ROQUE-IZADA

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                           Interim Decision #4103




      Matter of Israel Enrique ROQUE-IZADA, Respondent
                             Decided June 20, 2025
                         U.S. Department of Justice
                  Executive Office for Immigration Review
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

  Termination of removal proceedings is not warranted to permit a respondent to seek
adjustment of status under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966,

 Stat. 1161, as amended, before United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) based on speculation that USCIS will grant the
respondent parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

(d)(5)(A) (2018).
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Hiedy M. Marcus, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Peter F. Mather, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MANN, BAIRD, MAHTABFAR, Appellate Immigration Judges.

BAIRD, Appellate Immigration Judge:


    In a decision dated June 21, 2024, the Immigration Judge granted the
respondent’s motion to terminate proceedings to pursue adjustment of status
under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, 

 Stat. 1161, as amended (“Cuban Adjustment Act”), before
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). The
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has appealed that decision,
arguing that termination was not warranted because the respondent has not
been admitted or paroled into the United States and is not prima facie eligible
for adjustment of status. The respondent opposes the appeal. We will sustain
the appeal, reinstate proceedings, and remand the record to the Immigration
Court for further proceedings.

                       I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The respondent was served with a notice to appear on May 2, 2022. The
notice to appear alleged that he is not a citizen of the United States, that he
is a native and citizen of Cuba, and that he initially entered the United States
at or near San Luis, Arizona, on or about April 30, 2022. The respondent
admitted these allegations but denied the allegation that he was not admitted
or paroled into the United States. Rather, he alleged that he was paroled on
                                       Page
                                        106
Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                 Interim Decision #4103




or about May 2, 2022, pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 

(d)(5) (2018). The respondent
nonetheless conceded the charge of removability under section
212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, 

(a)(6)(A)(i), acknowledging that
the issuance of the notice to appear terminated his parole and he reverted to
the status of an alien present without being admitted or paroled. See 

(e)(2)(i) (2025); see also Matter of Arambula-Bravo, 

, 392–93 (BIA 2021).

    On June 14, 2024, the respondent filed a motion to terminate, seeking to
pursue adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act before USCIS.
DHS opposed the motion, arguing that the respondent was not prima facie
eligible for adjustment of status. The Immigration Judge granted the
respondent’s motion and terminated proceedings without prejudice.

    Relying on Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 

, 651–52
(A.G. 2022), the Immigration Judge concluded that termination of
proceedings was appropriate to allow the respondent to pursue an application
for adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act with USCIS. The
Immigration Judge found that because the respondent has not been admitted
or paroled into the United States, the Immigration Judge did not have the
authority to adjudicate the application under the Board’s decision in Matter
of Cabrera-Fernandez, 

 (BIA 2023). However, the
Immigration Judge concluded that because USCIS may grant the respondent
humanitarian parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 

(d)(5)(A), while the Cuban Adjustment Act application is pending,
termination of proceedings was appropriate.

                                  II. DISCUSSION
   We review de novo whether the Immigration Judge erred in terminating
proceedings. See 

(d)(3)(ii) (2025). In Matter of Coronado
Acevedo, the Attorney General reasoned that an Immigration Judge may
consider and, where appropriate, grant termination or dismissal where
termination “is necessary for the respondent to be eligible to seek
immigration relief before USCIS.” 28 I&N Dec. at 651–52. 1 Here,
1
   Prior to the Immigration Judge’s decision, new regulations were promulgated regarding
an Immigration Judge’s authority to terminate proceedings.                  See 

(d)(1)(ii) (2025). The regulation at 

(d)(1)(ii)(B) provides, in
relevant part, that an Immigration Judge has the discretionary authority to terminate
proceedings where a respondent demonstrates (1) prima facie eligibility for adjustment of
status and (2) USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate the application for adjustment of status
                                           Page
                                           107
Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                Interim Decision #4103




termination of proceedings to allow the respondent to pursue adjustment of
status under the Cuban Adjustment Act before USCIS was not necessary or
warranted. Contrary to the Immigration Judge’s conclusion, Matter of
Cabrera-Fernandez, 

