Hicklin v. Coney’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate · 6 district · 71 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 170 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Appellant insists that an undue burden is placed upon interstate commerce because the license fees are based on the ‘carrying capacity’ of the vehicles. The state court held that the fees ‘are collected, as provided for by section 8517, for the purpose of maintaining the public highways over which such motor vehicles shall operate, as compensation for their use.’ The statute provides for the segregation, for this purpose, of the moneys collected. See Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 , 555-557, 47 S.Ct. 702 , 71 L.Ed. 1199 . In this view the fees are not open to the objection raised in Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 , 186, 188, 51 S.Ct. 380 , 75 L.Ed. 953 . Carrying capacity, the size and weight of trucks, unquestionably have a direct relation to the wear and hazards of the highways. It is for this reason that the authority of the state to impose directly reasonable limitations on the weight and size of vehicles, although applicable to interstate carriers, has been sustained. Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135 , 143, 47 S.Ct. 548 , 71 L.Ed. 966 ; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 , 388, 389, 52 S.Ct. 581 , 76 L.Ed. 1167 . As the state may establish such regulations directly, the state may adjust its license fees, otherwise valid as being reasonable and exacted as compensation for the use of the .highways, according to carrying capacity in furtherance of the same purpose. Clark v. Poor, supra. ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. McCarroll · 163 Ind. App. 4 - Duff Truck Line, Inc. v. State

2. ““In sustaining the exemption, the District Court referred to the factual basis for the distinction. ‘The Legislature knew,’ said the court ‘that as a matter of fact farm products are transported to town by the farmer, or by a nonexempt “contract carrier” employed by him. The Legislature knew that as a matter of fact the use of the highways for the transportation of farm products by the owner is casual and infrequent and incidental; farmers use the highways to transport their products to market ordinarily but a few times a year. The Legislature rightly concluded that the use of the highways for carrying home his groceries in his own automobile is adequately compensated by the general tax imposed on all motor vehicles.’ 55 F.(2d) at page 352. And the court properly excluded from consideration mere hypothetical and fanciful illustrations of possible discriminations which had no basis in the actual experience to which the statute was addressed. The court found a practical difference between the case of the appellants ‘who operate fleets of trucks in the conduct of their business and who use the highways daily in the delivery of their products to their customers,’ and that of ‘a farmer who hauls his wheat or live stock to town once or twice a year.’ The Legislature in making its classification was entitled to consider frequency and character of use and to adapt its regulations to the classes of operations, which by reason of their habitual and constant mse of the highways brought ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Deppman v. Murray

3. “farmers or dairymen, hauling dairy or farm products; or lumber haulers engaged in transporting lumber or logs from the forests to the shipping points.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission