B-S-H

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                Interim Decision #4140




                        Matter of B-S-H-, Respondent
                            Decided November 19, 2025
                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

   Under the plain language of section 240(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) (2018), the extraordinary circumstances
or extreme hardship waiver for motions to reopen only applies to temporal limitations for
filing a motion to reopen to apply for relief under the Violence Against Women Act and
not to the numerical limitation on such motions.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ali F. Sayyid, Esquire, New York, New York
BEFORE: Board Panel: MONTANTE and OWEN, Appellate Immigration Judges;
GILLIES, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

MONTANTE, Appellate Immigration Judge:


    This matter was last before the Board on October 10, 2024, when we
denied the respondent’s motion to reopen to pursue adjustment of status in
accordance with the provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, enacted
as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,

 Stat. 1796, 1902 (“VAWA”), and special rule
cancellation of removal for battered spouses under section 240A(b)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2018).
In November 2024, the respondent filed the instant motion to reconsider,
which will be denied on the merits. The motion is also in the nature of a
motion to reopen. Because we conclude that the motion to reopen is number
barred, the motion will be denied.

                         I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   The respondent is a native and citizen of India. The Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against him in
2016, and he applied for various forms of relief before the Immigration
Judge. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s applications. The




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respondent appealed, and on November 22, 2022, the Board affirmed the
Immigration Judge’s decision. 1

    In November 2023, the respondent filed a motion to reopen based on his
pending VAWA self-petition filed with United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and his claimed eligibility for special rule
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A). The respondent alleged in his motion that he married his
United States citizen wife while his appeal was pending with the Board and
that sometime after the marriage, his wife began abusing him and exploiting
his immigration status. The respondent later filed a supplement to his
motion, presenting evidence that USCIS issued a prima facie determination
regarding his VAWA self-petition.

    On October 10, 2024, the Board denied the respondent’s motion to reopen
because the respondent had not established prima facie eligibility for relief.
The Board noted that the VAWA self-petition was still pending and that a
prima facie determination by USCIS is a preliminary determination and does
not indicate that USCIS will approve the self-petition. The Board also
concluded that the respondent had not made a prima facie showing that the
requisite hardship and battery or cruelty requirements for special rule
cancellation of removal had been met. See INA § 240A(b)(2)(A)(i), (v),
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i), (v). In November 2024, the respondent filed
the instant motion.

                                II. DISCUSSION
   Although labeled a motion to reconsider, the respondent’s motion is both
a motion to reconsider and a motion to reopen. “A motion to reconsider
contests the correctness of the original decision based on the previous factual
record, [whereas] a motion to reopen . . . seeks a new hearing based on new
or previously unavailable evidence.” Matter of O-S-G-, 

,
57–58 (BIA 2006). A party seeking reconsideration requests that the original
decision be reexamined in light of alleged legal or factual errors, a change of
law, or an argument or aspect of the case that was overlooked. 

;
Matter of Cerna, 

, 402 n.2 (BIA 1991); see also INA
§ 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) (2018) (providing that a motion to
reconsider must specify the errors of law or fact in the prior decision). Here,
the respondent challenges the Board’s prior decision and seeks to submit

1
   On January 7, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied
the respondent’s petition for review of the Board’s decision.

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additional evidence in support of his request for reopening to seek adjustment
of status based on his still-pending VAWA self-petition or special rule
cancellation of removal.

                           A. Motion to Reconsider

    A motion to reconsider shall specify “errors of fact or law in the prior
Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 

(b)(1) (2025); see also Matter of O-S-G-, 

. The
respondent’s motion does not establish any error in our previous decision
denying reopening. While the respondent alleges that the Board erred in
finding that jurisdiction over his adjustment of status application lies solely
with USCIS, we did not make such a determination in our decision. We are
also unpersuaded that we erred in our evaluation of the evidence presented,
including our findings regarding USCIS’ prima facie determination. See

(c)(6)(ii), (iv) (2025) (providing that a prima facie
determination does not relieve the VAWA self-petitioner of the burden of
providing additional evidence in support of the petition, does not establish
eligibility for the underlying petition, will not be considered evidence in
support of the petition, will not be construed to make a determination on the
credibility or probative value of any evidence submitted along with the
petition, and will not relieve the self-petitioner of his or her burden of
complying with all of the evidentiary requirements for obtaining relief).
Disagreement with the result is not sufficient to establish error in our prior
decision. Therefore, the motion to reconsider will be denied.

                              B. Motion to Reopen

    The INA imposes both a time limitation and a numerical limitation on
motions to reopen. A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the
final administrative order of removal. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 

(c)(2). The general 90-day motion to
reopen time limitation does not apply to motions to reopen filed to pursue
relief under VAWA if the motion to reopen is filed within 1 year of the
final order of removal.         INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). Moreover, the Attorney General may, in the
exercise of discretion, waive this 1-year time limitation in the case of a
respondent who demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances or extreme
hardship to the [respondent’s] child.” Id.

