s-S-F-M

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 (A.G. 2025)                             Interim Decision #4123




                      Matter of S-S-F-M-, Respondent
               Decided by Attorney General September 2, 2025
                           U.S. Department of Justice
                          Office of the Attorney General

   Matter of A-B-, 

 (A.G. 2021), is overruled, and immigration judges and
the Board shall adhere to Matter of A-B-, 

 (A.G. 2018), and Matter of
A-B-, 

 (A.G. 2021), in all pending or future cases. By extension, Matter
of A-R-C-G-, 

 (BIA 2014), and any decision issued in reliance thereupon
is also overruled.

                  BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Pursuant to 

(h)(1)(i), I direct the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) to refer this case to me for my review. With the case thus
referred, I hereby remand to the Board for further consideration consistent
with this opinion.

    Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Attorney
General may grant asylum to individuals who meet several statutory
requirements, including an inability to return to their home country because
of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 

(a)(42)(A); see INA
§ 208(b)(1)(A), 

(b)(1)(A). In Matter of A-B-, 

 (A.G. 2018) (“A-B- I”), Attorney General Sessions clarified the
standards that an asylum applicant must meet to establish persecution on
account of membership in a “particular social group.” 

. If the
alleged persecutor is unaffiliated with the government of the applicant’s
home country, Attorney General Sessions further ruled, then “the applicant
must show that flight from her country is necessary because her home
government is unwilling or unable to protect her.” 

 In Matter of A-B-,

 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- II”), Acting Attorney General
Rosen further clarified that standard. In Matter of A-B-, 

 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- III”), however, Attorney General Garland
vacated both A-B- I and A-B- II in anticipation of a rulemaking
directed by President Biden. See Exec. Order No. 14010, § 4(c)(ii),

, 8271 (Feb. 2, 2021). Attorney General Garland
instructed “immigration judges and the Board [to] follow pre-A-B-I
precedent” until the completion of that anticipated rulemaking, and
particularly Matter of A-R-C-G-, 

 (BIA 2014), which A-B- I

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had overruled. A-B- III, 28 I&N Dec. at 309. That anticipated rulemaking
never occurred.

    Respondent, a native and citizen of Honduras, applied for asylum
claiming she would be persecuted in Honduras on account of her political
opinions and membership in several purported particular social groups,
including “Honduran women,” “Honduran women unable to leave a
relationship,” “Honduran women who have demonstrated resistance to
Honduran society’s acceptance of male domination,” and “Honduran women
with views of women’s autonomy.” Matter of S-S-F-M-, at 1 (BIA Oct. 20,
2023) (unpublished decision). Respondent also claimed that the Honduran
government was “unable or unwilling” to control her alleged abuser. Id. at 3.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) rejected those claims in part relying on A-B- I
(which had not yet been vacated) and denied respondent’s application for
asylum and withholding of removal. Id. at 1–2, 2 n.4. The Board affirmed
the IJ’s decision but declined to rely on A-B- I, noting that the decision had
been vacated by A-B- III. Id. Respondent filed a petition for review in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which granted the
parties’ joint motion for remand to allow the Board to reconsider several
issues in respondent’s appeal, many of which may be implicated by the legal
standards articulated in A-B- I and A-B- II. S-S-F-M- v. Garland,
No. 23-60586 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024) (unpublished order).

    Having considered the case following remand from the Fifth Circuit, I
conclude A-B- III was incorrect. I hereby reinstitute the legal standards
articulated in A-B- I and A-B- II, and overrule A-B- III (and, by extension,
Matter of A-R-C-G- and any decision issued in reliance thereupon).
Furthermore, I remand this matter to the Board for adjudication in light of
the standards articulated in A-B- I and A-B- II.

    In my view, A-B- I’s analysis and articulation of the standards for
deciding asylum applications reflect the “best reading” of the statutory text
“applying all relevant interpretive tools.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

, 400 (2024). A-B- III never stated otherwise. Instead, A-B- III
abandoned the rules established in A-B- I and A-B- II in deference to an
anticipated executive rulemaking that never occurred. But the reasons
A-B- III gave for doing so are unpersuasive.

   First, A-B- III noted that A-B- I contains “broad language” that “could be
read to create a strong presumption against asylum claims based on private
conduct.” 28 I&N Dec. at 309. But A-B- I used that language for good
reason: It has long been well-established that “[p]ersecution is something a
government does,” Hor v. Gonzales, 

 (7th Cir. 2005), and
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so must be “inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or
an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control.”
Matter of Acosta, 

 (BIA 1985); see also Galina v. INS,

 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that an applicant must show
that the government condoned private actions “or at least demonstrated a
complete helplessness to protect the victims”). Although there may be
circumstances when a government’s failure to control private conduct itself
amounts to persecution, A-B- I was entirely correct to treat those
circumstances as few and far between.

    Second, A-B- III insisted that A-B- I “spawned confusion among courts”
because one court of appeals found that A-B- I announced a “new, more
demanding standard” for determining when private conduct can amount to
public persecution than the traditional “unable or unwilling” standard.
28 I&N Dec. at 309 (quoting Grace v. Barr, 

 (D.C. Cir.
2020)). But as the Third Circuit subsequently explained, the only court of
appeals to express such confusion—the D.C. Circuit—failed to “account for”
the full relevant test, “isolate[d] the standards from their surrounding words,”
and “overlook[ed] the relationships” those words described.
Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen. United States, 

 (3d Cir. 2021).
A-B- II, moreover, explained that A-B- I “reiterated and did not change the
legal standard for determining when ‘persecution’ by third parties may be
attributed to the government.” See 28 I&N Dec. at 213; see also id. at 202
(“No matter whether Matter of A-B- is viewed as changing the existing
standard for persecution, I conclude . . . that Matter of A-B-’s formulation
appropriately clarifies the requisite governmental role in relation to
persecution by private actors for purposes of establishing refugee status.”).
A-B- II then clarified the application of that standard. See id. at 203–07. If
anything, it is Attorney General Garland’s decision to vacate that
clarification without replacing it with anything himself that has contributed
to confusion over the applicable standards in this field.

    Third, A-B- III was wrong to suggest that the issues addressed in A-B- I
and A-B- II are best left to rulemaking. “[W]hether A-B- I had changed the
‘unable or unwilling’ standard, the proper application of that standard, and
the meaning of the statutory ‘one central reason’ test,” A-B- III, 28 I&N Dec.
at 309, are legal questions appropriately resolved as part of the Attorney
General’s authority to issue “controlling” decisions “with respect to all
questions of law” “relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,”

(a)(1). And as Attorney General Barr explained in a different
opinion that I am reinstituting as precedent today, what constitutes a
cognizable social group is “defined with sufficient particularity and is
socially distinct in [an applicant’s] society” is inherently a “fact-based
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inquiry.” Matter of L-E-A-, 

 (A.G. 2019). That such
an inquiry is better resolved through case-by-case adjudication than
broad-based rulemaking is confirmed by the failure of the previous
administration to issue any rule addressing the meaning of “particular social
group” over almost three years—despite a (now rescinded) Executive Order
requiring that the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney General do
so “within 270 days.” Exec. Order No. 14010, § 4(c)(ii), 86 Fed. Reg. at
8271; see Exec. Order No. 14148, § 2(u), 

, 8238 (Jan. 20,
2025) (rescinding Executive Order 14010). Accordingly, I hereby instruct
that immigration judges and the Board shall adhere to A-B- I and A-B- II in
all pending or future cases, and disregard A-B- III. I remand this matter to
the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and with the
opinions in A-B- I and A-B- II.




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