l-T-A

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                               Interim Decision #4151




                        Matter of L-T-A-, Respondent
                           Decided December 18, 2025
                          U.S. Department of Justice
                   Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

  Evidence that a respondent had a legal right to enter, live, work, and own property
indefinitely in the country of proposed resettlement demonstrates that the respondent was
offered “some other type of permanent resettlement” for purposes of the firm resettlement
bar.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ilya Laksin, Esquire, New York, New York
BEFORE: Board Panel: MULLANE, CREPPY, and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration
Judges.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:


    The respondent is a native and citizen of Nepal. In a decision issued on
January 15, 2020, the Immigration Judge denied her application for asylum
but granted her application for withholding of removal to Nepal.
Sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 

(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018). The
Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was statutorily ineligible
for asylum because she firmly resettled in India. See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi),

(b)(2)(A)(vi); 

 (2020). The respondent
has appealed the denial of asylum. 1 She has also filed additional evidence
on appeal, which we construe as a motion to remand. The appeal will be
dismissed, and the motion to remand will be denied.

             I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The respondent testified that while she was a student in Nepal in 2009,
she received approximately five threats from Maoists because she refused to
support them. In 2011, Maoists from the Young Communist League attacked
the respondent while she organized a meeting in support of the Nepali
Congress Party and beat her with wooden sticks. As a result, the respondent
lost consciousness, spent a week in the hospital, and received stitches on her

1
   The respondent does not challenge any other aspects of the Immigration Judge’s
decision. The Department of Homeland Security has not appealed the Immigration Judge’s
grant of withholding of removal to Nepal.
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head. After the attack, the respondent fled to India, where she obtained
employment as a hotel receptionist. She lived in India for 5 years without
incident. While the respondent was in India, her uncle in Nepal was
approached by Maoists who told him they would find the respondent in India
and force her to join them. The respondent subsequently left India for the
United States.

   The Immigration Judge concluded that the threats and harm the
respondent suffered rose to the level of persecution and that her political
opinion was at least one central reason for her persecution. The Immigration
Judge also found that the respondent established that, in 2011, the Nepali
Government was unable or unwilling to control her attackers. However, the
Immigration Judge determined that the respondent had firmly resettled in
India and was ineligible for asylum. The Immigration Judge granted
withholding of removal.

                                    II. ANALYSIS
   The sole issue in this case is whether the respondent firmly resettled in
India. In particular, we will consider whether the respondent was offered
“some other type of permanent resettlement.” 

. While
we review the Immigration Judge’s factual findings for clear error, we review
de novo whether the facts support a determination of firm resettlement.
Matter of A-G-G-, 

 (BIA 2011); 

(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (2025).

                                 A. Legal Background

    An alien is ineligible for asylum if he or she “was firmly resettled in
another country prior to arriving in the United States.”               INA
§ 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 

(b)(2)(A)(vi). The applicable Federal
regulation set forth at 

 2 defines firm resettlement as
follows:
        An alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the United States,
      he or she entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an

2
   This case is governed by the version of 

 in place in 2020. The
regulation was amended by Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible
Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 

 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at
8 C.F.R. pts 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235). However, the amended rule was enjoined. See
Pangea Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
The enjoined version of the firm resettlement regulation is meaningfully different from the
2020 version of the regulation.
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      offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent
      resettlement unless he or she establishes:
          (a) That his or her entry into that country was a necessary consequence of his or
        her flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that country only as long as
        was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish
        significant ties in that country; or
          (b) That the conditions of his or her residence in that country were so
        substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of refuge
        that he or she was not in fact resettled. In making his or her determination, the
        asylum officer or immigration judge shall consider the conditions under which
        other residents of the country live; the type of housing, whether permanent or
        temporary, made available to the refugee; the types and extent of employment
        available to the refugee; and the extent to which the refugee received permission
        to hold property and to enjoy other rights and privileges, such as travel
        documentation that includes a right of entry or reentry, education, public relief, or
        naturalization, ordinarily available to others resident in the country.

    In Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. at 501–03, the Board set forth a
four-step framework for deciding cases involving firm resettlement. 3 First,
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “bears the burden of
presenting prima facie evidence of an offer of firm resettlement.” Matter of
A-G-G-, 

. Prima facie evidence of an offer of firm
resettlement may include both direct evidence of an offer and indirect
evidence. See 

 at 501–02; Sall v. Gonzales, 

(2d Cir. 2006) (instructing the Immigration Judge to consider both whether
the alien received an actual offer of permanent resident status in Senegal and
other factors including his family ties, business and property connections,
and whether he enjoyed the same legal rights to work and enter and leave the
country as those who are permanently settled).

