Yadav

Cite as 

 (BIA 2026)                              Interim Decision #4162




                   Matter of Amit YADAV, Respondent
                            Decided February 5, 2026
                          U.S. Department of Justice
                   Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

  A respondent’s valid marriage to a United States citizen entered into after a removal
order does not constitute an exceptional situation warranting sua sponte reopening of
removal proceedings.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Jose A. Vazquez, Esquire, Mashpee, Massachusetts
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; CREPPY,
Appellate Immigration Judge; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:


    The Board entered the final administrative order in these proceedings on
October 7, 2014, when we dismissed the respondent’s appeal of the
Immigration Judge’s January 16, 2013, decision denying his applications for
relief and ordering him removed from the United States. More than 10 years
after our decision, the respondent filed a motion to reopen to apply for
adjustment of status based on his 2017 marriage to his United States citizen
wife and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (“USCIS”)
2020 approval of a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on his
behalf. The respondent does not allege that his motion falls within an
exception to the 90-day deadline on motions to reopen. Section 240(c)(7)(C)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)
(2024); 

(c)(2) (2025). Instead, the respondent asks the
Board to exercise our discretionary authority to reopen his case sua sponte in
the interest of justice.

    The Board has the authority at any time to reopen or reconsider on our
own motion any case in which we have rendered a decision. 

(a) (2025). Our use of this discretionary authority is often requested
when an alien does not qualify for any of the specific avenues for reopening
provided by statute or regulation. See INA 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7);

(c). However, we have long held that our exercise of this
authority is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not meant to cure
filing defects or circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might
result in hardship. Matter of J-J-, 

 (BIA 1997). “It
would be inappropriate to expansively employ this authority in a manner that
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Cite as 

 (BIA 2026)                          Interim Decision #4162




contravened the intentions of Congress or failed to give effect to the
comprehensive regulatory structure in which it exists.” Matter of G-D-,

 (BIA 1999).

    “There is an important public interest in the finality of immigration
proceedings.” Matter of B-N-K-, 

 (BIA 2025) (citation
omitted). The laws passed by Congress limiting motions to reopen, and the
regulations implementing those laws, “are meant to bring finality to
immigration proceedings and to redress the problem of abuses resulting from
the filing of successive or frivolous motions.” Matter of J-J-, 

. An expansive use of our sua sponte authority “would substantially
erode the regulatory time and number limitations and undermine the goal of
finality that we understand Congress sought to achieve.” Matter of G-D-,

. Our administrative role in the immigration system,
which is to faithfully apply the laws and regulations, cautions us to exercise
this authority sparingly and only as an “extraordinary remedy reserved for
truly exceptional situations.” 

 at 1133–34.

    A motion to reopen sua sponte that is based on equities acquired while
remaining illegally in the United States after being ordered removed
generally does not establish a truly exceptional situation. Matter of H-Y-Z-,

, 161 (BIA 2020). Reopening proceedings based on equities
accrued during “[t]he continued presence of an alien lawfully deemed
removable” rewards a “continuing violation of United States law.”
Nken v. Holder, 

 (2009) (citation omitted). It is also
fundamentally unfair to other aliens who cannot acquire such equities
because they follow the immigration laws or comply with lawful orders of
removal. See Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 

, 5 (2025) (mem.)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the grant of the application for stay) (stating
that aliens “acting illegally by remaining in the United States . . . are not only
violating the immigration laws, but also jumping in front of those noncitizens
who follow the rules and wait in line to immigrate into the United States
through the legal immigration process”). Thus, with due regard for our role
as an administrative court of law rather than a court of equity, see Matter of
O-R-E-, 

, 336 (BIA 2021), the public interest in finality, and
the fair application of the immigration laws, only a truly exceptional situation
would warrant us exercising our sua sponte authority to reopen a case based
on equities acquired after a valid order of removal is entered.

   The respondent has not presented a “truly exceptional situation[].”
Matter of G-D-, 

. He entered the United States in 2008
and was placed in removal proceedings after he overstayed his visa. The
Immigration Judge denied his applications for relief and ordered him
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Cite as 

 (BIA 2026)                        Interim Decision #4162




removed in 2013. We dismissed his appeal in 2014, and his petition for
review was denied in 2015. See Yadav v. Lynch, 

(1st Cir. 2015). The respondent married his United States citizen wife in
2017, and USCIS approved the visa petition filed on his behalf in 2020. A
respondent’s valid marriage to a United States citizen entered into after a
removal order does not constitute an exceptional situation warranting sua
sponte reopening of removal proceedings. Thus, we decline to exercise our
discretionary authority to reopen these proceedings sua sponte.

   ORDER: The motion to reopen is denied.
   FURTHER ORDER: If a respondent is subject to a final order of
removal and willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States
pursuant to the order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or
other documents necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself
or herself at the time and place required for removal by the Department of
Homeland Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent
or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the
respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each
day the respondent is in violation. See INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024);

(b)(14) (2025). Further, any respondent that has been
denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while
an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter
enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be
fined or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a),

(a) (2024).




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