   The INA generally authorizes only one motion to reopen. INA
§ 240(c)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C § 1229a(c)(7)(A). However, “this limitation shall

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not apply so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen [to apply for
relief under VAWA].” 

    As a motion to reopen, the respondent’s November 2024 motion to pursue
relief under VAWA is untimely as it was not filed within 1 year of the
Board’s November 22, 2022, final administrative order of removal. INA
§ 240(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). The motion is
also number barred as it is not the respondent’s first motion to reopen filed
to pursue relief under VAWA.             INA § 240(c)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A).

   While the INA provides for a waiver of the 1-year time limitation on
motions to reopen to seek relief pursuant to VAWA, this provision does not
apply to the separate numerical limitation. Section 240(c)(7)(C)(iv) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv), provides, in relevant part:
      Any limitation under this section on the deadlines for filing such motions shall not
      apply . . .
          ....
          (III) if the motion to reopen is filed within 1 year of the entry of the final order
        of removal, except that the Attorney General may, in the Attorney General’s
        discretion, waive this time limitation in the case of an alien who demonstrates
        extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child . . . .

    The reference to “any limitation . . . on the deadlines” for filing a motion
to reopen under section 240(c)(7)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C),
refers to the temporal deadlines contained in that section. The numerical
limitation on motions to reopen appears in section 240(c)(7)(A) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A). 2 Additionally, section 240(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), specifically provides for a
waiver of the “time limitation;” it does not mention the numerical limitation.
Finally, the language of section 240(c)(7)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), limits an alien to “one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv),” thus barring a second motion to reopen to apply for
relief under VAWA.



2
   The only circuit court to have addressed this issue is the Third Circuit, which did so in
an unpublished decision. The Third Circuit held that “the ‘any limitation’ language [in
section 240(c)(7)(C)(iv) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv),] expressly applies to
‘deadlines’ for filing motions to reopen” and the applicant had not established “that this
language extends to the numeric bar, which appears elsewhere in the statute and limits an
applicant to a single VAWA motion to reopen.” See Wane v. Att’y Gen. U.S., No. 23-3229,

, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2024).
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     Under the plain language of section 240(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), the extraordinary circumstances or
extreme hardship waiver for motions to reopen only applies to temporal
limitations for filing a motion to reopen to apply for relief under VAWA and
not to the numerical limitation on such motions. See Republic of Sudan v.
Harrison, 

 (2019) (noting that when interpreting a statute, the
Court focuses on the language of the statute); see also Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., 

 (2020) (stating that a court should “interpret[] a
statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of
its enactment”). As this is the respondent’s second motion to reopen to apply
for relief pursuant to VAWA, it is number barred. This numerical bar cannot
be waived by the statutory provision under section 240(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III).

    The respondent urges us to sua sponte reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R
§ 1003.2(a) (2025). The Board’s sua sponte authority is not “a general
remedy for any hardships created by enforcement of the time and number
limits in the motions [statute and] regulations.” Matter of G-D-, 

, 1133–34 (BIA 1999). Rather, it is a discretionary authority to be
invoked sparingly, as an “extraordinary remedy reserved for truly
exceptional situations.” 

; Matter of J-J-, 

(BIA 1997). Whether a case merits sua sponte reopening depends on all the
facts and circumstances presented in each case.

   Having considered the motion and supporting documentation, we
conclude that the totality of the circumstances in this case do not present an
exceptional situation that warrants the exercise of our sua sponte reopening
authority. See Matter of J-J-, 

; 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(a).
Accordingly, we decline to reopen sua sponte in the exercise of discretion.

                             III. CONCLUSION
    The respondent’s motion is both a motion to reconsider and an untimely
and number-barred motion to reopen. Given the limited evidence supporting
his eligibility for relief, the motion to reconsider does not establish any error
in our prior decision denying the respondent’s motion to reopen to pursue
adjustment of status under VAWA and special rule cancellation. The motion
to reopen is untimely as it was not filed within 1 year of the final
administrative order and it is the respondent’s second motion to reopen
pursuant to VAWA. The statutory provision permitting the Attorney General
to waive the 1-year time limitation on one motion to reopen pursuant to
VAWA does not provide for a waiver of the numerical limitation on a second
motion to reopen pursuant to VAWA. Based on the foregoing, the
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respondent’s motion will be denied and his request for a stay of removal will
be denied as moot.

   ORDER: The respondent’s motion is denied.
    NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 

(b)(14) (2025). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 

(a).




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