GONZALEZ JIMENEZ

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                  Interim Decision #4108




      Matter of Pascacio GONZALEZ JIMENEZ, Respondent
                                 Decided July 9, 2025
                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) Use of false or stolen Social Security numbers and providing false information on tax
   returns are negative considerations that weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion.

(2) When a respondent seeks to excuse conduct by claiming to have relied on professional
   advice, the respondent should submit evidence of the specific advice given and explain
   why it was reasonable to rely on such advice.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Jill Aleshire, Esquire, Naples, Florida
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Evagelia Solomos, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE
and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:


    In a decision dated December 19, 2024, the Immigration Judge denied the
respondent’s applications for cancellation of removal and voluntary
departure under sections 240A(b)(1) and 240B(b)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1), 1229c(b)(1) (2018). The
respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision. The Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the appeal. Because we conclude
that the respondent does not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion, the
appeal will be dismissed.

   The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico. He conceded, through
counsel, that he is removable as an alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted or paroled.           INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 

(a)(6)(A)(i) (2018). He subsequently filed an application for
cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents and requested
voluntary departure in the alternative.

    The Immigration Judge found the respondent ineligible for cancellation
of removal and voluntary departure because he failed to demonstrate good
moral character or that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely
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unusual hardship to his United States citizen children.              INA
§§ 240A(b)(1)(B), (D), 240B(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(B), (D),
1229c(b)(1)(B). The Immigration Judge also found, in the alternative, that
the respondent did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion.

    Cancellation of removal and voluntary departure are both discretionary
forms of relief.      See INA §§ 240A(b)(1), 240B(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1229b(b)(1), 1229c(b)(1); Matter of Bain, 

, 72–73
(BIA 2025) (cancellation of removal); Matter of Pinzon, 

 (BIA 2013) (voluntary departure). A respondent who applies for such
relief bears the burden of proving that he satisfies all statutory eligibility
requirements and that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. See
Matter of Bain, 

; Matter of Pinzon, 

;
see also INA § 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2018).

    In exercising discretion, we “must balance the adverse factors evidencing
the alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane
considerations presented in his (or her) behalf to determine whether the
granting of . . . relief appears in the best interest of this country.” Matter of
C-V-T-, 

 (BIA 1998) (quoting Matter of Marin, 

 (BIA 1978)). Factors relevant to discretion include family ties
within the United States, length of residence in this country, evidence of
hardship to the respondent’s family if deportation occurs, military service,
history of employment, property or business ties, service to the community,
and, where a criminal record exists, proof of rehabilitation. 

 Where
adverse factors are present, the respondent should present offsetting
favorable evidence, which may require unusual or even outstanding equities,
to outweigh the negative factors. Id.; see also Matter of D-A-C-, 

 (BIA 2019) (holding in the context of a discretionary grant of
Temporary Protected Status that “any adverse factors, including recent
criminal activity, must be offset by significant additional equities”);
Matter of Arai, 

 (BIA 1970) (concluding that where
there are adverse factors weighing against the approval of an adjustment of
status application, the applicant may need to offset those factors by showing
“unusual or even outstanding equities”). We review de novo whether the
respondent merits a favorable exercise of discretion.                   

(d)(3)(ii) (2025).

   We begin by considering the respondent’s equities. The respondent
entered the United States as a teenager, has resided in this country for nearly
20 years, and has significant family ties. He has maintained consistent
gainful employment and has received commendations from his employer and
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neighbors. We recognize that removal to Mexico will result in significant
hardship to the respondent and his family. His four United States citizen
children will either be separated from the respondent or have to relocate with
him to an unfamiliar country with a lower standard of living and fewer
resources than the United States. Three of the children have been diagnosed
with medical conditions and developmental delays for which they previously
received treatment in the United States. However, as the most recent medical
records submitted for the children are dated 2020, and the respondent has not
established that they currently receive or need intensive medical or
educational interventions, their expected hardship is uncertain.