    The respondent can seek to rebut DHS’ prima facie evidence of an offer
of firm resettlement “by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
such an offer has not, in fact, been made or that . . . she would not qualify
3
    Prior to the Board’s decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in which jurisdiction this case arises, adopted the “totality of the circumstances” approach
to firm resettlement determinations in Sall v. Gonzales, 

 (2d Cir. 2006).
As we observed in Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. at 495–96, that approach considers
evidence of a direct offer of firm resettlement as a factor to be considered together with
indirect evidence. The four-step framework in Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. at 501–03,
is consistent with the totality of the circumstances approach. See also Tchitchui v. Holder,

 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that the burden is on DHS to establish a prima
facie case of firm resettlement and that the burden then shifts to the alien to show that he
or she qualifies for an exception). Although the Second Circuit has not directly applied the
four-part framework, the parties did not dispute before the Immigration Judge or on appeal
that the Matter of A-G-G- framework applies in this case. Moreover, the outcome of this
case would be the same regardless of the approach we apply.
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for it.” Matter of A-G-G-, 

. The Immigration Judge “will
consider the totality of the evidence presented by the parties to determine
whether [the respondent] has rebutted . . . DHS’ evidence of an offer of firm
resettlement.” Id.; accord Sall, 

. If the Immigration Judge
finds the respondent firmly resettled, the burden then shifts to the respondent
to establish that an exception to firm resettlement set forth in the regulations
applies by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of A-G-G-, 

; accord Tchitchui v. Holder, 

 (2d Cir. 2011).

    An offer of firm resettlement may take different forms. While in some
cases an offer of firm resettlement consists of a pathway to becoming a
permanent resident or citizen of a third country, the regulation governing
firm resettlement also contemplates an offer of “some other type of
permanent resettlement.” 

; see also Sall, 

(noting that because 

 refers to “some other type of
permanent resettlement,” it permits an offer of firm resettlement to come in
forms other than an “actual offer of permanent resident status”). “‘[O]ffers’
of ‘some other type of permanent resettlement’ may not always include
written documentation, much less formal state-issued identification cards.”
Sall, 

. Indirect evidence of an offer of firm resettlement may
include “whether the alien had legal rights normally given to people who
have some official status, such as the right to work and enter and exit the
country.” Matter of A-G-G-, 

; see also Sall, 

 (instructing the Immigration Judge to consider the alien’s legal right
to work and enter and leave the country when determining firm resettlement).

                       B. Application to the Respondent

    In this case, DHS did not present direct evidence that an offer of firm
resettlement was made to the respondent in India. See Matter of A-G-G-,
25 I&N Dec. at 501–02 (describing “direct evidence” as “governmental
documents indicating an alien’s ability to stay in a country
indefinitely . . . includ[ing] evidence of refugee status, a passport, a travel
document, or other evidence indicative of permanent residence”). The
Immigration Judge properly determined that the respondent’s testimony
regarding her ability to enter and live in India did not constitute direct
evidence of an offer of firm resettlement. However, the Immigration Judge
concluded that DHS met its burden of presenting prima facie evidence of an
offer of firm resettlement through indirect evidence.

   We discern no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s findings regarding
the respondent’s ability to live and work legally in India. See 

(d)(3)(i). In support of the firm resettlement bar, DHS submitted
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various country conditions documents, including a copy of the 1950 Treaty
of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal (“India-Nepal Treaty”),
obtained from the Ministry of External Affairs website for the Government
of India. Article 6 of the treaty provides that “[e]ach government
undertakes . . . to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national
treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic
development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts
relating to such development.” Article 7 of the treaty provides that “[t]he
Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the
nationals of one country in the territories o[f] the other the same privileges
in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and
commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.”

    An article DHS submitted regarding the India-Nepal Treaty states that the
treaty allows for free movement of goods between countries and allows
Nepali and Indian nationals to cross the border without a passport or visa,
“live and work in either country, and own property or do trade or business in
either country.” (Emphasis omitted). The article notes that as a result of the
treaty, there are millions of Nepalis living, working, and owning property in
India.

