G-C-I

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 (BIA 2025)                               Interim Decision #4116




                        Matter of G-C-I-, Respondent
                             Decided August 19, 2025
                          U.S. Department of Justice
                   Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) A respondent’s nonresponsive and evasive testimony, including when related to the
   issue of corroboration, supports an adverse credibility determination.

(2) A lack of corroboration may be an independent basis to find that a respondent has not
   met his burden of proof to establish a claim for asylum or withholding of removal.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Evan M. Gelobter, Esquire, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE
and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges.

MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:


   In a decision issued on December 5, 2024, the Immigration Judge denied
the respondent’s applications for withholding of removal under
section 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

(b)(3)(A) (2018), and protection under the regulations
implementing the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 1 Specifically, the
Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent did not testify credibly and
did not sufficiently corroborate his claim. The respondent’s appeal will be
dismissed.

            I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The respondent is a native and citizen of Georgia. He claims that he was
physically harmed and threatened by police officers in Georgia because of
his membership in and support for the United National Movement (“UNM”)
opposition political party. He testified that in support of the UNM, he helped
transport people to the polls and helped his brother, who was a leader of the
youth wing of the UNM. He claims that he was physically harmed by police
in Georgia on two occasions. The first was on Georgia’s election night in

1
   The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994).
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2020, while he was transporting people to the polls. He testified that the
police hit him on the head and caused him to be hospitalized. After
unsuccessfully seeking asylum in France, the respondent claims he was again
beaten by the Georgian police and hospitalized while attending a rally in
April 2024. He testified that he left Georgia later that month and traveled
through various countries before arriving in the United States.

    The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s applications for
withholding of removal and CAT protection, 2 finding that he was not a
credible witness and did not provide corroborative evidence to rehabilitate
his incredible testimony. The Immigration Judge alternatively found that,
irrespective of credibility, the respondent did not meet his burden of proof
because he did not provide reasonably available corroborative evidence. The
respondent challenges these findings.

                          II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
                                   A. Credibility

    Applicants “for asylum or withholding of removal bear[] the burden of
proof to establish eligibility for relief or protection from removal.” Matter of
H-C-R-C-, 

 (BIA 2024); see also
INA §§ 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 240(c)(4)(A), 

(b)(1)(B)(i),
1229a(c)(4)(A) (2018); INA § 241(b)(3)(C), 

(b)(3)(C)
(incorporating by reference the credibility and corroboration provisions
applicable to asylum). There is no presumption that an applicant is credible
in Immigration Court, and applicants bear the burden of establishing their
own credibility. Matter of H-C-R-C-, 

. As factfinders,
Immigration Judges “may credit all, some, or none of an applicant’s
testimony, so long as the finding considers ‘the totality of the circumstances
and all relevant factors.’”          

 (quoting INA §§ 208(b)(1)(B)(iii),
240(c)(4)(C), 

(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1229a(c)(4)(C)).

   Immigration Judges may consider factors such as demeanor, candor,
responsiveness, “the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the
consistency between the applicant’s . . . . written and oral statements . . . , the

2
   The respondent, through counsel, conceded that he was ineligible for asylum based on
the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 

, 31451 (May 16, 2023), rule
enacted at 

 (2025). This application is therefore not before us. See
Matter of H-L-S-A-, 

, 240 n.10 (BIA 2021) (noting that the Board will not
address issues for the first time on appeal).

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internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such
statements with other evidence of record,” among other factors.
INA §§ 208(b)(1)(B)(iii)), 240(c)(4)(C), 

(b)(1)(B)(iii),
1229a(c)(4)(C). Immigration Judges may rely on inconsistencies or
inaccuracies regardless of whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s
claim.” 

 An adverse credibility finding “must be supported by specific
and cogent reasons.” Matter of H-C-R-C-, 

 (quoting
Wang v. Holder, 

 (5th Cir. 2009)); accord Nkenglefac v.
Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2022).

    We discern no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility
finding. See 

(d)(3)(i) (2025); see also Cooper v. Harris,

 (2017) (explaining that clear error is a deferential
standard of review). The Immigration Judge provided specific, cogent
reasons for finding the respondent’s testimony not credible. See Nkenglefac,

. Specifically, the Immigration Judge found the respondent’s
testimony inconsistent regarding when he became involved with the UNM,
found several aspects of the respondent’s testimony implausible, and found
the respondent lacked candor when discussing his lack of corroboration.

