover Possession of Real Property.</p>

Common-law action on coupons which had been cut from bonds made and issued by the defendant, and which were secured by a mortgage to Ford & Jordan, as trustees, dated September 1,1880.

At Law. This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant, by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant. It appeared from the proof that the defendant was engaged ha the manufacture of car-wheels, in which paper was used as one of the materials of such wheels.

<p>Customs Duties—Duty on Crop-Ends of Steel Rails—Unwrought Metals.</p> <p>The tariff act of 1883, Schedule 0, metals, (22 St. U. S. 497-501,) providing a duty on “steel not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, ” and on “mineral substances in the crude state, and metals unwrought, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, ” the plaintiff imported the crop-ends of steel rails, being the rough, ragged, and imperfect ends of the rails when first rolled, cut off to make perfect rails, with square and even ends, and defendant, as- collector, exacted duty on them as manufactures of steel not specially provided for, which was the same as that on steel not specially provided for. Held, the rails should have been classified as metals unwrought, it appearing they were a mere surplus of metal not made into anything. The classification should be with the class which is more specific, and “unwrought steel” is more specific than “steel.”</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy—Discharge— Partnership—Proceedings to Annul-—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Three members of a copartnership, of which A. was the fourth member, were adjudged bankrupts on their own petition, as was the firm. A/s name was signed to the petition, but without Ms consent, and. in composition proceedings which resulted in a resolution assented to by creditors and approved by the court, anda settlement with creditors on the basis thereof, it was expressly stated that A.’s individual assets and debts wore not included in the schedules. Afterwards, in involuntary proceedings in another district, wherein A. resided, he was adjudged a bankrupt, and was granted a discharge. In proceedings under Rev. St. U. 8. § 5120, to annul the discharge, the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, and to grant the discharge, was denied by creditors. Held that, notwithstanding irregularities in the voluntary proceeding, and in the composition effected therein, these irregularities could not be availed of at this stage o f the present proceeding, and afforded no ground for annulling the discharge for want of jurisdiction to grant it.</p> <p>2. Same—Acts of Bankrupt before Discharge.</p> <p>A discharge in bankruptcy cannot be annulled under Rev. St. U. S. § 5120, where the proofs only go to such acts of the bankrupt as were shown on his examination previous to his discharge.</p> <p>'•3. Same—Distribution of Assets—Partnership and Individual Creditors.</p> <p>Three of the four members of a copartnership, and the copartnership itself, ■settled with creditors under a composition in a bankruptcy proceeding to which the fourth member, A., was not a party. Afterwards, in another proceeding, A. was adjudged a bankrupt. Held, that the firm creditors were not ■entitled to share with A.’s individual creditors in the distribution of the fund realized from A.’s individual estate, except the holders of certain notes made by the firm, but on which A. was liable as an indorser.</p>

<p>1. Courts — Of United States—District of California—Division of District—Indictment.</p> <p>Under act of congress of August 5, 1886, dividing California into two judicial districts, and providing, in section 11, that “all offenses heretofore committed in the district of California shall he prosecuted, tried, and determined in the same manner, and with the same effect, to all intents and purposes, as if this act had not been passed, ” the old district and circuit courts for the district of California are practically continued in existence for the purpose of prosecuting offenses antedating the passage of the act, and an indictment for such an offense found by a grand jury of the old district or circuit court, after the passage of the act, is property found.</p> <p>2. Same—Qualification of Jurors—Application of State Law.</p> <p>In appyling Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 198, establishing, as one of the qualifications of a juror, that he shall have been “assessed on the last assessment roll of the county, or city and county, on property belonging to him, ” to the United States courts, under the act of congress adopting as the qualification of jurors in the United States courts those prescribed by law in the courts of the state, it is sufficient that the juror pays taxes upon property assessed upon the assessment roll, although assessed in the name of another.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Sulpiionated Rosaniline—Letters Patent No. 250,247.</p> <p>In letters patent No. 250,247, dated November 29,1881, issued to John Holliday for a sulphonated compound of rosanilinc, tho process claim only advises the treatment of the anhydrous chloride of rosaniline with fuming sulphuric acid, gauging from 09 to 70 degs. Beaume, and does not make the employment of these specific kinds of rosaniline and fuming sulphuric acid essential to tho process, and the claim must therefore bo construed as embracing the conversion of the rosaniline by means of fuming sulphuric acid, without respect to the anhydrous condition of the rosaniline, or the peculiar strength of the fuming acid; and, in view of the state of tho art of sulphonating dyestuff's, such claim is void for want of novelty.</p> <p>2. Same—Letters Patent Nos. 250,247 and 250,201—Interference.</p> <p>field (1) that John Holliday was the prior inventor of the process by which the tri-sulpho compound of rosaniline is produced; (2) that the first claims (for the products) of letters patent No. 250,247, dated November 29,1881, issued to John Holliday, and No. 250,201, of the same date, issued to Heinrich Caro, are interfering claims; (3) that the second claims (for the process) are not interfering claims; (4) that the first claim of the Caro patent is void as against the first claim of the Holliday patent; and (5) that the second claim of the Caro patent is invalid, because Holliday was the prior inventor of the process.</p> <p>8. Same—Acids—Reference to Beatjme’s Hydrometer Scale—Sufficiency.</p> <p>A reference in letters patent to the Beaume hydrometer scale, for the purpose of determining tho density of acids, alkalies, and many other liquids, is sufficiently accurate as a gauge of their strength.</p> <p>4 Same—Estoppel—Interference—Priority of Invention-Want of Novelty.</p> <p>Where two applications are made for letters patent for the same process, and interference is declared by tho primary examiner, and one of the claimants declared lo be tho prior inventor, but notwithstanding letters patent issue to each claimant, in a suit by the claimant who was declared to be the prior inventor to vacate the patent granted to tho other claimant,’ the defendant is not, by attempting to defeat the plaintiff’s application for letters patent on the ground that he was the prior inventor, estopped from assailing the validity of the patent for want of novelty.</p>