    DHS also submitted a document from the Research Directorate of the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada regarding the status of Nepalese
citizens in India. The document provides that, due to the treaty, “citizens of
Nepal may reside, work, attend school and access health services in India”
and “are not considered ‘illegal’ residents.” Citing a British Broadcasting
Corporation article from 2008, the document states that approximately
5 million Nepalese citizens work and own property in India and do not
require visas or work permits to cross the border. The document also cites
information from the Bureau of Immigration in India providing that “citizens
of Nepal do not require visas to enter India, unless they are entering India
from China,” and that Nepalese citizens, when entering India by land or air
from Nepal, require valid identification but not a passport.

    The respondent’s testimony about her ability to enter India and work and
live there is consistent with the documentary evidence submitted by DHS.
The respondent testified that she and her parents did not require a visa to
enter India and that the Indian Government would allow them to continue
living there. The respondent testified that she lived and worked in India for
approximately 5 years and was otherwise not restricted from residing there
indefinitely. She agreed with DHS’ counsel at the hearing that “anyone from
Nepal can just simply go to India [and] live and work there.” Based on the
foregoing, the Immigration Judge correctly concluded that DHS met its
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initial burden by presenting indirect evidence of an offer of “some other type
of permanent resettlement.” 

; see also Matter of A-G-G-,
25 I&N Dec. at 501–03. See generally Tchitchui, 

 (holding
that the totality of an applicant’s activities in the third country were “relevant
to the question of whether his permanent residency [there] created a place to
turn to seek refuge” from the country he or she fled).

    Turning to the second step of our analysis of firm resettlement, we
consider whether the respondent has rebutted DHS’ prima facie evidence of
an offer of firm resettlement. The respondent asserts on appeal that she has
not been offered any form of “enduring legal status” in India. However, an
offer of firm resettlement is not limited to a path to permanent residency or
citizenship. As noted above, an alien may be firmly resettled in a third
country if he or she received an offer of “some other type of permanent
resettlement.” 

. Because of the India-Nepal Treaty, the
respondent was not considered in unlawful status while living and working
in India and could continue to legally live and work there indefinitely.

    Additionally, although the respondent attempts to rebut DHS’ evidence
by arguing that there was no evidence that the Indian Government was aware
of her presence, “the regulations only require that an offer of firm
resettlement was available.” Matter of A-G-G-, 

. The
Indian Government need not be aware of the respondent’s presence if it
“accepted as permanent a class of persons to which [the respondent]
belongs.” Makadji v. Gonzales, 

 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the
Indian Government has accepted the permanent presence of Nepalese
citizens by virtue of the India-Nepal Treaty and the rights given to Nepalese
citizens to live, work, and own property in India. As a Nepalese citizen, the
Indian Government consented to the respondent’s lawful presence in India.
See 

 (observing that many courts have found “a formal or express
‘offer’” is not needed “if the circumstances of the person’s existence in a
country demonstrate that the person was effectively accepted by that nation
as a permanent resident”).

    The respondent also contends her living and working situation was not
permanent and that she worked and lived in the same hotel out of necessity.
In addition, she asserts that although the evidence in the record shows
“nominal notions of economic reciprocity between India and Nepal, the
reality of life for Nepalese in India is often miserable.” The respondent has
submitted country conditions evidence that Nepalese in India often endure
discrimination and harassment, poor housing conditions, and limited
employment opportunities.

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    We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent did not rebut
DHS’ evidence that she was offered permanent resettlement in India.
Evidence that a respondent had a legal right to enter, live, work, and own
property indefinitely in the country of proposed resettlement demonstrates
that the respondent was offered “some other type of permanent resettlement”
for purposes of the firm resettlement bar. 

. The
Immigration Judge found based on the documentary evidence and the
respondent’s testimony that the India-Nepal Treaty granted the respondent
the same privileges in “residence[,] ownership of property, participation in
trade and commerce, [and] movement” as citizens of India. While the
respondent has presented evidence that many Nepalese in India live in poor
conditions and do not have stable employment, this does not overcome the
evidence that the Indian Government offered the respondent permanent
resettlement in India.

    The respondent also contends that an exception to the firm resettlement
bar applies because the conditions of her residence in India “were so
substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of
refuge that . . . she was not in fact resettled.” 

(b). The
respondent argues that she remained afraid that Maoists would find and
attack her while living in India. Although she asserts on appeal that Maoists
move freely across the border, she did not submit any evidence before the
Immigration Judge to support this assertion. See INS v. Phinpathya,

, 188 n.6 (1984) (noting that unsupported statements from
counsel in an appellate brief do not constitute facts in evidence).
Furthermore, the Immigration Judge found that Maoists did not attack nor
contact the respondent while she was in India, and she did not establish that
the Indian Government was not able or willing to protect her.