    The Immigration Judge did not clearly err in finding the respondent’s
testimony inconsistent with his statements during the credible fear interview
regarding when his involvement with the UNM began. See 

(d)(3)(i). While he testified that he became an active supporter of
the party in 2015, his statements during the credible fear interview indicate
that he became involved with the party in 2005. When asked to explain the
inconsistency during his hearing, the respondent stated that he may have
remembered the facts differently at the credible fear interview. The
Immigration Judge did not clearly err in finding that the explanation was
unpersuasive and further diminished the respondent’s credibility.

    On appeal, the respondent argues that this inconsistency is explained by
the respondent’s testimony that his more direct activism began in 2015. 3 He
did not, however, provide this explanation at the hearing, and unsupported
assertions in a respondent’s appellate brief are not facts or evidence. See
INS v. Phinpathya, 

, 188 n.6 (1984); Matter of Khan, 

, 862 (BIA 2024) (same). The respondent’s interpretation of the
3
   The respondent’s counsel asked him at the hearing what he meant by his testimony that
he “became more active” in the party around 2015. The respondent stated that “starting
from 2015, [he] was an owner of a small car,” and that he “helped people to transport to
election polls during the election[,] . . . talked to people about ideas of the United National
Movement Party,” and helped his brother with party activities.
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evidence is not enough to establish clear error in the Immigration Judge’s
findings. See Matter of D-R-, 

 (BIA 2011) (finding
that an Immigration Judge is not required to interpret the evidence in the
manner advocated by the applicant), remanded on other grounds by
Radojkovic v. Holder, 

 (9th Cir. 2015).

    Based on the totality of the statements made in the credible fear interview,
the Immigration Judge permissibly found that the respondent’s statement that
he became involved with the UNM in 2005 was inconsistent with his
testimony at the hearing. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.”); see also Matter of A.J. Valdez and Z. Valdez, 

 (BIA 2018) (explaining that an Immigration Judge is “entitled to make
‘reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence of the record
as a whole’” (quoting Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. at 454–55)).

    The Immigration Judge also found aspects of the respondent’s testimony
implausible. Specifically, the Immigration Judge found it was not plausible
that the respondent did not investigate how to lawfully enter the United States
or communicate with family members in the United States about the best way
to enter. Given the respondent’s extensive travel across many countries to
enter the United States, his earlier experience navigating the asylum system
in France, and his statements that he communicated with family members in
the United States during his journey, we discern no clear error in the
Immigration Judge’s assessment. Similarly, the Immigration Judge did not
clearly err in finding implausible the respondent’s claim that after being
outside the country for 2 years, he received an anonymous phone call in
Georgia telling him not to go to a rally, and then when he attended the rally,
which was in another town, he was recognized in the dark by police despite
being surrounded by thousands of protesters. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii),

(b)(1)(B)(iii) (directing adjudicators to consider “the inherent
plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account”).

    In addition, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent was
nonresponsive and evasive several times during his testimony
when questioned about his efforts to obtain corroborative evidence. A
respondent’s nonresponsive and evasive testimony, including when related
to the issue of corroboration, supports an adverse credibility determination.
See 

 The respondent was asked about the specific efforts he had taken to
collect medical records when he requested a continuance to gather additional
evidence. Rather than answer the question directly, his response focused on
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the generalized political climate in Georgia, claiming that people were afraid
of participating in his case. He did not answer the specific question of why
protests would prevent his friends or family from obtaining his medical
records. When asked again about his inability to provide medical records
during cross-examination, the respondent provided a similarly vague
response. The Immigration Judge found that these evasive responses
demonstrated a lack of candor, and we discern no clear error in this finding.
Such a lack of candor further undermines the respondent’s credibility. See 

    The Immigration Judge did not clearly err in finding that, considering the
totality of the circumstances, the issues discussed above undermine the
credibility of the respondent’s testimony. See 

 We therefore discern no
clear error in the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination.
See 

(d)(3)(i).

                               B. Corroboration

    The Immigration Judge also found that the respondent did not sufficiently
corroborate his claim. Credibility and corroboration are distinct but related
issues discussed in separate provisions of the INA and require separate
analysis. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii), 

(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii);
see also Garland v. Ming Dai, 

, 371 (2021) (explaining that
“credibility and persuasiveness are closely bound concepts”). The testimony
of an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal “may be sufficient to
sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant
satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is
persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the
applicant is a refugee.” INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 

(b)(1)(B)(ii);
see also Mohndamenang v. Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2023);
Matter of H-C-R-C-, 28 I&N Dec. at 810–11.