    We agree with the Immigration Judge that the foregoing equities are
outweighed by the negative factors in this case. The most significant
negative consideration is the respondent’s 2024 arrest in Florida for drunk
driving with a high blood-alcohol content and with his then 10-year-old son
in the car. See Matter of Thomas, 

, 23–25 (BIA 1995)
(holding that “criminal conduct which has not culminated in a final
conviction” remains relevant as an adverse discretionary factor when
established by probative evidence). “Drunk driving is an extremely
dangerous crime” that poses a grave danger to the lives and property of
others. Begay v. United States, 

 (2008), abrogated on other
grounds by Johnson v. United States, 

 (2015); see also Matter of
Castillo-Perez, 

, 669–70 (A.G. 2019) (collecting cases).
Based on the Immigration Judge’s factual findings regarding the
circumstances of the arrest, the respondent created a particularly acute risk
of harm by driving drunk with his young son in the car after having reportedly
consumed about 20 beers. The quantity of alcohol consumed and the
respondent’s actions in endangering a child increase the negative impact of
his DUI arrest. 1

     Also weighing against a favorable exercise of discretion is the
respondent’s dishonesty in his dealings with the United States, repeatedly
using false or stolen social security numbers for tax and work-eligibility
purposes. The Immigration Judge did not clearly err in finding that the
respondent utilized two different Social Security numbers, including one
belonging to a deceased United States citizen. See 

(d)(3)(i).
The respondent also provided false information on some of his tax returns,
listing his cousins in Mexico as nieces and nephews living with him as

1
   The respondent testified that he has not received treatment for alcoholism and does not
consider himself to be an alcoholic.

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household dependents, and claimed income tax credits to which he was not
entitled. 2

    Use of false or stolen Social Security numbers and providing false
information on tax returns are negative considerations that weigh against a
favorable exercise of discretion. Presenting a false Social Security number
and false information on tax returns are examples of deceptive conduct that
reflects adversely on an alien’s character. See Cuenca-Arroyo v. Garland,

 (5th Cir. 2024) (recognizing that “misrepresentations on
tax filings, such as claiming a dependent nephew residing in Mexico who did
not qualify under U.S. tax law . . . reflect adversely on [an alien’s] credibility
and character, which are relevant factors in the discretionary analysis”);
Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 

 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“By knowingly presenting a false Social Security card to an employer to
obtain and maintain unauthorized employment, [the alien] . . . engaged in
deceptive conduct.”). Use of an unauthorized Social Security number
“disrupts the ability of the government to oversee the management of social
security accounts; impacts legitimate tax collection efforts; and imposes a
public cost in efforts to protect personal information.” Munoz-Rivera v.
Wilkinson, 

 (5th Cir. 2021). Moreover, while not the case
here, conduct of this nature can result in criminal prosecution. See, e.g.,

(1) (criminalizing making a material false statement on a
tax return); 

(a)(7)(B) (criminalizing misrepresenting a Social
Security number to be one’s own for any purpose).

    The respondent claims that he did not know such conduct was against the
law and that he reasonably relied upon professional advice when filing his
taxes. Specifically, he asserts that all his tax forms were in English, a
language he does not speak or read, and that he was told by his tax
professional that he was allowed to claim his relatives in Mexico as
dependents on his tax return. With respect to the Social Security numbers,
the respondent testified that he only used one Social Security number and
that he thought the Social Security number was his. He further testified that
an attorney provided him with the Social Security number he used and that
he was told it was his. He claims that he was unaware that the number
belonged to another person.

