Landers

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                  Interim Decision #4128




             Matter of Beresford A. LANDERS, Jr., Attorney
                             Decided September 17, 2025
                            U.S. Department of Justice
                     Executive Office for Immigration Review
                          Board of Immigration Appeals

  Circumstantial evidence of similarities in allegedly pro se filings and suspended
counsel’s involvement in the mailing of documents to the Immigration Courts and DHS
can constitute clear and convincing evidence that counsel practiced law in violation of a
disciplinary order of suspension.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL: Catherine M. O’Connell, Disciplinary Counsel
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Amy S. Paulick, Disciplinary
Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE
and CREPPY, Appellate Immigration Judges.
CREPPY, Appellate Immigration Judge:


   The Disciplinary Counsels for the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed
a Joint Notice of Intent to Discipline, requesting that the respondent 1 be
disbarred from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the
Immigration Court, and DHS. The respondent has appealed the Adjudicating
Official’s August 15, 2024, decision ordering his disbarment. The appeal
will be dismissed.

               I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   On June 2, 2022, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended the respondent
from the practice of law in Florida for 90 days. Based on this suspension,
the Disciplinary Counsels for EOIR and DHS sought the respondent’s
suspension from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS
in disciplinary proceeding. See 

(e), 1003.103(b)
(2025). On October 20, 2022, the Board issued a final order in the


1
    The respondent in this case is an attorney in practitioner disciplinary proceedings.
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proceedings suspending the respondent from practice before the Board, the
Immigration Courts, and DHS for 90 days, effective September 8, 2022.

    At the end of the 90-day period, the respondent, who had been reinstated
to practice in Florida on October 3, 2022, moved the Board for reinstatement.
The Disciplinary Counsels opposed the respondent’s motion arguing that the
respondent had violated the terms of his suspension by practicing before
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) in two
different cases while suspended. Although the respondent denied practicing
before USCIS, the Board denied his reinstatement request based on evidence
presented by the Disciplinary Counsels. The respondent remains suspended
from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS.

    From January 2023 through January 2024, the Disciplinary Counsels for
EOIR and DHS received numerous additional complaints that the respondent
was continuing to practice law before the Immigration Courts and DHS in
violation of his suspension. The Disciplinary Counsels sent the respondent
a preliminary inquiry letter asking him to explain alleged pro se filings that
were substantially similar to filings the respondent had submitted in other
cases prior to his suspension. The respondent denied violating the terms of
his suspension. On May 15, 2023, the Disciplinary Counsels filed a Joint
Notice of Intent to Discipline with the Board initiating the current
proceedings.

   The Notice of Intent to Discipline contains 335 factual allegations
supporting 52 counts of alleged violations of the Board’s suspension order.
Based on these violations, the Disciplinary Counsels charged the respondent
with the unauthorized practice of law in violation of a disciplinary order of
suspension. The Disciplinary Counsels recommend disbarment as the
appropriate sanction given the extent of the respondent’s violations.

    On July 12, 2023, we referred the respondent’s case to the Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge for the appointment of an Adjudicating Official.
The Adjudicating Official received additional evidence, conducted hearings,
and issued a decision sustaining the charge in the Notice of Intent to
Discipline. The Adjudicating Official found that the Disciplinary Counsels
had proven the allegations in the Notice of Intent to Discipline and had linked
the respondent to each of the motions and other legal filings described in the
allegations.    The Adjudicating Official further concluded that the
Disciplinary Counsels had established, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by
drafting and filing the motions and other legal documents described in the
allegations while suspended from practice before the Board, the Immigration
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Courts, and DHS. Given the extent of the respondent’s violations, the
Adjudicating Official disbarred the respondent from practice before the
Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS.

   The respondent has appealed from the Adjudicating Official’s decision.
He argues that there is no direct evidence establishing that he engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, and he contends that the circumstantial
evidence is not sufficient to establish that he performed acts that qualify as
practicing before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS while
suspended. 2

                                    II. ANALYSIS
    In disciplinary proceedings, the Disciplinary Counsels “bear the burden
of proving the grounds for disciplinary sanctions enumerated in the Notice
of Intent to Discipline by clear and convincing evidence.” 

