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29 Ohio St. 261

Smith v. Lynch

Ohio Supreme Court

Decided December 15, 1876

Ohio Supreme Court · decided 1876-12-15

<p>The council of a village passed an ordinance establishing a board of health in the village, and regularly appointed members of the board, who qualified and.' acted as such. But th^ ordinance establishing the board was not read three times, nor were the yeas and nays suspending the rule requiring it to be so read recorded, as prescribed by law. The members so appointed entered upon and discharged the duties of the appointment, and were accepted and regarded by the public as such beard — Held: That they were such board defacto, and that their acts as such board, within the sphere of their office, are valid and binding.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1876-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently April 1967

6 state decisions

201876188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Welch, C. J.

¶1The questions argued by counsel are: 1. Had the superior court jurisdiction ? 2. Are the requirements of the statute as to the manner of passing the ordinance mandatory, or are they merely directory? 3. If these requirements are mandatory, are the persons so acting to be regarded as a board health defacto ? We are satisfied that the last named of these questions must be answered in the affirmative. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the first and second questions. In other words, we think that, under the circumstances, the board is to be regarded as a board de -facto. Whether it was a board de jure, and whether the superior court had jurisdiction of the case, become, therefore, immaterial questions. It is claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff that this is not a case where an office has been filled, and its duties performed, by parties not legally appointed or qualified, but a case where there was no office to he filled. We do not so understand the law. The statute (66 Ohio L. 200) creates the office. It authorizes the council to “establish” the board, and to fill it by appointment. True, until the council act in the premises, it is a mere potentiality in their hands; yet it is none the less an office, known to the law,.and provided for by law. Where the council assume to establish the board *263under the law, and to appoint its members, there is no good reason why an irregularity or illegality in the act of establishing the office, any more than an irregularity or illegality in the appointment of the officers, should be.held as rendering the acts of the officers void, and themselves mere trespassers. The reasons — the considerations of public policy — which exist in one case exi&t equally in the other. It is enough that the office is one provided for by law, and that the parties have the color of appointment, assume to be and act as such officers, and that they are accepted aird acknowledged by the public as such to the exclusion of all others. Such was the case here. There was both the color and the fact of office.

¶2 Motion overruled.

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