F-B-A

Cite as 

 (BIA 2026)                                 Interim Decision #4165




                         Matter of F-B-A-, Respondent
                             Decided February 20, 2026
                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) The unique barriers to reporting harm faced by children do not apply to adults,
   including adults who suffered harm as children. Matter of C-G-T-, 

   (BIA 2023), clarified.

(2) Given the size of Russia, the respondent’s membership in the country’s majority
   religion, and the insufficient evidence demonstrating her family maintains an interest in
   locating her more than 2 years after they last threatened her, the Immigration Judge’s
   finding that the respondent could not reasonably relocate to avoid persecution is clearly
   erroneous.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Irina Rusanova, Esquire, Mountlake Terrace, Washington
BEFORE: Board Panel:          MULLANE, HUNSUCKER, and GEMOETS, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:


   This case was last before the Board on November 7, 2025, when we
sustained the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) appeal of the
Immigration Judge’s March 14, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s
application for asylum under section 208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 

(b)(1)(A) (2024). In sustaining
DHS’ appeal, we vacated the Immigration Judge’s decision and ordered the
respondent removed. On November 10, 2025, the respondent, a native of
Tajikistan and citizen of Russia, filed a timely motion to reconsider. 1

    Based on the particular arguments raised in the respondent’s motion and
our own authority, we will grant the motion to reconsider for the purpose of
further clarifying the reasoning in our November 7, 2025, decision. See

(a) (2026) (“The Board may at any time reopen or
reconsider . . . any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). Upon
reconsideration, we will again sustain DHS’ appeal and order the respondent
removed.


1
  On November 19, 2025, the respondent filed an addendum to her motion to reconsider.
The motion, including the addendum, has been considered in its entirety.
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              I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The respondent is an unmarried adult woman who fears harm from her
family, including her parents, brother, and cousin, due to her conversion from
Islam to Russian Orthodox Christianity. Specifically, the respondent
described a variety of harms she experienced at the hands of her family due
to her resistance to Islam and later due to her conversion to Christianity. The
respondent also explained that she fears future harm because members of her
family threatened to kill her for apostasy, and her brother threatened to cut
off her head for the shame and humiliation that she caused.

    The Immigration Judge found the respondent credible and concluded that
based on her credible testimony, her corroborative evidence, and the country
condition evidence in the record, the respondent established a well-founded
fear of persecution. On appeal, DHS did not challenge the Immigration
Judge’s determination that the respondent is likely to be persecuted or killed
by her family due to her conversion from Islam to Russian Orthodox
Christianity.    Instead, DHS challenged the Immigration Judge’s
determination that Russian authorities would be unable or unwilling to
protect the respondent and the Immigration Judge’s finding that the
respondent could not relocate to avoid future harm.

    We agreed with DHS that the Immigration Judge’s finding that
authorities in Russia would be unable or unwilling to protect the respondent
was clearly erroneous. See Matter of C-G-T-, 

(BIA 2023) (“Whether a government is unable or unwilling to protect an
individual from persecution is a question of fact we review for clear error.”).
Specifically, we concluded that the Immigration Judge erroneously relied on
evidence regarding domestic violence when the respondent’s fear was based
on religious persecution. We concluded that evidence of general country
conditions pertaining to domestic violence was insufficient to establish the
inability or unwillingness of the Russian Government to protect the
respondent from harm by her family due to her conversion to Russian
Orthodox Christianity. We also noted that the respondent had not established
that her family had influence over the police, such that seeking police
assistance would have been futile.

                                II. ANALYSIS
   The respondent argues in her motion to reconsider that the Immigration
Judge properly concluded that it would be pointless or dangerous for her to
have sought help from authorities. While a failure to report harm is “not
necessarily fatal” to a respondent’s claim of persecution, the reasonableness
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of the respondent’s failure to seek assistance from authorities is a significant
factor that must be considered along with other evidence regarding whether
the government was unable or unwilling to protect the respondent. See
Matter of C-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. at 743–44 (citation omitted).

