Volume 290 — Minnesota Reports

<bold>Highway traffic regulation — order suspending license of</bold> <bold>accident-involved, uninsured motorist — constitutionality of</bold> <bold>statute — basis for order</bold>. <block_quote> The Safety Responsibility Act, Minn. St. c. 170, which by its terms authorizes the commissioner of public safety to suspend the license of an accident-involved, uninsured motorist who does not make a deposit of security in an amount necessary to satisfy any judgment that might thereafter be entered against the motorist — an administrative determination to be made upon reports to the commissioner without a presuspension hearing, but subject to postsuspension judicial review — is not unconstitutional as a denial of administrative due process. Although the statute does not require<page_number>Page 89</page_number> that the administrative order be based upon an evidentiary showing sufficient to support a judgment, it does require an administrative record more substantial than that compiled in the instant case.</block_quote>

<bold>Criminal law — postconviction proceeding — improper</bold> <bold>determination of voluntariness of confession</bold>. <block_quote> 1. In postconviction proceedings where it appeared that in 1945 prosecution of defendant charged with murder the jury was instructed that "[t]he weight to be given to the confession as admitted in this case is for you the jury to determine," such instruction was inadequate to meet the requirements of Jackson<page_number>Page 106</page_number> v. Denno, <cross_reference>378 U.S. 368</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>84 S.Ct. 1774</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>12 L. ed. 2d 908</cross_reference>, which holds that to commit the determination of the voluntariness of a confession solely to the same jury that decides guilt is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the procedures used to determine voluntariness be reliable.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same — showing necessary for relief</bold>. <block_quote> 2. In postconviction procedures defendant is not entitled to relief merely on the basis of bald or unsupported assertions of prejudice. The right to relief on the issue of voluntariness of a confession must rest upon something more than an assertion that there has been some procedural shortcoming. It is necessary to show that there are substantial facts in dispute and that petitioner's version of the events, if true, would require the conclusion that his confession was involuntarily given.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — claimed error in admission of confession —</bold> <bold>record required for appellate review</bold>. <block_quote> 3. In postconviction hearing on admissibility of confessions the trial court is obliged to prepare a record so that the merits of the petition may be fairly reviewed on appeal.</block_quote>

<bold>Negligence — proximate cause — burden of proof</bold>. <block_quote> 1. The burden rests upon plaintiffs to establish primary negligence of defendant which was the proximate cause of the injury for which plaintiffs seek recovery.</block_quote><page_number>Page 150</page_number> <bold>Same — same — sufficiency of evidence</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it was nevertheless insufficient to justify the jury's finding defendant negligent and this negligence to be the proximate cause of the accident and the minor plaintiff's injuries.</block_quote>

<bold>Damages — adequacy — compromise verdict — new trial</bold>. <block_quote> Although granting or refusing a new trial for inadequate or excessive damages rests almost wholly within the discretion of the trial court, a new trial will be ordered where the record establishes that the damages awarded were a compromise between plaintiff's right to recover for the aggravation, caused by defendant's negligence, of plaintiff's preexisting back disability and the proved damages he sustained.</block_quote>

<bold>Statute — statute permitting revocation of a driver's license</bold> <bold>conflict with statute forbidding revocation for conviction by</bold> <bold>court of ordinance violation in Hennepin County</bold>. <block_quote> A conviction by the court without a jury and upon stipulated facts for careless driving under an ordinance of the city of Minneapolis does not permit the Department of Public Safety to revoke<page_number>Page 246</page_number> the defendant's driver's license pursuant to Minn. St. <cross_reference>171.17</cross_reference>(6), even though it was the defendant's third conviction for careless driving or illegal speeding within a 12-month period.</block_quote>

<bold>Garnishment — unconstitutional statute — effect on</bold> <bold>garnishee's obligation to hold garnished funds</bold>. <block_quote> The unconstitutionality of Minn. St. 1967, § <cross_reference>571.41</cross_reference>, does not justify a garnishee's releasing funds to defendant where the defendant had had an opportunity to be heard and tender any defenses she might have had but failed to exercise it and permitted the action to go by default.</block_quote><page_number>Page 257</page_number>

<bold>Divorce — custody of child — right of mother</bold>. <block_quote> 1. In a custody dispute the natural mother should not be deprived of custody of her minor daughter as against the paternal grandparents unless grave reasons are shown for doing so or there is a clear showing that transfer of custody from the grandparents to the mother would not be in the best welfare and interest of the child.</block_quote> <bold>Appeal and error — review — custody dispute — need for</bold> <bold>showing basis for trial court's conclusion</bold>. <block_quote> 2. For meaningful appellate review in contested custody matters, the trial court should set forth with a high degree of particularity the basis for its conclusion.</block_quote>

<bold>Criminal law — robbery conviction — sufficiency of evidence</bold>. <block_quote> Since the findings of the trial court are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury in a criminal case, and the trial court could reasonably choose to believe the eyewitnesses' testimony which detailed conduct sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's participation as a principal in the crime of aggravated robbery, the conviction must be affirmed.</block_quote>

<bold>Pensions — policeman's pension — credit for military service</bold> <bold>— waiver of claim</bold>. <block_quote> In computing the time of service required for a pension, a policeman is not entitled to credit for military service performed after he could have secured a release from duty. Failure to request separation and return to his job constitutes an implied waiver of any claim for credit for military service thereafter performed.</block_quote>

<bold>Payment — check not paid and not delivered to endorsee —</bold> <bold>effect on obligation to endorsee</bold>. <block_quote> 1. A check which was not paid and never delivered to the endorsee does not constitute a payment to the endorsee.</block_quote><page_number>Page 466</page_number> <bold>Same — note payable to and converted by corporate officer —</bold> <bold>effect on obligation to corporation</bold>. <block_quote> 2. The note of a third party payable to an individual who is an officer of a corporation and who fraudulently converted the note to his own use does not constitute payment to the corporation.</block_quote> <bold>Receivers — claims filed against receivers for undetermined</bold> <bold>amount — accounting</bold>. <block_quote> 3. A claim for an undetermined amount filed in a receivership proceeding requires an accounting. Where an accounting shows that the claim of the receiver exceeds the claim of the claimant, the dismissal of the claim by the trial court is sustained by the evidence.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same — effect of obtaining unrelated judgment</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Reducing a note to judgment against a corporation which has no direct connection with the claims here involved did not constitute an election of remedies.</block_quote> <bold>Setoff — payment on debt to corporation fraudulently converted</bold> <bold>by corporate officer — assertion as setoff against receiver</bold> <bold>of corporation</bold>. <block_quote> 5. If a debtor corporation would have a right of setoff against a creditor corporation on an account to the extent of a payment which was made to an officer of the creditor corporation and which was fraudulently converted by such officer, a right of setoff cannot be asserted against the receiver of such corporation who represents the rights of creditors.</block_quote>

<bold>Divorce — custody of children — propriety of award</bold>.

<bold>Criminal law — postconviction proceeding — dental of relief</bold> <bold>— propriety</bold>.

<bold>Criminal law — conviction of selling liquor to minor —</bold> <bold>sufficiency of evidence</bold>.

<bold>Criminal law — conviction of aggravated forgery — sufficiency</bold> <bold>of evidence</bold>.