State v. Madigosky’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Crawford , the Supreme Court declined to spell out a comprehensive definition of testimonial .... Instead, the court defined a testimonial statement in general terms: A solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.... The court did note, however, three formulations of th[e] core class of testimonial statements ... [1] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially ... [2] extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions ... [and 3] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial ....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 186 Conn. App. 814 - State v. Patel

2. “Under Crawford v. Washington , [ 541 U.S. 36 , 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ], the hearsay statements of an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may be admitted under the sixth amendment's confrontation clause only if the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Hearsay statements that are nontestimonial in nature are not governed by the confrontation clause, and their admissibility is governed solely by the rules of evidence.... Thus, the threshold inquiry for purposes of the admissibility of such statements under the confrontation clause is whether they are testimonial in nature.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 186 Conn. App. 814 - State v. Patel

3. “The affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, otherwise known as the insanity defense, is codified in General Statutes § 53a-13.... This defense has both a cognitive and a volitional prong.... Under the cognitive prong [of the insanity defense], a person is considered legally insane if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity ... to appreciate the ... [wrongfulness] of his conduct.... Under the volitional prong, a person also would be considered legally insane if he lacks substantial capacity ... to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 172 Conn. App. 242 - Madigosky v. Commissioner of Correction