Ghanbari

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                 Interim Decision #4153




                Matter of Gholam GHANBARI, Respondent
                              Decided October 10, 2025 1
                            U.S. Department of Justice
                     Executive Office for Immigration Review
                          Board of Immigration Appeals

  The Immigration Judge erred in determining that the respondent did not provide material
support to a terrorist organization and was not subject to mandatory detention under section
236(c)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(c)(1)(D) (West
2025).
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Bradley Maze, Esquire, Southfield, Michigan
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Timothy E. Garcia, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: GOODWIN and HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judges;
McCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:


  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals the Immigration
Judge’s July 10, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s request for bond.
The Immigration Judge’s August 7, 2025, bond memorandum sets forth the
basis for the Immigration Judge’s order. The respondent has filed a brief
opposing DHS’ appeal. The appeal will be sustained. 2

   The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent is not subject to
mandatory detention under section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 

(c) (West 2025), as an alien described under
section 237(a)(4)(B) of the INA, 

(a)(4)(B) (2024), for
providing material support to a terrorist organization. The Immigration
Judge found that the respondent established DHS is “substantially unlikely
to prevail” on the charge that the respondent is removable for providing
material support to an undesignated terrorist organization. Thus, the
Immigration Judge conducted the respondent’s custody redetermination

1
   Pursuant to Order No. 6534-2025, dated December 19, 2025, the Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Ghanbari (BIA October 10, 2025), as precedent
in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 

(g)(3) (2025).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a precedent.
2
    DHS’ request that the bond hearing be transcribed is denied.
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Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                        Interim Decision #4153




hearing under section 236(a) of the INA, 

(a), and found
that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.

   We agree with DHS that the Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to
consider the respondent’s request to be released from custody under section
236(c)(1)(D) of the INA, 

(c)(1)(D). The respondent did
not meet his burden to prove that he is not properly included in this category
of aliens subject to mandatory detention. 

(h)(2)(ii)
(2025); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 

, 289 n.1 (2018); Matter
of Joseph, 

 (BIA 1999). We have held that an alien
need not be charged with the ground of removability making detention under
section 236(c) of the INA, 

(c), applicable. See Matter of
Kotliar, 

 (BIA 2007).

   As DHS argues on appeal, the record in the bond proceedings shows that
the respondent stated in his refugee application that he was a sympathizer of
the terrorist organization Mojahedin-e-Khalq (“MEK”) from 1980 to 1987
and was “dealing in propaganda activities.” He also stated that authorities
came to his house on June 28, 1981, found papers, leaflets, and books about
the MEK movement, and detained him for being involved in “mojahidins’
activities.” Information provided by DHS from the Congressional Research
Service states that the MEK participated in the 1979 Iranian Revolution,
“supported the takeover of the U.S. embassy, and opposed the release of
American hostages.” In the early 1980s, the MEK launched attacks against
the Islamic Republic in Iran, including a 1981 bombing that killed Iran’s
chief justice and dozens of other officials.

   Additionally, in Hosseini v. Nielsen, 

 (6th Cir. 2018),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, under whose
jurisdiction this case arises, found that the MEK operated as a terrorist
organization in the 1970s until at least September 1981. In addition, the court
found that the distribution of flyers on behalf of the MEK constitutes material
support to a terrorist organization. Hosseini, 

 (finding that
distributing non-violent flyers on behalf of the MEK constitutes material
support because it gives legitimacy to the organization while it engaged in
terrorism).

   Further, we disagree with the Immigration Judge’s finding that the
respondent’s support was not material because he was approximately 15 to
16 years old and did not and should not have reasonably known of the MEK’s
involvement in the terrorist activities until the 1981 bombing. The
Immigration Judge ignored the respondent’s statements in his refugee
application that Iranian officials accused him of being involved in
mojahidins’ activities, he was imprisoned twice, and a family member also
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Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                       Interim Decision #4153




was a “mojahidin.” Moreover, the respondent did not testify at his bond
hearing and did not present evidence that he was unaware of the MEK’s
violent activities or that he disassociated himself from the MEK upon
learning of its violent activities. Cf. Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 

 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the Board erred finding the respondent
engaged in terrorist activity as a 16 year old, where he testified that he was
unaware of MEK’s violent activities and voluntarily disassociated from
MEK merely a year after he joined it). We thus cannot conclude that DHS
is substantially unlikely to establish that the respondent’s actions would
support a charge of removability under section 237(a)(4)(B) of the INA,

(a)(4)(B). See Matter of Joseph, 

(stating that “the Immigration Judge must have very substantial grounds to
override” the mandatory detention category prior to the completion of the
merits hearing); see also Matter of Kotliar, 

.

   Thus, the respondent is subject to mandatory detention under section
236(c)(1)(D) of the INA, 

(c)(1)(D), and the Immigration
Judge lacked jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s request to be released
from custody. See 

(h)(2)(i)(D). The respondent will
therefore be detained without bond. In light of our disposition, we need not
address DHS’ remaining arguments on appeal. See INS v. Bagamasbad,

 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies
are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which are
unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

  Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.

  ORDER: The appeal is sustained.

  FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s July 10, 2025, custody
decision is vacated, and the respondent is ordered detained without bond.




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