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29 N.C. App. 14

222 S.E.2d 747

Simpson v. Simpson

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Decided March 17, 1976

Court of Appeals of North Carolina · decided 1976-03-17

Relies on Peele v. Finch · 28 N.C. App. 178 - Stoney v. MacDougall

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1976-03-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently January 1991

6 state decisions

20197619801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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MARTIN, Judge.

¶1 The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that adopted children of the petitioners, Nic-h'olas Carroll Simpson and Julian Edward Simpson, are devisees under the will of L. E. Newsom fully and to the same extent as are the natural-born children, Mary Emma Simpson and Virginia Ann Simpson.

¶2 G.S. 48-23 provides, in pertinent part:

“The following legal effects shall result from the entry of every final order of adoption:
(1) The final order forthwith shall establish the relationship of parent and child between the petitioners and child, and from the date of the signing of the final order of adoption, the child shall be entitled to inherit real and personal property by, through, and from the adoptive parents in accordance with the statutes relating to intestate succession. An adopted child shall have the same legal status, including all legal rights and obligations of any kind whatsoever, as he would have had if he were born the legitimate child of the adoptive parent or parents at the date of the signing of the final order of adoption, except that the age of the child shall be computed from the date of his actual birth.
(3) From and after the entry of the final order of adoption, the words ‘child,’ ‘grandchild,’ ‘heir,’ ‘issue,’ ‘descend-ente or an equivalent, or the plural forms thereof, or any other word of like import in any deed, grant, will or other written instrument shall be held to include any adopted person, unless the contrary plainly appears by the terms *17 thereof, whether such instrument was executed before or after the entry of the final order of adoption and whether such instrument was executed before or after the enactment of this section.”

¶3 The express provisions of paragraph (3) of the statute state that in a will the word “child” shall be construed to include any adopted person unless the contrary plainly appears by the terms of the will itself. This rule of construction shall apply whether the will was executed before or after the final order of adoption and whether the will was executed before or after the enactment of the statute. Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 200 S.E. 2d 635 (1973) ; Stoney v. MacDougall, 28 N.C. App. 178, 220 S.E. 2d 368 (1975).

¶4 We find nothing in the devise made by the will of L. E. Newsom to indicate an intention to exclude adopted children.

¶5 For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is

¶6 Affirmed.

Judges Britt and Hedrick concur.
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