    The respondent also argues that she lacked the right to vote and
participate in the electoral process in India. However, the respondent has not
cited any legal authority requiring that an offer of firm resettlement include
the right to vote. Cf. Matter of K-S-E-, 

 (BIA 2020)
(finding that “the right to vote . . . is generally reserved for citizens” and that
an alien did not establish an exception to firm resettlement based on
restrictions to this right), vacated by Sylvestre v. Garland, No. 20-71316,

 (9th Cir. June 9, 2021). We note that lawful permanent
residents in the United States generally do not have the right to vote. See
L. Xia v. Tillerson, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Many invaluable
benefits flow from United States citizenship, including [the] right[] to vote
in federal elections . . . .”). Based on the foregoing, the respondent has not
established that the conditions of her residence in India were substantially

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and consciously restricted by the Indian Government such that she has
established an exception to the firm resettlement bar. 

(b).

                            C. Motion to Remand

    The respondent submitted new evidence on appeal, which we construe as
a motion to remand. See Matter of L-A-C-, 

(BIA 2015). The respondent contends that the new evidence, which consists
of a news article about the Maoists’ influence currently in India and an article
about problems with the India-Nepal Treaty, supports an exception to firm
resettlement. The first news article discusses efforts by the Maoists to rebuild
and strengthen their urban network in India. The second news article
discusses tensions between Nepal and India and a general feeling among
Nepalese that they are not treated equally under the India-Nepal Treaty.

    Although the proffered news articles were previously unavailable, the
respondent has not shown that the new evidence would likely change the
result of the firm resettlement bar. See Sanusi v. Gonzales, 

 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding the Board’s denial of a motion to remand to
submit new evidence regarding the alien’s prior claim for protection under
the Convention Against Torture because the alien did not demonstrate that
the new evidence would have changed the disposition of the case). The new
evidence does not show that the respondent’s ability to live in India would
be “substantially or consciously restricted by the authority of the country of
refuge.” 

(b). Although the first article discusses the
rebuilding of the Maoist network in India, it provides that the Indian
Government is taking steps to address this issue by convening a meeting of
leadership from all Maoist-affected states. Furthermore, though the
respondent’s second article and previously submitted evidence highlight
inequalities that Nepalese face in India, the evidence does not demonstrate
that any restrictions on the respondent’s conditions of residence are “by the
authority of the country of refuge.” 

(b). The India-Nepal
Treaty continues to allow Nepalese to legally live and work freely in India.
Therefore, the respondent has not shown that remand to the Immigration
Judge is warranted for consideration of the newly submitted evidence.

                             III. CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the
respondent was firmly resettled in India. The provisions of the India-Nepal
Treaty, the respondent’s lengthy residence in India after leaving Nepal, and
her ability to work in India are sufficient to establish that she received an
offer of “some other type of permanent resettlement.” 

.
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Additionally, the respondent has not demonstrated that an exception to the
firm resettlement bar applies. Thus, the respondent is statutorily ineligible
for asylum. 4

    ORDER: The respondent’s appeal of the Immigration Judge’s denial of
asylum from Nepal is dismissed.

    FURTHER ORDER: The motion to remand is denied.
  NOTICE TO RESPONDENT/APPLICANT TO CONTACT
DHS/USCIS: The Board of Immigration Appeals has issued a final
decision in your case. Depending on the type of relief or protection from
removal that you have been granted, you may be entitled to documents
evidencing your status allowing you to remain in the United States or you
may be eligible to work in this country. However, in order to receive any
documentation, you need to contact the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) of DHS, which is the agency responsible for the issuance
of documents evidencing your status and/or work authorization. Information
regarding the specific USCIS instructions can be found at www.uscis.gov
(search “Post-Order Instructions” or “Notice to Individuals Granted
Immigration Benefits by an Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration
Appeals”) on procedures for obtaining status documentation or work
authorization. Additionally, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) website at www.justice.gov/eoir contains a link to the USCIS
webpage which in turn links to the “Post Order Instructions.” You may also
call the USCIS national customer service number at 1-800-375-5283.

    NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 

(b)(14) (2025).




4
   As noted earlier, the Immigration Judge granted withholding of removal and DHS did
not appeal. DHS has informed the Board that the respondent’s background checks are
current.
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