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← 291 U.S. 205 - Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.

Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.’s Empirical Analysis

291 U.S. 205 · 1934

Citation profile

380
cited by 380 later decisions
40
cited 40 times by the Supreme Court
7
states following
February 2022
most recently cited

130 federal appellate · 39 district · 31 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 380 later decisions (40 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2022 · most notably Cannon v. University of Chicago (1979), Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson Ex Rel. Thompson (1986)

130 federal appellate · 39 district · 31 state decisions

6701934194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedChesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Moore (from Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby · Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton · Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin · Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. · St Louis Iron Mountain Southern Railway Company v. May Taylor W

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 380 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ * * * The Federal Safety Appliance Acts, while prescribing absolute duties, and thus creating correlative rights in favor of injured employees, did not attempt to lay down rules governing actions for enforcing these rights. The original act of 1893 made no provision for suits, except for penalties. That act did impliedly recognize the employee’s right of action by providing in section 8 [45 USCA § 7] that he should not be deemed to have assumed the risk of injury occasioned by the breach of duty. But the act made no provision as to the place of suit or the time within which it should be brought, or as to the right to recover, or as to those who should be the beneficiaries of recovery, in case of the death of the employee. While dealing with assumption of risk, the statute did not affect the defense of contributory negligence, and hence that defense was still available according to the applicable state law. * * * In these respects the amended act of 1903 made no change, notwithstanding the enlargement of the scope of the statutory requirements. The act of 1910, by a proviso in section 4 relating to penalties ( 36 Stat. 299 [45 USCA § 13]), provided that nothing in that section should ‘be construed to relieve such carrier from liability in any remedial action for the death or injury of any railroad employee’ caused by the use of the prohibited equipment. “The Safety Appliance Acts having prescribed the duty in this fashion, the right to recover damages sustained by the injure”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““In relation to injuries received in that state in intrastate commerce, aside from the particular bearing of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, the liability of respondent was determined by the laws of Kentncky. . . . Questions arising in actions in state courts to recover for injuries sustained by employees in intrastate commerce and relating to the scope or construction of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts are, of course, federal questions which may appropriately be reviewed in this court. . . . The Federal Safety Appliance Acts, while prescribing absolute duties, and thus creating correlative rights in favor of injured employees, did not attempt to lay down rules governing actions or enforcing these rights. . . . But the act made no provision as to the place of suit or the time within which it should be brought, or as to the right to recover, or as to those who should be beneficiaries of recovery, in case of the death of the employee. While dealing with assumption of risk, the statute did not affect the defense of contributory negligence and hence that defense was still available according to the applicable state law. [Citing the Schlemmer ( 220 U. S. 590 [31 Sup. Ct. 561, 55 L. Ed. 596 ]) and Popplar ( 237 U. S. 369 [35 Sup. Ct. 609, 59 L. Ed. 1000 ]) cases.] In these respects the amended act of 1903 made no change, . . . "The Safety Appliance Acts having prescribed the duty in this fashion, the right to recover damages sustained by the injured employee through the breach”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[I]t does not follow that a suit brought under the state statute which defines liability to employees who are injured while engaged in intrastate commerce, and brings within the purview of the statute a breach of the duty imposed by the federal statute, should be regarded as a suit arising under the laws of the United States and cognizable in the federal court in the absence of diversity of citizenship.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.