<p>1. Equity—Master—Except! ons— Finding—Waiver.</p> <p>Exception to a principal finding of a master, based on all the evidence in bis report, is not waived by refraining from making the exception before the master, and subsequently making it before the court, since all that the parties could do would be to request the master to change his finding, a thing which they wore under no obligation to do.</p> <p>3. Patents for Inventions—Several Infringers-Damages.</p> <p>Where several parties infringe a patent, one by manufacturing and the others by soiling the goods so manufactured, the torts are both joint and several, and there maybe several judgments, though but one satisfaction; and it is not necessary that the fact that the same damages are included in two decrees should appear in the decrees, to limit the plaintiffs to one satisfaction.</p> <p>3. Same—Master’s Report.</p> <p>The want of a statement in the master’s report that the same damages were included in two suits is no ground for setting aside and recommitting the reports, the fact being conceded.</p>

In Equity. Suit for the infringement of letters patent No. 192,225, granted to Arthur S. Burnell, June 19, 1877, for an “improvement in barbed-wire fences.” The claim of the patent is as follows: “A barb for double-strand cable-wire fences, composed of two pointed pieces of wire, each of which passes over a strand of tho cable, thence between its strands, and reciprocally binds the other wire to the strand of the cable, wherefrom the points of the wires project as from a…

<p>Patents for Inventions—Expiration—Foreign Patent — Rev. St. 1J. S. § 4887.</p> <p>Under section 4887, Rev. St. U. S., a patent for an invention which, had been previously patented in England for the term of 14 years does not expire until 14 years from date of the English patent, notwithstanding the grant of the English patent has terminated by the failure of the patentee to pay the stamp duty required to be paid as a condition of the continuance of the grant beyond the term of three years.</p>

In Equity. This is a suit for the infringement of three letters patent granted to Frederick Shickle, viz.: (i) Reissued letters patent No. 8,562, granted January 28, 1879, for an Improvement in Moulding Pipes; (2) letters patent No. 209,428, granted October 29, 1878, for an “Improvement in Pipe-moulding Machines;” (3) letters patent No. 295,205, granted March 18, 1884, for an “Improvement in Pipe-moulding Apparatus.” The claims of-letters patent No. 209,428 are as follows:…

The cross-libels in this case grew out of q collision between the bark Bessie Rogers and the steam-boat Bristol, which occurred near Newport, Rhode Island, during a dense fog, on the night of August 9, 1872. Upon a trial before Blatceiford, J., in April, 1873, both vessels were held in fault. 6 Ben. 477.. The bark was sunk by the collision, and was a total loss.

<p>Maritime Lien—Laches.</p> <p>Unregislered and secret maritime lions maybe enforced against a vessel m the hands of bona fide purchasers, unless the holders of such liens have been guilty of negligence or laches. See the same case, reported at length, in 27 Rod.'Rep. 575.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for salvage.</p>

<p>Estoppel —Op Bank by Record op Yote —Fraudulent Alteration—Sale, op Mortgage.</p> <p>The secretary and treasurer of a savings hank fraudulently altered the record of a vote of the trustees authorizing him to discharge and release all mortgages belonging to the bank, by interpolating the word “assign,” and then assigned one of the mortgages for full value to A. Held, that the evidence showed that the transaction was a sale, and not a pledge; that the purchase was made on A.’s own account, and not on account of a national hank, as claimed, and that, the purchaser acted in good faith and without notice of any fraud; that it was immaterial whether the signature to a certified copy of the record received by the purchaser through the mail (sent, as he supposed, by the secretary in fulfillment of his promise to that effect) was a forgery of the secretary's name or not; and that the purchaser obtained a good title by estoppel against the bank; following certain cases involving similar fraudulent transactions of the same official.</p>