    The respondent refers to our decision in Matter of C-G-T- and asserts that
the social and psychological circumstances in which she was raised were so
repressive and coercive that reporting her harm would have been futile and
subjected her to additional harm. She further argues that our prior decision
failed to recognize the impact that the sexual abuse she suffered as a youth
and her upbringing in a “strict Muslim household” had on her ability to seek
assistance from the authorities in Russia.

    In Matter of C-G-T-, we addressed the circumstances of a respondent who
was abused by his father as a child and acknowledged that it may be futile or
dangerous for a child who is being abused by a relative to report this harm to
authorities. 28 I&N Dec. at 743–44. We noted that due to their age, children,
particularly young children, might be unable to recognize mistreatment as
abuse, articulate their fear, or seek help from governmental authorities. 

Further, we recognized that children under the control of their abuser could
be prevented from contacting the authorities. Id. at 743. Therefore, we
concluded that the personal circumstances of a child respondent are relevant
to the factual determination regarding the child’s ability to seek protection
from the authorities in his or her country. See id. at 744.

   The flaw in the respondent’s argument is that our decision in Matter of
C-G-T- outlines the unique barriers children, especially young children, may
have in attempting to report harm to authorities. Such unique barriers to
reporting harm faced by children do not apply to adults, including adults who
suffered harm as children.

    While the respondent began experiencing harm at the hands of her family
as a child, this harm continued well into adulthood and the respondent still
failed to report it to the authorities. As an adult the respondent traveled to
different cities far away from her family, and at times lived outside of her
family’s control, yet she never sought assistance or protection from the police
or other authorities. Although the respondent argues that her family
maintains connections with the police in her town such that reporting her
harm would have been futile or dangerous, the respondent’s status as an
adult, her ability to travel apart from her family, and her ability to
communicate, all demonstrate that the respondent could have requested
assistance from the authorities in her country.

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    Without any citation to the record, the respondent also argues that “record
evidence” contradicts our conclusion that her conversion to Russian
Orthodox Christianity makes police protection more likely. However, the
respondent’s conversion makes her a member of the country’s majority
religion, and the record reflects that the Russian Orthodox Church maintains
a privileged status in Russia and works closely with the Russian Government.
Given these facts, the respondent has not established that her family
members, who practice Islam, would be able to meaningfully influence the
Russian authorities.

    Nor has the respondent established that the Russian Government would
be unable or unwilling to protect her from those who would seek to harm her
for converting to Russian Orthodox Christianity. See Mejia-Alvarenga v.
Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2024) (“To prove that a government is
unable or unwilling to protect against private persecution, an applicant for
asylum ‘must show that the government condoned the private violence “or at
least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the [applicant.]”’”
(citation omitted)). While the respondent presents documentary evidence of
violence faced by women in certain areas of Russia at the hands of their
Muslim families and evidence suggesting that these women are often
returned to their families by the local authorities, this evidence does not
address interfaith violence or whether the Russian Government would protect
a convert to Russian Orthodox Christianity from harm committed by Muslim
family members. Overall, the Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding that
the Russian Government would be unable or unwilling to protect the
respondent from the family members she fears. See Matter of C-G-T-,

 (“A mere ‘subjective belief’ that reporting would be
futile is not sufficient to establish that a government is unable or unwilling
to provide protection.” (citation omitted)); see also Sanchez-Amador v.
Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding that the respondent’s
subjective belief that it was futile to report crime to authorities paired with
general evidence of ineffectiveness is insufficient to establish that the
government was unable or unwilling to protect her).