(a)(2)(iv) (2025). A party presents clear and convincing evidence
when it “place[s] in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the
truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.’” Colorado v.
New Mexico, 

 (1984). We review the Adjudicating
Official’s findings of fact for clear error, but review questions of law,
discretion, and judgment de novo. 

(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (2025);
see also 

(c).

                                A. Disciplinary Charge

    The Disciplinary Counsels charged the respondent with the unauthorized
practice of law in violation of the Board’s October 20, 2022, order of
suspension. The regulations governing proceedings before the Immigration
Courts and the Board define “practice” as “exercising professional judgment
to provide legal advice or legal services related to any matter before EOIR.”

(i) (2025).
      Practice includes, but is not limited to, determining available forms of relief from
      removal or protection; providing advice regarding legal strategies; drafting or filing
      any document on behalf of another person appearing before EOIR based on an



2
   The respondent made additional arguments in his notice of appeal. However, because
the respondent did not renew or further develop these arguments in his brief, we deem them
waived. See Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 

, 190 n.2 (BIA 2018), aff’d sub
nom. Cantareros-Lagos v. Barr, 

 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Abebe v. Mukasey,

, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that arguments raised in the
notice of appeal are waived unless raised in the appellate brief).
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      analysis of applicable facts and law; or appearing on behalf of another person in any
      matter before EOIR.

 The regulations distinguish “practice” from “preparation,” which
“consist[s] solely of filling in blank spaces on printed forms with information
provided by the applicant or petitioner that are to be filed with or submitted
to EOIR, where such acts do not include the exercise of professional
judgment to provide legal advice or legal services.” 

(k).

   The regulations governing proceedings before DHS similarly define
“practice” as “the act or acts of any person appearing in any case, either in
person or through the preparation or filing of any brief or other document,
paper, application, or petition on behalf of another person or client before or
with DHS.” 

 (2025). The DHS regulations define “preparation,
constituting practice,” as
      the study of the facts of a case and the applicable laws, coupled with the giving of
      advice and auxiliary activities, including the incidental preparation of papers, but
      does not include the lawful functions of a notary public or service consisting solely
      of assistance in the completion of blank spaces on printed DHS forms, by one whose
      remuneration, if any, is nominal and who does not hold himself or herself out as
      qualified in legal matters or in immigration and naturalization procedure.

 (emphasis omitted).

    To sustain the disciplinary charge in this case, the Disciplinary Counsels
must present clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in
acts that qualify as practicing before the Immigration Courts and DHS while
suspended. 3 Upon de novo review, we agree with the Adjudicating Official
that the Disciplinary Counsels have met their burden of proof. See 

(d)(3)(ii).

    The respondent does not dispute the Adjudicating Official’s factual
findings regarding the allegations in the Notice of Intent to Discipline and
we discern no clear error. See 

(d)(3)(i). In particular, the
Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding that the evidence the
Disciplinary Counsels provided was sufficient to establish the facts set forth
in allegations 1 to 335.


3
   Our October 20, 2022, order was effective as of September 8, 2022, the date we granted
the Disciplinary Counsels’ petition for immediate suspension. The respondent,
accordingly, violated our suspension orders if he practiced before the Immigration Courts
or DHS on or after September 8, 2022.

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    Agreeing with the respondent, the Adjudicating Official also found that
the allegations do not specifically state that the respondent prepared or filed
the motions and other filings identified by the Disciplinary Counsels in
counts 1 to 52. 4 The Adjudicating Official, however, concluded that the
Disciplinary Counsels’ evidence was sufficient to link the respondent to the
filings and to provide clear and convincing evidence that the respondent
continued to practice before the Immigration Courts and DHS despite his
suspension from practice before these entities. We affirm the Adjudicating
Official’s decision.

   The Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding a link between the
respondent and the filings discussed in the Notice of Intent to Discipline
based on: (1) the pattern of similarities among the legal filings discussed in
counts 1 to 52 and between the pre-suspension legal filings from the
respondent and the legal filings identified in the Notice of Intent to
Discipline; (2) the testimony of the Government’s witnesses; and (3) the
evidence from the Miami and El Paso Immigration Courts. The Adjudicating
Official also did not clearly err in finding that the respondent’s statements in
response to the preliminary inquiry letter and the Notice of Intent to
Discipline corroborated rather than weakened this link.

