CHOC-TUT

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                 Interim Decision #4092




                Matter of Felipe CHOC-TUT, Respondent
                      Decided by Board February 25, 2025 1
                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

  While an Immigration Judge may consider a State court’s decision as to dangerousness
and the amount of bail that was set in criminal proceedings, an Immigration Judge does not
owe a State court custody order deference in immigration bond proceedings.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Niki I. Saleh, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Scott Jebson, Assistant Chief
Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge,
GOODWIN and CLARK, Appellate Immigration Judges.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:


   The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals from the
Immigration Judge’s bond order dated July 23, 2024, granting the
respondent’s request for a change in custody status and releasing him from
custody upon payment of a $4,000 bond. The Immigration Judge issued a
bond memorandum explaining her bond decision on September 22, 2024.
The respondent opposes DHS’s appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

    At the time of the Immigration Judge’s custody determination, the
respondent had multiple pending criminal charges. He was arrested on
April 14, 2024, for having no driver’s license or insurance after being
involved in an accident. He was subsequently arrested on May 2, 2024, for
driving without a license and careless driving. At the time of his arrest, he
had a blood alcohol content of .201. Finally, he was arrested on May 20,
2024, for careless driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, open
alcohol beverage container in a motor vehicle, and no driver’s license. At
the time of this arrest, he had a blood alcohol content of .214. The respondent

1
   Pursuant to Order No. 6254-2025, dated May 2, 2025, the Attorney General designated
the Board’s decision in Matter of Choc-Tut (BIA Feb. 25, 2025), as precedent in all
proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 

(g)(3) (2025).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.

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 (BIA 2025)                         Interim Decision #4092




invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding the
pending charges, but counsel stated that the respondent began drinking after
he lost contact with his son when his former partner became engaged to
another man. The respondent testified that he did not intend to drink alcohol
and drive in the future and that he would rely on his family for rides. On
appeal, the respondent indicated that subsequent to the Immigration Judge’s
decision, he pleaded guilty to: (1) Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the
Influence of Alcohol under section 189A.010(5A) of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes and (2) one count of No Operators/Moped License under section
186.410(1) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The remaining charges were
dismissed.

    The Immigration Judge found the respondent credible and found that he
established he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk based on
his testimony and the documentation in the record. The Immigration Judge
explained that following the respondent’s third arrest, the criminal court set
a $1,000 bail, which was later reduced to $500, and did not indicate that the
respondent was a danger to the community, despite his two prior arrests in
April and May 2024. The Immigration Judge stated that “[h]ad the state court
found Respondent to be a danger to the community, [in light of] his two prior
arrests in April and May 2024, the state court could have denied bail.” On
appeal, DHS argues that the Immigration Judge erred in concluding that the
respondent met his burden of establishing that he does not present a danger
to the community. We review the Immigration Judge’s discretionary
determination de novo. 

(d)(3)(ii) (2025).

    At a bond hearing conducted pursuant to section 236(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 

(a) (2018), the
burden of proof is on the respondent to demonstrate “to the satisfaction” of
the Immigration Judge and the Board that his “release would not pose a
danger to property or persons,” and that the respondent is likely to appear for
any future proceeding. 

(c)(8) (2025); accord Matter of
Adeniji, 

 (BIA 1999); see also Matter of Urena,

 (BIA 2009) (“Dangerous aliens are properly detained
without bond.”); Matter of Guerra, 

 (BIA 2006). An
Immigration Judge has broad discretion to consider any matter he or she
deems relevant when determining whether an alien’s release on bond is
permissible or advisable. See Matter of Guerra, 

. A
custody redetermination that has a “reasonable foundation” will not be
disturbed on appeal. 

 at 39–40. Section 236(a) of the INA, 

(a), does not give detained aliens any right to release on bond.
Matter of D-J-, 

 (A.G. 2003). Rather, it “merely gives
the [Immigration Judge] the authority to grant bond if he [or she] concludes,
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 (BIA 2025)                         Interim Decision #4092




in the exercise of broad discretion, that the alien’s release on bond is
warranted.” 

 (emphasis omitted).

    We reverse the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent
met his burden to show that he is not a danger to the community. Driving
under the influence represents a grave danger to the community and is a
significant adverse consideration in bond proceedings. Matter of Siniauskas,

 (BIA 2018); see also Begay v. United States,

, 141–42 (2008) (recognizing that “[d]runk driving is an
extremely dangerous crime” which creates a serious potential risk of physical
injury to others), abrogated on other grounds, Johnson v. United States,

 (2015).

    The respondent’s repeated arrests for traffic offenses while under the
influence, including a second arrest just 18 days after his first arrest for
similar behavior, indicates a strong disregard for public safety. See
Portillo-Rendon v. Holder, 

 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that
the alien exhibited a “disdain for the rules that govern the use of automobiles”
and that “[d]riving while intoxicated or without a license reflects both
indifference to the welfare of other drivers and pedestrians and defiance of
known legal obligations”).

    The Immigration Judge appears to have relied to a significant degree on
the fact that the State court did not find the respondent to be a danger and
ultimately set a low bond of $500. While an Immigration Judge may consider
a State court’s decision as to dangerousness and the amount of bail that was
set in criminal proceedings, an Immigration Judge does not owe a State court
custody order deference in immigration bond proceedings. The legal
standards for bail in State court may be different than in Immigration Court
and there may be a variety of reasons why an Immigration Judge may or
should reach a different determination than a State court judge. It is for the
Immigration Judge to make his or her own determination as to dangerousness
under the custody redetermination provisions of the INA and applicable
precedent. See Matter of Panin, 

 (BIA 2024) (“[A]
respondent’s release from Federal pretrial criminal custody does not preclude
an Immigration Judge from denying a respondent’s request for release from
immigration detention under section 236(a) of the INA, 

(a).”).

   In this case, we do not agree with the Immigration Judge’s bond
determination. Considering the repeated and serious nature of the
respondent’s actions, including a driving under the influence arrest just
18 days after a prior arrest for similar behavior, we conclude that the
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 (BIA 2025)                       Interim Decision #4092




Immigration Judge’s decision releasing the respondent on bond does not
have a “reasonable foundation.” Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 39–40;
see also Matter of Siniauskas, 27 I&N Dec. at 208–10. Under these
circumstances, we are unpersuaded that the respondent has met his burden to
show that he is not a danger to the community. See Matter of Guerra, 

. Therefore, his release on bond is not appropriate. See Matter of
Urena, 

 (holding that only if an alien has established that
he would not pose a danger to property or persons should an Immigration
Judge decide the amount of bond necessary to ensure the alien’s presence at
proceedings to remove him from the United States).

   ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.

   FURTHER ORDER:                 The Immigration Judge’s custody
redetermination is vacated, and the respondent is ordered detained without
bond.




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