State v. Blocker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"An `overbroad' law, as that term has been developed by the United States Supreme Court, is not vague, or need not be. Its vice is not failure to communicate. Its vice may be clarity. For a law is overbroad to the extent that it announces a prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited. A legislature can make a law as `broad' and inclusive as it chooses unless it reaches into constitutionally protected ground. The clearer an `overbroad' statute is, the harder it is to confine it by interpretation within its constitutionally permissible reach."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 66 Or. App. 953 - State v. House · State v. Robertson

2. “"Thus defendant's attack on ORS 166.510 as `overbroad' impliedly asserted that it reached beyond permissible limits to impinge on a constitutionally protected right. This could only be the right to bear arms, although its source was not identified, as it should have been. The question is whether we should reject the attack for failure to cite its source. The fact is that we decided State v. Kessler, supra , after the present case had been tried and appealed. The case was held by the Court of Appeals for our disposition of Kessler . That court then decided it upon a correct interpretation of our decision in Kessler . The state's petition for review asked us to consider whether the Court of Appeals had misapplied our interpretation of § 27. "In these circumstances, we conclude that it is proper for us to consider defendant's `overbreadth' attack to mean that the statute swept so broadly as to infringe rights that it could not reach, which in this setting means the right to possess arms guaranteed by § 27." 291 Or. at 261, 630 P.2d 824 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 93 Or. App. 731 - City of Portland v. Ayers

3. “`Vagueness' means that a penal law is stated in terms from which those to whom it is addressed — potential defendants, prosecutors, courts, and jurors cannot discern what conduct the lawmaker did or did not mean to include in the prohibition. Such a failure of communication in penal laws has been held to contravene article I, section 21 of the Oregon Constitution because `they not only allow a court or a jury to define a crime but to do so after the fact,' Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 298 , 605 P.2d 273 (1980), citing State v. Blair, 287 Or. 519 , [521,] 601 P.2d 766 (1979); State v. Hodges, 254 Or. 21 , 457 P.2d 491 (1969). * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 66 Or. App. 953 - State v. House