29 Va. App. 759 - Ingram v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Our consideration in Ingram of the six other Hudson factors is similarly applicable to the statute’s sixty-day suspension period: First, the [sixty-day] administrative suspension does not involve an affirmative restraint, for it is “certainly nothing approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104[, 118 S.Ct. at 496 ] (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 [ 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 ] (1960)). “If occupational debarment from the banking industry [in Hudson] cannot be considered an affirmative disability or restraint, then quite obviously the temporary suspension of [one’s] driving privilege also cannot be so considered.” Lomas, 955 P.2d at 681 . Second, drivers’ license suspensions historically have not been considered punishment in Virginia. See, e.g., Brame, 252 Va. at 130-31, 476 S.E.2d at 181-82 . The “ ‘revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted’ ” is an act which “ ‘is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.’ ” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 [, 118 S.Ct. at 496 ] (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 , 399 & n. 2 [ 58 S.Ct. 630 , 633 & n. 2, 82 L.Ed. 917 ] (1938)); see also Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 414 , 4 S.E.2d 762, 767 (1939) (“The operation of a motor vehicle ... is a conditional privilege, which may be suspended or revoked under the police power.... [It] is not a contract or property right in a constitutional sense.”). Third, the administrative license suspension does not come into”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 50 Va. App. 454 - Depsky v. Commonwealth

2. “If a breath test is taken pursuant to [Code] § 18.2-268.2 or any similar ordinance and ... the results show a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of breath ... and ... upon issuance of a warrant by the magistrate, for a violation of ... [Code] § 18.2-266 ..., the person’s license shall be suspended immediately or in the case of ... a person whose driver’s license is from a jurisdiction other than the Commonwealth, such person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth shall be suspended immediately. The period of suspension of the person’s license or privilege to drive shall be seven days, unless the ... warrant issued charges the person with a second or subsequent offense. If the person is charged with a second offense the suspension shall be for 60 days.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 50 Va. App. 454 - Depsky v. Commonwealth

3. “Any person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended under subsection A may, during the period of the suspension, request the general district court ... to review that suspension.... If the person proves to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the arresting officer did not have probable cause for the arrest, that the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue the warrant, or that there was not probable cause for issuance of the petition, the court shall rescind the suspension .... Otherwise the court shall affirm the suspension.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 31 Va. App. 714 - Easter v. Commonwealth