    The Immigration Judge did not credit this portion of the respondent’s
testimony and instead found that he testified falsely regarding his use of the
Social Security numbers and his knowledge of the false statements on the tax

2
    The respondent does not claim that he financially supported these family members.
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returns. “[L]ack of candor in itself serves as an adverse factor weighing
against a favorable exercise of discretion.” Matter of Burbano, 

 (BIA 1994); see also Matter of Gomez-Beltran, 

 (BIA 2016) (“Truthful testimony and disclosures are critical
to the effective operation of the immigration court system.”). We discern no
clear error in the Immigration Judge’s factual findings regarding the
respondent’s credibility. See 

(d)(3)(i). The respondent’s
testimony that he only used one Social Security number is contradicted by
the documentary evidence reflecting two Social Security numbers listed on
his tax returns and W-2 forms. Further, the respondent’s testimony that he
obtained a Social Security number about 8 years prior to the 2024 hearing
from an attorney is contradicted by the respondent’s tax returns and
W-2 forms from as early as 2007 reflecting two false Social Security
numbers.

    Even apart from the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent
provided false testimony, the respondent’s claimed lack of knowledge is not
sufficient to negate the negative considerations in this case. It is well settled
that ignorance of the law is not an excuse or defense against unlawful
conduct. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,

 (2010) (“We have long recognized the ‘common maxim,
familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person,
either civilly or criminally.’” (citation omitted)); see also Cheek v.
United States, 

 (1991) (noting the “deeply rooted” general
rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse). The respondent has a duty to
ensure the accuracy of any representation he makes to governmental
authorities. See Matter of A.J. Valdez and Z. Valdez, 

(BIA 2018) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect that aliens will take steps to
ascertain the accuracy of documents they sign.”). The respondent signed his
tax returns and employment forms under penalty of perjury, and it was
reasonable for the Immigration Judge to infer that he knew and assented to
their contents. See 

 at 499–500 (holding that an alien’s signature on an
immigration application establishes a strong presumption that he or she
knows of and has assented to the contents of the application, absent evidence
of fraud or other wrongful acts by another person).

   The respondent claims that he relied on the professional advice of his tax
preparer when filing his tax returns and of the attorney who obtained the
Social Security number for him. 3 A claim of reasonable reliance on
professional advice presupposes that such advice was sought in good faith

3
    The respondent has not asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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and that in relying on such advice, one is not willfully ignorant.
See generally Bautista v. Star Cruises, 

 (11th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing “the general principle that ‘[o]ne who has executed a written
contract and is ignorant of its contents cannot set up that ignorance to avoid
the obligation absent fraud and misrepresentation’” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)). When a respondent seeks to excuse conduct by claiming
to have relied on professional advice, the respondent should submit evidence
of the specific advice given and explain why it was reasonable to rely on such
advice. Cf. Garland v. Ming Dai, 

, 371 (2021) (holding that the
agency need not find that credible testimony is persuasive or alone sufficient
to meet the alien’s burden of proof); Matter of L-A-C-, 

(BIA 2015) (“[R]egardless of whether an applicant is deemed credible, he
[or she] has the burden to corroborate the material elements of the claim
where the evidence is reasonably obtainable, without advance notice from
the Immigration Judge.”).

    Here, the respondent’s vague testimony that he received his
Social Security number 8 years prior to the hearing based on the “10 years”
law from an attorney whose name and information he could not remember is
contradicted by evidence that he used two false Social Security numbers on
prior tax filings. Thus, the evidence is insufficient to support his claim that
he reasonably believed this Social Security number was legitimately
obtained. With respect to the respondent’s false claims regarding his
dependents on his tax filings, he did not present any evidence from his tax
preparer or any other tax professional supporting his claim that he was told
he could claim relatives in Mexico whom he did not support as dependents.
Based on the evidence provided, the respondent has not demonstrated that he
reasonably relied on professional advice when he listed false or stolen Social
Security numbers on his tax forms and employment paperwork and falsely
claimed relatives living abroad as dependents for purposes of a tax credit.

    Weighing the respondent’s equities against these negative factors, we
conclude on balance that a favorable exercise of discretion would not be in
the best interests of the United States. See Matter of C-V-T-, 

. Therefore, we will deny his applications for cancellation of removal
and voluntary departure in the exercise of discretion. We need not address
the respondent’s arguments regarding good moral character and hardship.
See INS v. Bagamasbad, 

 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general
rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). The appeal will
be dismissed.

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   ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.
    NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 

(b)(14) (2025).




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