MAYORGA IPINA

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                Interim Decision #4104




     Matter of Cesar Rolando MAYORGA IPINA, Respondent
                               Decided June 26, 2025
                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

  The respondent’s conviction for indecent exposure in violation of section 18.2-387 of the
Virginia Code is for a crime involving moral turpitude because the requirement of an
“obscene display or exposure” necessarily involves a lewd intent. Matter of Cortes
Medina, 

 (BIA 2013), reaffirmed.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY:                           Nicholas J. Bolzman,
Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel:            MULLANE, O’CONNOR, MAHTABFAR, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judge:


    On June 18, 2020, the Immigration Judge ordered the respondent released
from the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) upon the
payment of a bond. 1 DHS appealed that decision, arguing that the respondent
is mandatorily detained based on a conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude. The respondent, through counsel, filed a brief opposing the
appeal. 2 The appeal will be sustained. 3

    The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was convicted in 2017
for indecent exposure in violation of section 18.2-387 of the Virginia Code.
He was later detained by DHS and filed a motion for custody
redetermination. DHS argued that the respondent was subject to mandatory
detention based on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. On

1
   On September 1, 2020, the Immigration Judge issued a written bond memorandum
supporting the bond order.
2
   On June 4, 2025, we granted Pooja Bhagat, Esquire’s motion to withdraw as the
respondent’s attorney.
3
  The Board previous issued a decision in this matter on May 16, 2025. On June 4, 2025,
we issued an interim order reopening the matter and reinstating DHS’ appeal.
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February 28, 2020, a prior Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s
request for redetermination of custody. On June 18, 2020, the present
Immigration Judge reconsidered sua sponte the prior Immigration Judge’s
decision and set a bond in the amount of $1,500. The Immigration Judge
concluded that the respondent’s conviction was not categorically for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Specifically, he found that the statute punishes
activities that are not for the purpose of arousing lewd or lascivious interest,
such as the exposure of a breast for sunbathing, political protest, or an interest
in nudism; urinating in a public area; or adjusting one’s underwear for
comfort. DHS appealed from that decision. 4 We review de novo whether
the respondent is subject to mandatory detention. 

(d)(3)(ii)
(2025).

   Section 236(c)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

(c)(1)(A) (2018), provides that “any alien who . . . is
inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
212(a)(2) [of the INA, 

(a)(2) (2018)]” is mandatorily
detained.     Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the INA, 

(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), in turn, provides that an alien convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude is inadmissible.

    To determine whether an offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, we
employ the categorical approach. Prudencio v. Holder, 

(4th Cir. 2012); Matter of Silva-Trevino, 

, 830 (BIA 2016).
In doing so, we focus on whether the elements of the crime, rather than the
conduct of the respondent, fit within the generic definition of a crime
involving moral turpitude. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 

(2013); Prudencio, 

.

    Moral turpitude “generally refers to conduct that is ‘inherently base, vile,
or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties
owed between persons or to society in general.’” Matter of Silva-Trevino,

 (citation omitted); accord Matter of Ortega-Lopez,

 (BIA 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 

(9th Cir. 2016). “To involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential
elements: reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.” Matter of
Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. at 834; accord Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I&N
Dec. at 100. A culpable mental state includes acts that are committed
knowingly, intentionally, or with criminal recklessness. See Sotnikau v.
Lynch, 

 (4th Cir. 2017). Conduct is reprehensible if it

4
    During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent was released from custody.
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Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                  Interim Decision #4104




shocks the conscience and violates a moral norm. See Mohamed v. Holder,

 (4th Cir. 2014).

    Section 18.2-387 provides, in relevant part: “Every person who
intentionally makes an obscene display or exposure of his person, or the
private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where others are
present, or procures another to so expose himself, shall be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor.” 

 (West 2017). There is no dispute
that a conviction under this statute requires a culpable mental state.
However, the Immigration Judge concluded that the statute did not require a
lewd intent such that the offense violated a moral norm.

   For indecent exposure to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude,
“the statute prohibiting the conduct must require not only the willful
exposure of private parts but also a lewd intent.” Matter of Cortes Medina,

 (BIA 2013). Although section 18.2-387 of the Virginia
Code does not include the word “lewd,” it requires an “obscene display or
exposure.” The Virginia Code defines obscene as:
     [T]hat which, considered as a whole, has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal
     to the prurient interest in sex, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sexual
     conduct, sexual excitement, excretory functions or products thereof or
     sadomasochistic abuse, and which goes substantially beyond customary limits of
     candor in description or representation of such matters and which, taken as a whole,
     does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

 (West 2017); see also Copeland v.
Commonwealth, 

 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (“To be obscene,
conduct must violate contemporary community standards of sexual candor.”
(citing House v. Commonwealth, 

 (Va. 1969))). The
Board has previously defined “lewd” in the context of a lewd intent as
“obscene or indecent.” Matter of Cortes Medina, 26 I&N Dec. at 82 (citation
omitted). Thus, “lewd” and “obscene” have the same meaning.

    We agree with DHS that the Immigration Judge erroneously determined
that the minimum conduct proscribed by the respondent’s statute of
conviction reaches conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. Obscenity
is a necessary element for a conviction under section 18.2-387 of the Virginia
Code. Absent a finding of obscene conduct, the Immigration Judge’s
examples of topless sunbathing, urinating in public, and adjusting one’s
underwear for comfort would not result in a conviction. See generally
Price v. Commonwealth, 

 (Va. 1974) (stating the
“portrayal of nudity is not, as a matter of law, a sufficient basis for a finding
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that a work is obscene” (citing House, 

)). Because section
18.2-387 of the Virginia Code explicitly and unequivocally requires an
“obscene display or exposure,” it encompasses the reprehensible conduct that
brings it into the rubric of a crime involving moral turpitude.

    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent’s conviction for
indecent exposure in violation of section 18.2-387 of the Virginia Code is for
a crime involving moral turpitude because the requirement of an “obscene
display or exposure” necessarily involves a lewd intent. The respondent’s
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude renders him mandatorily
detained under section 236(c)(1)(A) of the INA, 

(c)(1)(A).
Therefore, we will sustain the appeal and reverse the Immigration Judge’s
grant of the respondent’s release on bond.

   ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
   FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s June 18, 2020, order
is vacated.




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