    If an Immigration Judge adequately explains his or her reasons, the
Immigration Judge may find in a particular case that an applicant’s credible
testimony is sufficient to meet the applicant’s burden of proof. See
Matter of S-H-, 

 (BIA 2002) (explaining that
Immigration Judges must make clear and complete findings). However,
section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of

 Stat. 231, 303, which enacted the present credibility
and corroboration provisions of the INA, anticipates that corroboration will
generally be necessary to meet an applicant’s burden of proof. See
Matter of L-A-C-, 

, 518–19 (BIA 2015) (discussing the
legislative history of the REAL ID Act); see also INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii),
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(b)(1)(B)(ii); Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 371 (“In order for an
alien’s testimony to carry the day on its own, the statute requires the alien to
satisfy the trier of fact on all three counts—showing his ‘testimony is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate
that the applicant is a refugee.’” (citation omitted)); Mohndamenang,

 (emphasizing that “corroborating evidence must be provided”
unless the applicant demonstrates that such evidence is not reasonably
available).

    An Immigration Judge typically will first consider whether the testimony
of a respondent is credible and then address whether the testimony is
sufficiently reliable and detailed to satisfy his or her burden of proof without
additional evidence. Corroboration is especially important where testimony
from the respondent or other key witnesses lacks a strong foundation or
otherwise is not entirely persuasive, even when issues with the testimony are
not sufficient for an adverse credibility finding. In this way, corroboration
may be found to fill an evidentiary gap created when testimony is unspecific
or otherwise unpersuasive on its own. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 

(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 371.

    Separate and apart from his adverse credibility determination, the
Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for withholding of
removal based on a lack of corroboration. A lack of corroboration may be
an independent basis to find that a respondent has not met his burden of proof
to establish a claim for asylum or withholding of removal. See
Mohndamenang, 

; see also INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 

(b)(1)(B)(iii). The Supreme Court of the United States has explained
that “the INA expressly distinguishes between credibility, persuasiveness,
and the burden of proof.” Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 371. “It’s not always the
case that credibility equals factual accuracy, nor does it guarantee a legal
victory.” Id. at 372. An Immigration Judge might not find that a respondent
“lack[s] credibility—in the sense that [he or] she was lying or not ‘worthy of
belief,’” but his or her testimony may be outweighed by other evidence such
that it is not sufficiently persuasive to meet the burden of proof. Id. (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 448 (10th ed. 2014)). In such a case, corroborating
evidence, or the lack of it, is directly related to whether the burden of proof
has been met.

   If an Immigration Judge decides corroborative evidence is needed, “such
evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence
and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii),

(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Mohndamenang, 

.
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When an Immigration Judge determines that specific evidence is needed, he
or she should “(1) give the applicant ‘an opportunity to explain why he could
not reasonably obtain such evidence,’ (2) ‘ensure that the applicant’s
explanation is included in the record,’ (3) ‘clearly state for the record whether
the . . . explanation is sufficient,’ and (4) if a continuance is requested,
‘decide whether to grant a continuance for the applicant to obtain additional
corroboration.’” 4 Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 

 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 518–22); see also
Mohndamenang, 59 F.4th at 215–16 (explaining that these procedures are
only necessary when the Immigration Judge requires “specific corroborating
evidence” and does not apply when the Immigration Judge “engaged in a
comprehensive analysis of why . . . credible testimony was not corroborated
by the evidence provided”). However, an Immigration Judge is not required
to give a respondent advanced notice of the specific corroboration necessary
to meet his or her burden of proof or provide an automatic continuance for a
respondent to obtain corroborative evidence. 5 See Avelar-Oliva, 

; Matter of L-A-C-, 

.

    The Immigration Judge properly found that the respondent did not submit
reasonably available corroborative evidence. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii),

(b)(1)(B)(ii). In support of his claim, the respondent
submitted only general country conditions evidence of political unrest in
Georgia. Such generalized evidence, however, does not corroborate the
respondent’s claim that he personally experienced harm or faces an
individualized risk of harm in the future. See Maryam v. Gonzales,

 (1st Cir. 2005) ([G]enerally, evidence of widespread
violence and human rights violations affecting all citizens is insufficient to
establish persecution.” (citation omitted)).

   The Immigration Judge identified several pieces of evidence that could
have corroborated aspects of the respondent’s claim, including medical

4
   Although the respondent requested a continuance before the Immigration Judge, he did
not challenge the denial of his motion to continue on appeal, and we deem that issue
waived. See Matter of W-E-R-B-, 

, 795 n.1 (BIA 2020).
5
    The majority of the United States Courts of Appeal agree. See Wambura v. Barr,

, 373–74 (4th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). Some circuits, however, have
issued contrary authority. See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 

 (3d Cir.
2007); Ren v. Holder, 

 (9th Cir. 2011). As this case arises in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, we are not bound by those decisions
in this case and do not find them persuasive. See Matter of U. Singh, 

 (BIA 2012). We encourage circuits with contrary authority to reconsider the issue.
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documentation or a letter from his brother whose political activities he
claimed contributed to the harm he experienced and fears. The Immigration
Judge gave the respondent the opportunity to explain why this type of
evidence was not or could not be provided. See Avelar-Oliva, 

; Matter of L-A-C-, 

.