    In assessing the evidence submitted by the Disciplinary Counsels, the
Adjudicating Official found the similarities between the allegedly pro se
filings striking. Specifically, the Adjudicating Official found that the filings
used identical font and language and that several contained the same
typographical and grammatical errors. The Adjudicating Official also found
that several of the filings were submitted by aliens the respondent represented
prior to his suspension. He further found that some of the filings were
identical to motions the respondent filed in cases prior to his suspension.
Moreover, the Adjudicating Official pointed out that the respondent signed
one of the pro se asylum applications included with these filings as preparer
even though he was suspended. The Adjudicating Official also observed that
several of the aliens signed their asylum applications on the same day. The
Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding that these similarities were
sufficient to establish that the respondent prepared the allegedly pro se legal
filings.

   The respondent asserts that legal arguments and case law are in the public
domain and available for anyone to use in legal filings. This fact, however,

4
   It would have been better practice for the Disciplinary Counsels to have included
specific allegations in the Notice of Intent to Discipline stating that the respondent had
drafted and filed the motions and other legal documents discussed.
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does not adequately explain how so many different individuals independently
obtained the respondent’s work product, adapted it for themselves, and then
prepared motions and filings in the same font, same format, and with the
same typographical errors. Further, as the Adjudicating Official pointed out,
many of the individuals using his work product were his former clients prior
to his suspension. This fact makes it even less likely that the allegedly pro se
aliens found the respondent’s work product without the respondent’s
assistance and then adapted it to their individual cases without the
respondent’s advice and assistance.

    The Adjudicating Official additionally did not clearly err in finding that
the manner in which many of the documents were mailed provided further
proof of the respondent’s involvement. Many of the allegedly pro se motions
were sent to the Miami Immigration Court in large boxes with multiple other
motions from unrelated cases. The boxes bore the respondent’s name as
sender. Even one of the filings sent individually to DHS had links to the
respondent. The mailing label for the response to a DHS request for
additional evidence, which is discussed in count 52 of the Notice of Intent to
Discipline, listed the respondent as sender. The response also included an
address used by the respondent as the alien’s return address.

    Finally, the Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding that the
respondent tacitly admitted he was drafting legal documents despite his
suspension. When the Disciplinary Counsels sent a preliminary inquiry
asking the respondent about allegedly pro se filings that closely resembled
filings he had made before his suspension, the respondent did not deny his
involvement with the filings. Rather, he argued, incorrectly, that the Board’s
suspension order was narrowly tailored and only prevented him from
physically appearing before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS.
The respondent claimed, again incorrectly, that the Board’s order did not
prevent him from providing document assistance. The respondent reiterated
these arguments in his response to the Notice of Intent to Discipline and
chose not to testify during the hearing held by the Adjudicating Official. The
Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in interpreting this as an admission
that the respondent engaged with clients in a manner that qualified as
“practice” under 

 and 

(i). See Cooper v.
Harris, 

 (2017) (stating that under clear error review,
reversal is appropriate only when “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed” (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 

 (1985))); see also Matter of D-R-, 

,
454–55 (BIA 2011) (explaining that an Immigration Judge may make
“reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence of the record
as a whole” and “is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even if
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plausible, where there are other permissible views of the evidence based on
the record”), remanded sub nom. Radojkovic v. Holder, 

(9th Cir. 2015).

    We disagree with the respondent’s claim that the Adjudicating Official
did not distinguish practice from preparation in finding that he violated his
suspension order. The respondent did more than “fill[] in blank spaces on
printed forms with information provided by the applicant or petitioner” or act
as a courier service for former and new clients. 

(k). The
record provides clear and convincing evidence that the respondent drafted
motions requiring legal analysis and citation to cases and provided legal
advice on strategy. This conduct clearly falls within the definition of
“practice” contained in 

(i) and 

.

   The respondent further argues that there is no direct evidence that he
prepared or filed the documents discussed in counts 1 to 52. He asserts that
the circumstantial evidence in the record is not sufficient to meet the
Disciplinary Counsels’ burden of showing a disciplinary violation by clear
and convincing evidence.