<p>1. Costs—Witness "Making Examination m? Dock.</p> <p>A fee to witness for his services in making a preliminary examination of the loc/us in. quo, a certain (lock, the exact location of which was in question, cannot be allowed to be taxed as costs, costs being the creature of statute, and the statute not authorizing such an allowance: and it is immaterial that the survey was made in order that intelligent testimony might be given upon the question of location.</p> <p>2. Same—Somcitok’s Eran nob Taking Depositions.</p> <p>ítev. St. U. S. § 824, allowing an attorney’s or solicitor’s fee of $2.50 for each deposition taken and admitted in evidence in a cause, does not apply to depositions taken before any of the regular examining officers of the court, in the ordinary way of taking depositions, or before some person agreed on by the parties to act as examiner, hut applies only to depositions taken tie bene due, and in such other cases, not within the scope of the ordinary method of taking testimony in causes pending in the federal courts, as may arise.</p> <p>8. Same—Witness Eke to Pakty to Action.</p> <p>A witness fee to a party to the action is taxable in the federal court as costs, provided the party causes it to appear by his affidavit, annexed to his hill of costs, that his attendance was solely for the purpose of giving his evidence in the action, and not to assist in its management. Although those fads do not appear by the affidavit in a cause, yet, where the omission is- not excepted to, the fee will he allowed as already taxed, upon the party filing an affidavit stating the facts. No allowance of traveling fees can be made where the party does not appeal from the disallowance thereof by the clerk.</p>

Action begun July 12, 1884, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a loan of $1,000 and interest. There were two notes, and ten interest coupon notes, which, with the mortgage, were dated July 16, 1872. The principal notes were payable in five years; the coupons, in one, two, three, four, and five years, respectively. Usury, statute of limitations, and former adjudication, among other defenses, were set up.

<p>Heard upon the Trial of the Cause. Jury, by agreement of parties, was discharged.</p>

<p>Life Insurance—Answers of Applicant not Warranties.</p> <p>An applicant for life insurance, under Ite contract in this case, undertakes to answer the questions put to him according to his knowledge or reasonable belief, and not to misrepresent or suppress known facts, but does not warrant the absolute truth of his answers.</p>

<p>Benefit Association—Knights of Honor—Expulsion—Death Pending Appeal—Reversal.</p> <p>A member of a lodge of the Knights of Honor was expelled by his lodge, and appealed to the grand dictator. Pending the appeal he died.' Subsequently the judgment of expulsion was reversed by the grand dictator, he was reinstated by vote of the lodge, and his assessments due up to the time of his death were received. Held, following the analogy of the common law and of the law of the order, as held by its supreme dictator, that the appeal did not abate by the death of the member, and his benefit should be paid.</p>

<p>Indictments under Rev. St. U. S. § 5511; on Motion to Quash.</p>

Upon habeas corpus, Petitioner was committed by a United States commissioner for contemjot in refusing to be sworn as a witness, in an examination, before the commissioner, of certain persons charged with violation of the United States election laws.

<p>1. Patent—Suit foe Inektngjsment—Original Supplementary Account.</p> <p>In a suit to recover damages for the infringement of a patent, where a supplementary account of the profits since the first accounting is ordered, the master may use on the second accounting, for all proper purposes, the record which he used on the first accounting, without its being' put in evidence before him.</p> <p>3 Same—Principle to be Applied in Accounting eou Promts.</p> <p>In a suit for the infringement of a patent, the defendant is accountable only for the sum which represents that portion of the profits resulting from the employment of the patented devices in the article manufactured by the defendant. If the article made by him embodies the use of other valuable features. not patented to the complainant, but which have contributed to its marketable value, the defendant is not liable to the complainant for the use of such features; and the burden is on the complainant to show what portion of defendant’s profits arose from the use of complainant’s patent.</p>

<p>1. Collision— East iuvmr— Tide Currents— Keeping Out of the Way — Safe Margin.</p> <p>A steamer, bound to keep out of the way, must, at her own peril, shape her course for a safe margin against the contingencies of navigation, and the effects of tide currents. Held, in this case, that the conflict in the evidence was probably in part to be explained by the westward set of the flood-tide off Twenty-third street, which changed to-the westward the course of the S., a steamer’300 feet long, as she struck the current, and that the collision was by her fault only.</p> <p>2. Same—-Tuo and Tow—Sudden Backing—Lines Parted — Krror of Judgment IN KxTKEMIS NOT A FAULT.</p> <p>The collision being with a heavy car-iloat in tow along-side a tug, and the S. contending that the float had broken loose from the tug just before the collision, through the tug’s too sudden backing, which the tug denied, held that, even if the lines were parted, as alleged, before the collision, the tug’s backing was made necessary by the fault of the S. when the danger was imminent; and that the error, if there was any error, was one of judgment, under the excitement of the moment, and not a legal fault.</p>

<p>Admiralty Appeal.</p>