, did not hold that Immigration
Judges lack authority to adjudicate applications for adjustment of status
under the Cuban Adjustment Act where an alien has not been admitted or
paroled into the United States. Rather, Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez,

, held that applicants for admission who are released on
a grant of conditional parole under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the INA, 

(a)(2)(B) (2018), rather than humanitarian parole under section
212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 

(d)(5)(A), have not been “inspected
and admitted or paroled” under section 1 of the Cuban Adjustment Act and
are not eligible for adjustment of status.

   An Immigration Judge has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any
application for adjustment of status filed by a respondent in removal
proceedings, except for a respondent classified as an “arriving alien.”

(a)(1) (2025); see also Matter of Silitonga, 

,
91–92 (BIA 2009); Matter of Martinez-Montalvo, 

(BIA 2009) (addressing an adjustment of status application under the Cuban
Adjustment Act filed by an arriving alien). In his motion to terminate, the
respondent conceded that he was not charged as an “arriving alien” in the
notice to appear. See 

(q) (2025) (defining “arriving alien”).
As such, the Immigration Judge had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
respondent’s application for adjustment of status under the Cuban
Adjustment Act.

   Termination was also not warranted because the respondent has not
demonstrated prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status under the Cuban
Adjustment Act. See 

(d)(1)(ii) (2025) (providing that an
Immigration Judge has the discretionary authority to terminate proceedings
where an alien is prima facie eligible for adjustment of status before USCIS).
Adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act requires that the
respondent have been “admitted or paroled” into the United States. Cuban
Adjustment Act § 1. The respondent has not presented evidence to support
his claim that he was paroled under section 212(d)(5) of the INA,

if the respondent were not in removal proceedings. The new regulation is largely consistent
with the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Coronado Acevedo, upon which the
Immigration Judge relied in terminating proceedings. See Efficient Case and Docket
Management in Immigration Proceedings, 

, 46742 (May 29, 2024) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003, 1239, 1240) (providing that “the proposed rule was
designed to largely codify the currently operative status quo”).
                                           Page
                                           108
Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                       Interim Decision #4103

(d)(5). He has also not meaningfully distinguished his
release from DHS’ custody from the conditional parole at issue in Matter of
Cabrera-Fernandez, 

.

    The respondent’s claim that USCIS will exercise its authority and grant
him parole in the future, rendering him eligible for adjustment of status, is
speculative at best. Although the respondent contends and the Immigration
Judge found that USCIS has granted humanitarian parole to some Cuban
nationals, humanitarian parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA,

(d)(5)(A), may only be granted for “urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit” and consideration is on a “case-by-case
basis.” The respondent’s motion to terminate did not point to any evidence
demonstrating eligibility for humanitarian parole. Thus, we conclude that
termination of removal proceedings is not warranted to permit a respondent
to seek adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act before USCIS
based on speculation that USCIS will grant the respondent parole under
section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 

(d)(5)(A).

                             III. CONCLUSION
   The respondent’s speculative eligibility for adjustment of status before
USCIS was insufficient to warrant termination of the respondent’s removal
proceedings. The Immigration Judge had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
respondent’s application for adjustment of status under the Cuban
Adjustment Act and thus termination was not necessary. See Matter of
Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at 651–52. Additionally, there is no
persuasive evidence in the record to support the respondent’s assertion that
he was previously granted, or will be granted in the future, humanitarian
parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 

(d)(5)(A).
Thus he is not prima facie eligible for the relief he seeks. See 

(d)(1)(ii). Accordingly, DHS’ appeal will be sustained, removal
proceedings reinstated, and the record remanded for further proceedings.

   ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
   FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s June 20, 2024,
decision is vacated, removal proceedings are reinstated, and the record is
remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings and the issuance
of a new decision.



                                     Page
                                     109