    “Depending on its probative value, circumstantial evidence alone may be
sufficient to prove a charge in [disciplinary] cases.” Matter of Koden,

 (BIA 1974). 5 In fact, the Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient
even to prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See Desert Palace, Inc.
v. Costa, 

 (2003) (stating, in the context of an employment
discrimination lawsuit, that the adequacy of circumstantial evidence extends
beyond civil cases and that the Court has “never questioned the sufficiency
of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even though
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required”); Holland v. United States,

 (1954) (stating that circumstantial evidence is
no different from testimonial evidence). “[T]he law makes no distinction
between the weight or value to be given to either direct or

5
   It has long been held and accepted that charges of professional misconduct may be
established by circumstantial evidence. E.g., Utz v. State Bar, 

(Cal. 1942). The regulations governing disciplinary proceedings before the Board further
state that disciplinary hearings “shall be conducted in the same manner as Immigration
Court proceedings as is appropriate.” 

(a)(2)(v). Circumstantial
evidence is admissible in immigration proceedings conducted before Immigration Judges,
and Immigration Judges may rely on circumstantial evidence to determine if a party has
met its burden of proof. See, e.g., Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. at 454–56 (upholding an
Immigration Judge’s findings that were based on reasonable inferences drawn from direct
and circumstantial evidence of the record as a whole).
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circumstantial evidence.” Desert Palace, 

 (citation omitted);
Kevin F. O’Malley et al., Federal Jury Practice & Instructions, Criminal
§ 12:04 (7th ed. 2025) (discussing direct and circumstantial evidence and
indicating that no greater degree of certainty is required of circumstantial
evidence than of direct evidence).

    Circumstantial evidence of similarities in allegedly pro se filings and
suspended counsel’s involvement in the mailing of documents to the
Immigration Courts and DHS can constitute clear and convincing evidence
that counsel practiced law in violation of a disciplinary order of suspension.
As we explained above, the evidence in this case connects the respondent to
52 separate filings allegedly made by pro se aliens while the respondent was
suspended from practice before the Immigration Courts and DHS, and the
respondent did not deny his involvement in the preparation of these filings.
Based on these factual findings, we agree that the Disciplinary Counsels’
evidence, even though circumstantial, constitutes clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent violated his suspension by continuing to
practice before the Immigration Courts and DHS. See Colorado v.
New Mexico, 

 (defining clear and convincing evidence). We
accordingly sustain the disciplinary charge against the respondent.

                                     B. Sanction

   The respondent does not specifically challenge the Adjudicating
Official’s choice of sanction. The Adjudicating Official engaged in a
comprehensive analysis and considered all relevant factors in determining
the appropriate sanction for the respondent’s misconduct. We affirm the
Adjudicating Official’s conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate
sanction in this case. See Matter of K. Gupta, 

, 657
(BIA 2022) (finding that the attorney’s “knowing and repeated disregard” for
a prior order of suspension and his false “claim on notices of entry of
appearance that he was not subject to any order restricting his right to practice
law . . . [were] serious violations that undermine the integrity of the legal
system” and that disbarment was the appropriate sanction).

    The respondent’s extensive and knowing violations of our October 20,
2022, order suspending him from practice before the Board, the Immigration
Courts, and DHS strike at the heart of the legal system. He continued to
violate our order for months after we denied his request for reinstatement
based on his conduct and after he received the Disciplinary Counsel’s
preliminary inquiry letter notifying him that his actions appeared to
constitute disciplinary violations. The respondent has not identified any
factors mitigating his serious misconduct. We therefore uphold the
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Adjudicating Official’s determination that disbarment is the appropriate
sanction in this case.

   ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.
   FURTHER ORDER: The Board hereby disbars the respondent from
practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts,
and DHS, effective immediately.

   FURTHER ORDER: The respondent must maintain compliance with
the directives set forth in our prior order. The respondent must notify the
Board of any further disciplinary action against him.

    FURTHER ORDER: The contents of the order shall be made
available to the public, including at the Immigration Courts and appropriate
offices of DHS.




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