    As discussed above, the respondent’s testimony when discussing the
availability of medical records was vague and nonresponsive. The
Immigration Judge found that the respondent was unable to identify any steps
taken to gather medical evidence and that he provided no clear explanation
for why it could not be presented, other than general assertions regarding the
political situation in Georgia.

    The respondent also did not submit a letter from his brother who resided
in the United States at the time of the final hearing and was a key witness to
the respondent’s political activities in Georgia. When asked why he did not
submit a letter from his brother in support of his application, the respondent
testified that while his brother would have been willing to write a letter, he
had not asked him. Given the brother’s role in the respondent’s claim and
his residence in the United States, the Immigration Judge found the evidence
was reasonably available and should have been provided. See Aben v.
Garland, 

, 467–68 (5th Cir. 2024) (emphasizing the importance
of considering whether an applicant “could have ‘reasonably obtained’
corroborating evidence” (quoting INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 

(b)(1)(B)(ii))). This lack of evidence from the respondent’s brother
without a persuasive explanation for why it could not be provided leaves a
significant evidentiary gap in assessing the respondent’s claim.

    For the reasons discussed above, we agree with the Immigration Judge’s
determination that regardless of whether the respondent is credible, he did
not provide reasonably available evidence to corroborate material elements
of his claim and therefore has not met his burden of proof to
establish his eligibility for relief. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 

(b)(1)(B)(ii); Mohndamenang, 

; Rui Yang v Holder,

, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming the Board’s determination
that a failure to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence is an
independent basis for the denial of relief); Matter of L-A-C-, 

 (stating that regardless of whether an applicant is deemed credible,
he has the burden to corroborate the material elements of his claim and
“where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged
facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should
be presented” (citing Matter of S-M-J-, 

 (BIA 1997))).
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Given both the adverse credibility finding and the separate determination that
the respondent did not provide reasonably available corroborating evidence,
we affirm the Immigration Judge’s denial of withholding of removal under
the INA.

                           C. Convention Against Torture

    The respondent also challenges the Immigration Judge’s denial of CAT
protection. We concluded above that the Immigration Judge did not clearly
err in finding the respondent’s testimony not credible. However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained that “where the
applicant offers evidence which may independently entitle him to CAT
protection, ‘an adverse credibility finding alone cannot defeat [his] eligibility
for relief.’” Aguilar-Quintanilla v. McHenry, 

 (5th Cir.
2025) (quoting Ndifon v. Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2022)).

    Contrary to the respondent’s appellate arguments, the Immigration Judge
considered the only independent evidence presented, which was articles and
reports about general country conditions. Such “[g]eneralized country
evidence tells us little about the likelihood state actors will torture any
particular person.” Qorane v. Barr, 

 (5th Cir. 2019);
see also Matter of J-J-G-, 

 (BIA 2020) (explaining that
“generalized evidence of violence and crime” is insufficient to establish
eligibility for CAT protection). While the evidence discusses conditions
political opponents face in Georgia, it provides no insight into the
respondent’s political activity or any past harm, which are key to assessing
his claim that he will suffer torture in the future. See 

(c)(3)
(2025) (directing adjudicators to consider “all evidence relevant to the
possibility of future torture,” including “[e]vidence of past torture inflicted
upon the applicant”).

   Given the adverse credibility finding and the lack of independent
evidence supporting an individualized risk of torture, we agree with the
Immigration Judge that the respondent did not show it is more likely than not
he will be tortured in Georgia by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. 6 See 

(c)(2); 

(a)(1) (2020).

6
   Because we affirm the Immigration Judge’s decision for the reasons discussed, we need
not address any other issues raised on appeal. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 

(1976) (explaining that, “[a]s a general rule[,] courts and agencies are not required to make
findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach”).
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Therefore, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s denial of CAT protection. As
the respondent did not establish his eligibility for withholding of removal
under the INA or protection under the CAT, we will dismiss the respondent’s
appeal.

   ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
    NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by the Department of Homeland
Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper
the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent
shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the
respondent is in violation. See INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018);

(b)(14) (2025).




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