    The Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent cannot avoid future
persecution by relocating within Russia is also not supported by the
evidentiary record and thus clearly erroneous. See Matter of F-R-A-, 

 (BIA 2022) (stating that the Board reviews for clear error the
Immigration Judge’s factual finding that an alien can avoid harm by
relocating); Matter of D-I-M-, 

 (BIA 2008) (remanding
to the Immigration Judge to determine relocation because of the Board’s
limited fact-finding abilities); see also 

(b)(2)(ii) (2020)
(stating that an applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if
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he or she could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of his or her
country, if under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect him
or her to do so). Where, as here, a respondent fears harm at the hands of
private actors, he or she bears the burden of establishing that it would not be
reasonable to relocate. 

(b)(3)(i). In determining that the
respondent could not internally relocate, the Immigration Judge relied on a
single article to find that the respondent would have to register her address
wherever she moved and that her family could and would employ a variety
of methods including filing a false police report with the assistance of
Russian authorities to locate the respondent.

    We acknowledge the respondent’s assertion that she attempted to relocate
on one occasion in the past and was located by her family. However, given
the size of Russia, the respondent’s membership in the country’s majority
religion, and the insufficient evidence demonstrating her family maintains an
interest in locating her more than 2 years after they last threatened her, the
Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent could not reasonably
relocate to avoid persecution is clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 

 (1985) (“[A] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” (citation omitted)).

    Because the respondent has not established that the Russian Government
was or would be unable or unwilling to protect her and that internal relocation
would be unreasonable, she is ineligible for asylum. See Mejia-Alvarenga,

; 

(b)(2)(ii). It necessarily follows that she
cannot establish eligibility for withholding of removal, which likewise
requires a showing that the government is unable or unwilling to protect her
and that she cannot internally relocate. See Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr,

, 228–29 (5th Cir. 2019); 

(b)(2) (2026). As
these findings are dispositive, we do not reach any remaining arguments
pertaining to the respondent’s applications for asylum and withholding of
removal. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 

 (1976) (“As a general
rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

   The respondent also asks that we reconsider our decision regarding her
application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), 2
2
   The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 

(c)(2); 

(a)
(2020).
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claiming we ignored relevant facts related to her fear of torture and that
remand is necessary. We are not persuaded that remand is necessary because
the record evidence cannot establish that it is more likely than not the
respondent will be tortured upon removal to Russia by, at the instigation of,
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.                See

(c)(2); 

(a)(1) (2020); see also
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 

 (1982) (holding that remand
is not necessary where “the record permits only one resolution of a factual
issue”); Ball v. LeBlanc, 

 (5th Cir. 2015) (same).

    The record reflects that the respondent has not demonstrated an inability
to relocate within Russia to avoid future harm by her family. The availability
of internal relocation is relevant and weighs against a grant of protection. See

(c)(3)(ii) (“[A]ll evidence relevant to the possibility of
future torture shall be considered, including . . . [e]vidence that the applicant
could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely
to be tortured.”); see also Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 

(9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that “the reasonableness of a relocation is not
relevant to a CAT claim, where the agency considers only whether safe
relocation is possible, not whether it is reasonable (or comfortable or
convenient),” and that the respondent bears the overall burden of proof to
show he or she will more likely than not experience torture).

    Additionally, as the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the
authorities would be unwilling or unable to protect her from the family
members she fears, the respondent has consequently failed to demonstrate
that a public official acting in an official capacity would acquiesce to her
torture by these family members. See Matter of O-A-R-G-, 

 (BIA 2025) (“Acquiescence in the CAT context requires a greater degree
of governmental complicity than is required to establish a government is
unable or unwilling to protect a respondent in the asylum context.”). Thus,
the respondent cannot establish her eligibility for protection under the CAT.
Accordingly, although we will grant the respondent’s motion to reconsider,
we will once again sustain DHS’ appeal.

   ORDER: The respondent’s motion to reconsider is granted.
   FURTHER ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
   FURTHER ORDER:                    The previously issued stay of removal is
vacated.


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   FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s decision granting
asylum, dated March 14, 2025, is vacated, and the respondent is ordered
removed from the United States to Russia.

   NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 

(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 

(A) (2024).




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